



CATHOLIC JUNIOR COLLEGE

JC2 Preliminary Examinations

Higher 2

HISTORY

9174/02

Paper 2 Developments in Southeast Asia (Independence - 2000)

16 September 2025
3 hours

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of **5** printed pages and **1** blank page.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

- 1** Read the sources and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

Economic cooperation among members produced some results, though not particularly impressive. Negotiations were conducted on trade, tariffs, quotas and also economic and technical cooperation with the European Community, the United States, Japan, Australia, and other countries, obtaining here and there some limited satisfaction but nothing earth shaking. However, within the organisation, intra-regional trade and industrial joint projects made little headway, because of exacerbated nationalism shown by technocrats laying the groundwork for their political superiors. Moreover, certain members on several occasions have displayed a bazaar rather than co-operative spirit by insisting on taking more than giving, as evidenced in the case of industrial joint ventures and a few others. Also, there is no common market in the making.

From an article by former Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, September 1988.

Source B

Still intra-ASEAN trade did not grow much. Because the coverage of the PTA was negotiated product by product, the tendency of members, true to the protectionist spirit and import-substitution policies of that time, was to include mostly items that were not likely to be extensively traded. The national exclusion lists were long. In any case, with a margin of preference of 50%, a PTA tariff would remain high if the most favoured nation tariff was set at a lofty level. Tariff rates were not brought down, those ASEAN products that were covered were only given 25-50% discount on high tariffs. At their 1991 meeting, the economic ministers observed that, while intra-ASEAN trade in items covered by the PTA had grown from \$121million in 1987 to \$576 million in 1989, it accounted for an insignificant part of intra-ASEAN trade.

From a book by a former ASEAN Secretary-General, 2006.

Source C

The cooperation undertaken under the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme (AIC) and ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) projects by the Indonesian private sector, which specialised in the production of automotive companies, was also of only peripheral importance to the national automotive industry. Indonesia already had a well-developed automotive import-substitution industry that was closely linked with large Japanese automotive companies, particularly with Toyota, and its products were absorbed by the protected domestic market. The establishment of the AIC and AIJV projects was, therefore, only a minor corollary to Indonesia's own existing automotive industry, which was mainly created to fulfil the obligation to participate in ASEAN industrial cooperation. ASEAN industrial cooperation has certainly not become a central element in Indonesia's national industrialisation programme.

From an academic book written by an Indonesian researcher, 1987.

Source D

In opening ceremony speeches at the Fourth ASEAN Summit, all six heads of government called for greater economic co-operation. They welcomed the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) as ways to increase the flow of investments to the region.

Indonesia's President Suharto called AFTA a milestone in ASEAN's economic co-operation, noting that the 'scheme will accelerate the flow of goods among ASEAN countries and enhance the economies of member-states.' Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong devoted a major part of his speech to the need for more economic cooperation among ASEAN members, saying that AFTA was necessary to meet the 'unstoppable' global trend towards economic co-operation within regions. Thailand's Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, who proposed the idea last year, said the summit had a historic opportunity to forge a larger and more cohesive Southeast Asia. President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines urged both governments and private sectors in ASEAN to turn the agreements into reality and decide the pace of their implementation.

*From a report on the Fourth ASEAN Summit published in a Singaporean newspaper,
28 January 1992.*

Source E

The continued improvement in the global economy and the trend towards economic reforms and trade liberalisation will enhance regional cooperation and strengthen ASEAN's international competitiveness. Similarly, the inclusion of Vietnam as ASEAN's seventh member country and the likelihood of further expansion in the near future will help ASEAN become a major regional economic power. ASEAN economic cooperation should prevail and prosper in the face of future challenges. ASEAN Ministers in charge of various economic sectors, including transport and finance, have planned to meet regularly to discuss and propose new cooperation activities and to examine obstacles to progress. The new schedule for bringing down tariffs among ASEAN countries to 0-5% by 2000 is already in place, having been effective since 1 January 1996.

From an ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting statement, April 1996.

Source F

Many of Asia's industries are way beyond the infant stage, but some still cling to protectionist tariffs like an overgrown child to a security blanket. Despite a recent agreement to accelerate ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)'s implementation, threats of delays lurk. Most disturbing is the call by the chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce: "Indonesia needs to pull back from AFTA because the current domestic economic situation has yet to be conducive for such a move."

The grouping needs concrete action toward AFTA to lure back foreign investors, which could help kick recovery into high gear. With that in mind, ministers have moved up their deadlines for eliminating import duties by five years. It is acknowledged that Indonesia remains open to AFTA, but that it needs to resolve its internal economic problems first. Nevertheless, if Jakarta hints at foot-dragging, it will tempt other members to follow suit. Already, Malaysia has said it will not carry out tariff cuts on cars.

From an American newspaper, 1999.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a)** Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources A and B on ASEAN economic cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s. [10]
- (b)** How far do Sources A-F show that ASEAN economic cooperation from 1967 to 2000 demonstrated the prioritisation of national interests over regional interests? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2 To what extent can the rise of authoritarian governments in independent Southeast Asia be attributed to the military elite? [30]

OR

- 3 To what extent was the appeal of Communism an obstacle to the governments' ability to consolidate power after independence? [30]

AND EITHER

- 4 "The way the governments prioritised economic aims was central to the economic transformation of independent Southeast Asian countries." How far do you agree with this statement? [30]

OR

- 5 How far did the independent Southeast Asian countries reduce their reliance on agriculture for economic development? [30]

Acknowledgements for Sources:

Source A - Khoman, Thanat. "Reminiscences." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 10, no. 2 (September 1988): 211–217.

Source B - Severino, Rodolfo C. *Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General*. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2006.

Source C - Solidum, Estrella D., and Seah, Chee Meow. *Decision-Making in an ASEAN Complementarity Scheme: The Automotive Industry*. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 1987.

Source D - "ASEAN Leaders Hail AFTA as Milestone in Regional Cooperation," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), January 28, 1992.

Source E - ASEAN Economic Ministers. 1996. *1996 Joint Press Statement of the 28th ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting*. Jakarta, 12 September 1996. Centre for International Law (NUS).

Source F - *The Washington Post*. "ASEAN Struggles to Speed Free-Trade Effort." July 25, 1999.

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Mark and Answer Schemes

Section A: Source-based Case Study

1a. Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources A and B on ASEAN economic cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s. [10]

Success Criteria

Criterion	Descriptor
#1a	Identify and explain a similarity in views between two sources, on a common basis of comparison and supported by source content.
#1b	Provide reason for similarity, using Sourcing and/or Contextualisation.
#2a	Identify and explain a difference in views between two sources, on a common basis of comparison and supported by source content.
#2b	Provide reason for difference, using Sourcing and/or Contextualisation.

A-Level Rubrics

Level	Level Description	Marks
0	No evidence submitted or answer does not address the question.	0
1	The answer will describe the content of each source and is likely to be characterized by paraphrasing or quotation. Very simple comparisons may be made, and these are not developed (e.g. that one source is a letter and the other is a speech). Answers that are simply based on contextual knowledge, with no source use, should be credited at this level. Towards the upper end of the level, there may be some attempt to explain the similarities and/or differences between the sources, but any explanation will be confused or partial.	1-3
2	The answer will use both sources. There will be clear explanations on the similarities and differences between the sources and this will be supported with source details. Answers which explain either similarities or differences between the sources but begin to provide insight into the reasons for the similarities or differences may be found in this level. Towards the lower end of the level, the answer may explain either similarities or differences between the sources. Alternatively, there may be a tendency to treat the sources separately with most or all of the comparison implicit.	4-6
3	The answer will make good use of both sources. There will be clear explanations on the similarities and differences between the sources and this will be supported with source details. The answer will demonstrate a sense of critical evaluation of the sources and provide some insight into the reasons for the similarities or differences. Alternatively, the insight into the reasons for similarities and differences may be uneven. Towards the lower end of the level, the answer, which explains either similarities or differences between the sources but demonstrates critical insight into the reasons for the similarities or differences, may also be found in this level.	7-8

Level	Level Description	Marks
4	The answer will make full comprehensive use of both sources. There will be clear explanations on the similarities and differences between the sources and this will be supported with source details. The answer will demonstrate a strong sense of critical evaluation of the sources throughout and provide critical insight into the reasons for their similarities and differences.	9-10

Suggested Answer

Success Criteria	Answer
#1a	Sources A and B are similar in showing that there has been limited progress in terms of ASEAN's economic cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s. Source A acknowledged that while "economic cooperation among members produced some results" this had not been "particularly impressive" given that there was "no common market in the making." This suggests that there has not been much progress in economic cooperation amongst ASEAN member states. Similarly, Source B suggests that "intra-ASEAN trade did not grow much," which indicates that there had not been substantial progress in cooperation.
#1b	The similarity in views is due to their shared historical context. Both sources reference ASEAN's initial efforts at economic cooperation from 1976 to 1991. By this point, ASEAN had introduced the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) in 1976 in order to create large-scale industrial projects but had ultimately failed as ASEAN members were unable to agree on the location of many projects. Furthermore, by 1977, ASEAN had introduced the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) in an attempt to increase intra-ASEAN trade. However, given that ASEAN members favoured their national interests over regional ones, the PTA was not particularly effective and economies in the region remained competitive rather than complementary. Several ASEAN members had also continued to exclude certain export items from the PTA list. As such, this common context explains why both sources demonstrate that there was limited progress in ASEAN's economic cooperation.
#2a	However, Sources A and B are different in showing the reasons behind the limited progress in ASEAN economic cooperation in this period. Source A suggests that there had been a lack of cooperation due to the prioritization of national interests over cooperation, highlighting a "bazaar rather than cooperative spirit," where members wanted to gain more than they give. However, Source B seems to suggest that the limited cooperation was due to institutional design flaws of the PTA, suggesting that the PTA had a narrow scope which had been "negotiated item-by-item" and often "covering products with little trade potential."
#2b	The difference in views is due to the differing purposes of the two sources. Source A was written in 1988 by Thanat Khoman, a former Thai Foreign Minister and one of ASEAN's founding figures, reflecting on ASEAN's progress while it was still in its early decades. His purpose was to offer a frank yet tactful critique of ASEAN's economic cooperation, identifying political obstacles such as nationalism and self-interest, in order to encourage greater political will among members. In contrast, Source B was written in 2006 by a former ASEAN Secretary-General for a retrospective account of ASEAN's history. With the benefit of hindsight and access to trade data, he was probably trying to provide a detailed, technical analysis of why intra-ASEAN trade remained limited, focusing on structural flaws in the PTA's design and the prevailing protectionist policies of the time. Thus, while both sources acknowledge limited progress, Source A emphasises political mindsets and behaviour as the main impediments, whereas Source B stresses institutional and policy constraints.

1b. How far do Sources A-F show that ASEAN economic cooperation from 1967 to 2000 demonstrated the prioritisation of national interests over regional interests? [30]

Success Criteria

Criterion	Descriptor
#1	Unpack the given assertion. Identify possible arguments for and against it.
#2	Interpret, analyse, and group the sources according to their claims with respect to the given assertion.
#3	Evaluate the reliability/usefulness of each set of sources as evidence vis-a-vis the given assertion.
#4	Either... Conclude which set of sources is preferred and how far the assertion can be supported. Or... Modify the assertion to better reflect the evidence

A-Level Rubrics

Level	Level Description	Marks
0	No evidence submitted or answer does not address the question.	0
1	The answer will make limited use of the sources. The sources may be paraphrased or described. Answers which are simply based on contextual knowledge with no source use should be credited at this level. Towards the upper end of the level, some relevant information from the sources may be extracted at face value to support and/or challenge the hypothesis, but the answer may be undeveloped.	1-4
2	The answer will use relevant information from sources at face value to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. Sources may be used in isolation. The answer may demonstrate some awareness of provenance of the sources but evaluation of the sources is unlikely. Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will be balanced, using most of the sources. There may be some attempt at evaluation that is unsuccessful. Towards the lower end of the level, the answer may be one-sided or use a limited range of sources.	5-10
3	The answer will begin to treat sources as a set. It will demonstrate some understanding of the question. Some sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. There will be an attempt to evaluate sources, but the sources will not be placed in context. Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will make a case to support and challenge the statement in question, developing its points through accurate references to the source content and/or provenance. Such an answer is likely to use all of the sources and may make cross-references to support its ideas. Towards the lower end of the level, some sources may be neglected or used in a way which is not valid. The support/challenge element of the responses may also be uneven.	11-15
4	The answer will treat sources as a set and make good use of the sources. It will demonstrate a clear understanding of the question. Sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. There will be an attempt to evaluate the sources in context but there will be gaps, unevenness and a lack of balance.	16-20

	Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will be more even in evaluating sources in context, to support and challenge the hypothesis. Towards the lower end of the level, the answer will contain some evaluation of the source material but is likely to be uneven or lacking in balance.	
5	The answer will treat sources as a set and make very good use of the sources. It will demonstrate a good understanding of the question. Sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. The answer will demonstrate a critical evaluation of the sources in context, to support and challenge the hypothesis (that is, balanced). Towards the upper end of the level, the answer may begin to formulate a judgement in relation to the question although this is likely to be partial and incomplete.	21-25
6	The answer will treat sources as a set and make excellent use of the sources. It will demonstrate a very good understanding of the question. The answer will demonstrate a critical evaluation of the sources in context to support and challenge the hypothesis (that is, balanced). It may question how far a conclusion can be reached using the evidence in the sources. It will either explain fully why evidence to challenge or to support the hypothesis is better/preferred or justify an amended/alternative historical interpretation where appropriate. For L6, the L5 answer must also be secure. Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will present a sustained analytical argument and reach a supported conclusion. Towards the lower end of the level, the answer will demonstrate many of these features but may be less convincing in its approach.	26-30

Suggested Answer

Success Criteria	Answer
#1	The assertion implies that ASEAN economic cooperation from 1967 to 2000 was limited given that nations had often placed their own interests over regional economic cooperation. Sources A, B, C, and F support the assertion by highlighting that Southeast Asian countries had prioritized their national interests via protectionist policies, long exclusion lists, limited participation in industrial joint ventures, and delayed tariff reductions due to domestic economic concerns. In contrast, Sources D and E challenge the assertion by emphasising that ASEAN member states had prioritised regional interests by making a clear commitment to strengthening regional economic competitiveness and integration.
#2	Sources A, B, C, and F emphasise the significant role of national interests in constraining ASEAN economic cooperation. Source A highlights that Southeast Asian states had prioritized their individual national interests, noting that intra-regional trade and industrial joint projects made little progress due to “exacerbated nationalism shown by technocrats laying the groundwork for their political superiors” and members displaying a “bazaar rather than co-operative spirit.” Source B reinforces this by revealing structural protectionism, with “long national exclusion lists” and marginal tariff preferences under the PTA, pointing out that intra-ASEAN trade “accounted for an insignificant part of intra-ASEAN trade” despite formal agreements. The limited scope of regional industrial projects is further shown in Source C, which notes that Indonesia’s participation in the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme and Industrial Joint Ventures was “only a minor corollary to Indonesia’s own existing automotive industry,” illustrating how domestic priorities overshadowed regional cooperation. Similarly, Source F demonstrates how domestic economic concerns could override regional commitments even after the implementation of AFTA, as Indonesia and Malaysia delayed tariff reductions under AFTA because the “current domestic economic situation has yet to be conducive for such a move.” Together, these sources show ASEAN member states had prioritized their national interests over regional interests of

Success Criteria	Answer
	cooperation, given their protectionist policies, domestic industrial strategies and focus on economic self-interest.
#3	These sources provide relatively compelling evidence that ASEAN nations had often prioritized national interests over regional ones. Sources A and B were written with reference to a similar context, where ASEAN had been struggling with making progress on economic cooperation. ASEAN had made initial commitments to economic cooperation in 1977 through the establishment of the ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) which was introduced to increase intra-ASEAN trade through a number of measures, including exchanging tariff preferences and preferential terms for financing imports. That said, several ASEAN members excluded certain export items from the PTA list and the margin of preference for tariffs was low, hovering around 10%. Some ASEAN countries even offered items such as snow ploughs and nuclear reactors that were not manufactured or traded in the region. ASEAN countries also focused on trade with their own major trading partners including the US and Japan. In this context, Source A, which is an extract from an article by Former Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman in September 1988, was perhaps reflecting on the lack of progress in the context of little growth in intra-regional trade and joint industrial projects. Source B, which was an extract from a book by the former ASEAN Secretary General was published in 2006 but was commenting on the situation regarding the PTA leading up to 1991. Given that both Thanat Khoman and the ASEAN Secretary General were privy to the discussions and attempts at economic cooperation, both Sources A and B provide reliable and compelling evidence about the state of economic cooperation in this context. Within the same set, Source C is from an academic book written by an Indonesian researcher in 1994 but making references to the AIC which was implemented in 1981 and the AIJC which was introduced in 1982. When these initiatives were introduced, Indonesia had been engaged in import-substitution industrialization and wanted to protect its own industries by having higher tariffs for these industries' products and thus resisted opening up its market. As such, Source C also reliably demonstrates that national interests had been prioritized over regional interests. When used together with Source F, it becomes clear that Indonesia's prioritization of its own national interests had continued even till 1999. Source F, which is from an American newspaper in 1999, was published after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997, and after ASEAN had made some headway through the introduction of AFTA. When cross referenced to Source D, it is clear that AFTA was agreed upon by the leaders of many Southeast Asian governments, including Suharto as a "milestone in ASEAN's economic cooperation." Similarly, when cross referenced to Source E, clear frameworks such as tariff reductions to "0-5% by 2000" had already been in place. That said, even though the introduction of AFTA represented an improvement in economic cooperation, due to key conditions such as declaration of all AFTA exclusions, and increasing the rate of elimination of non-tariff barriers, the Asian Financial Crisis continued to reveal countries' prioritization of its own interests. In this context, Indonesia had been one of the countries that had been hit hardest by the AFC; and Malaysia had faced similar economic setbacks, including a contraction of 7.5% in its economy in 1998. As such, both Indonesia and Malaysia had exhibited reluctance to fully commit to AFTA. Hence, Source F is reliable in demonstrating that despite headway made in improving cooperation through AFTA, national interests had once again been prioritized over regional interests. As such, as a set, the support sources demonstrate reliably that national interests had often been prioritized over regional ones in ASEAN's efforts at economic cooperation.
#2	On the other hand, Sources D and E highlight the importance of regional and cooperative initiatives in advancing ASEAN economic integration, challenging the view that national interests were prioritized over regional interests. Source D reveals the strong political commitment of member states to regional cooperation, showing that the various Southeast Asian leaders welcomed the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) and AFTA, with Suharto calling it a "milestone in ASEAN's economic co-operation" and Goh Chok Tong emphasising that "AFTA was necessary to meet the 'unstoppable' global trend towards economic co-operation within regions." In the same source, other leaders such as Thailand's Anand Panyarachun and the Philippines' Corazon Aquino urged governments and private sectors to "turn the agreements into reality," indicating a collective effort to prioritise regional benefits. Similarly, Source E outlines concrete institutional measures, including scheduled "tariff reductions to 0–5%" and the "inclusion of Vietnam as a member", highlighting structured plans to strengthen regional

Success Criteria	Answer
	economic competitiveness. As a set, these sources suggest ASEAN member states seemed to be prioritizing regional interests through formal agreements and political commitment in advancing ASEAN economic cooperation.
#3	Source D is from a newspaper report on the fourth ASEAN Summit on 28 January 1992. During this summit, the Southeast Asian nations had the objective of moving towards a higher plane of economic cooperation, and as stated in the Singapore Declaration of 1992, created the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). AFTA was meant to liberalize trade in Southeast Asia through increasing intra-ASEAN trade and promote the region's competitive advantage as a single production unit. The key instrument for trade liberalisation was the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), which was meant to ensure that all countries would grant a preferential tariff for a particular product once it is placed under CEPT. This was unprecedented compared to earlier ASEAN attempts at the PTA and industrial projects. As such, in this context, the various Southeast Asian national leaders mentioned in the article would be inclined to demonstrate optimism about economic cooperation in the region at the launch of AFTA at this summit. However, the source is limited in revealing whether such optimism was realised in the implementation of AFTA thereafter, which makes Source E, from a statement at the ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting in April 1996, valuable as evidence. By this point, AFTA had already been introduced for 4 years and the share of intra-ASEAN trade from ASEAN's total trade had increased from 20% to almost 25% from 1993 to 1996. As such, when Sources D and E are used together, it seems to suggest that the challenge sources are able to demonstrate that ASEAN states had been able to put aside their national interests for increasing regional cooperation. That said, when Sources D and E are cross referenced to Source F, there seemed to be notable exceptions to the progress of AFTA, especially in terms of cooperation from Malaysia and Indonesia, and in specific industries. Given that Malaysia had refused to open up its automotive sector, with its insistence on protecting its own state-owned carmaker, Proton, the claims by both sources would be less convincing. As such, while the support sources were able to demonstrate that there had been a concerted effort to move towards regional cooperation, they were less convincing in showing that national interests were no longer prioritized over regional cooperation.
#4	In conclusion, the evidence from the support sources more convincingly shows that ASEAN economic cooperation demonstrated the prioritization of national interests over regional interests. Sources A, B, C, and F collectively provide strong evidence to highlight that over time and across varying attempts at economic cooperation, whether it be through joint ventures or tariff reductions, Southeast Asian countries always prioritized their national interests over regional ones. Although Sources D and E collectively demonstrate that there had been some improvements in regional economic cooperation over time, the claims that countries were able to put economic cooperation over national interests had been less convincing, given that even with new initiatives, limitations remain as a result of certain countries prioritizing their own individual economies. Therefore, to better reflect the evidence on offer, the assertion should be modified to "While ASEAN economic cooperation demonstrated increased progress towards prioritizing regional interests over time, it still largely demonstrated a general prioritization of national interests over regional interests."

Section B: Essays

Success Criteria

Criterion	Descriptor
Introduction	
#1a	I defined vague or debatable terms in the questions to scope my response
#1b	I provided relevant criteria to provide a framework for my response
#1c	I outlined the key arguments (balanced) I planned to make in direct response to the question
#1d	I stated my stand, in alignment with my key arguments
Paragraph Development	
#2a	I started my paragraph with a topic sentence that conveys the main point of my argument in direct response to the question
#2b	I explained and elaborated on the topic sentence to further develop my argument
#2c	I supported my argument with an analysis of relevant historical evidence
#2d	I closed my paragraph with a linking statement that connects to the question and my stand
Conclusion	
#3a	I reiterated the outline of my key arguments in direct response to the question
#3b	I restated my stand, in alignment with my key arguments.

A-Level Rubrics

Level	Quality of the Answer	Marks
1	The essay will be characterized by significant irrelevance or argument that does not begin to make significant points. The essay may mention historical concepts, but these will not be understood.	1 – 8
2	The essay will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack factual support. The essay may include references to historical concepts, but these may not be fully understood. Where appropriate, the essay may mention the existence of other historical interpretations, but this may not be explained. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.	9 – 12
3	The essay will offer some appropriate factual material but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis. The essay will include some references to historical concepts, but these may not be used to develop the analysis. Where appropriate, the essay may mention the existence of other historical interpretations, though this may be implicit. The quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be effectively linked to the argument. The structure will show	13 – 15

Level	Quality of the Answer	Marks
	weaknesses and treatment of topics within the essay will be unbalanced. The writing may show some accuracy but there will also be frequent errors.	
4	The essay will indicate attempts to argue relevantly, although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis and explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. The essay will show evidence of knowledge of historical concepts, and attempts may be made to use historical concepts to aid analysis. Where appropriate, the essay may mention the existence of other historical interpretations, but the nature of these interpretations may not be fully understood. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organized more effectively. The writing will usually be accurate.	16 – 18
5	The essay will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The essay will show evidence of understanding of relevant historical concepts and some use of historical concepts will be made in analysis. Where appropriate, the essay mentions the existence of other historical interpretations and offers some relevant knowledge of, or evidence for, these interpretations. The essay will be largely relevant. Most of the argument will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence. The essay will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. The writing will be generally accurate.	19 - 21
6	The essay will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative, demonstrating secure understanding of historical concepts relevant to analysis and to the topic. Where appropriate, the essay will discuss competing historical interpretations and offer good knowledge of or evidence for these interpretations. The essay will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The writing will be mostly accurate.	22 – 25
7	The overall quality that will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative, demonstrating clear and accurate understanding of historical concepts, relevant to analysis and to the topic. The essay will be fully relevant. It will be supported by carefully selected factual material and ideas closely focused on the topic and argument made. Where appropriate, the essay will effectively assess the strengths and limitations of competing historical interpretations. The argument will be structured coherently. The writing will be accurate.	26 – 30

Suggested Answer

2. To what extent can the rise of authoritarian governments in independent Southeast Asia be attributed to the military elite? [30]

Question Analysis

Focus:

- Topic: Factors for the establishment of authoritarian governments
- Timeframe: Independence to 2000

Concept:

- Cause and Consequence
- Diversity

Criteria:

- Content: Role of Military elite vs Civilian leaders (backed by military) vs Cold War circumstances
- Concept: Determining/driving vs reinforcing

Indicative Content

Introduction:

[#1a] The rise of authoritarian governments in Southeast Asian states can be attributed to an interplay of various factors. [#1b] In order to determine the extent to which the rise of authoritarian governments can be attributed to the military elite; the question will evaluate the extent to which the military elite had driven the establishment of authoritarian governments. [#1c] It can be argued that in several Southeast Asian states, authoritarian rule was brought about primarily through the direct intervention of the military elite, who had both the organisational capacity and coercive means to dismantle the existing weak democratic governments. However, in some other cases, the military elite did not seize power outright but played a crucial role in reinforcing civilian leaders in their bid to establish authoritarian regimes by providing the coercive effort needed to achieve this outcome. Furthermore, while the military elite played a crucial role in dealing with political challenges and popular opposition, they have often been emboldened by Cold War aid and support, which empowered them to replace existing governments. That said, the military elites were still often the drivers of coercive action that allowed for the rise of authoritarian governments. [#1d] As such, it can be argued that the rise of authoritarian governments in independent Southeast Asia can be largely attributed to the military elite.

[Note: it is accepted if students discuss the failure of democracy as an alternative factor].

Points of Argument:

Para 1

[#2a] It can be argued that in several Southeast Asian states, authoritarian rule was brought about primarily through the direct intervention of the military elite, who had both the organisational capacity and coercive means to dismantle the existing weak democratic governments. [#2b] In these cases, the military elite did not merely deal with political challenges but formed new governments in which they occupied the highest political offices, centralizing powers around themselves and their parties.

[#2c]

- In Thailand, the rise of authoritarian rule can be attributed significantly to the direct intervention of the military elite. Generals like Sarit Thanarat seized power in the 1957 and 1958 coups, dissolving the parliament in 1957, banning political parties, and ruling by decree. The Royal Thai Army, highly organized and disciplined, suppressed rival politicians, curtailed civil liberties, and silenced dissent through arrests and intimidation of opposition figures that had been associated with the former civilian government under Phibun. Sarit also centralized power by appointing military officers to key government positions, effectively merging the state apparatus with the military hierarchy. These concrete measures highlight how the military elite were able to dismantle weak democratic institutions and establish authoritarian rule, demonstrating that the rise of authoritarianism in Thailand was primarily driven by the military elite itself.

- Similarly, in Burma, the military elite's direct seizure of power under General Ne Win in 1962 marked the end of the country's experiment with parliamentary democracy. Ne Win activated the Tatmadaw, dissolved parliament, and suspended the 1947 constitution, justifying the coup as a necessary step to preserve national unity amidst ethnic insurgencies. The Revolutionary Council that Ne Win had established comprised almost entirely of senior military officers, ensuring that the highest political offices were controlled by the same elite. The subsequent implementation of the "Burmese Way to Socialism" under the Burma Socialist Programme Party consolidated one-party, military-led rule for over two decades. This demonstrates how the Burmese military elite played a driving role in the formation of the new authoritarian government and centralizing power around themselves.

[#2d] As such, it can be argued that the military elite had played a role in driving the formation of the authoritarian governments, given that they often dismantled democratic institutions and formed the new governments by centralizing power around themselves.

Para 2

[#2a] However, in some other cases, the military elite did not seize power outright but played a crucial role in reinforcing civilian leaders in their bid to establish authoritarian regimes by providing the coercive effort needed to achieve this outcome. [#2b] In these contexts, members of the military elite aligned themselves with authoritarian civilian leaders, lending legitimacy and practical support that enabled these regimes to seize power and dismantle democratic institutions, without the military formally taking over governance.

[#2c]

- In the Philippines, even though the military elite did not seize power, it played a role in helping Ferdinand Marcos's bid to establish authoritarian rule after 1972, where with the blessing of the Filipino military elite, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) served as Marcos' coercive arm. Through the declaration of martial law, which the military elite connived in, Marcos vastly expanded the AFP's role in internal security, deploying it to arrest opposition politicians such as Benigno Aquino Jr., clamp down on student protest movements, and suppress both the communist New People's Army (NPA) insurgency and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) separatist movement in Mindanao. The military elite's loyalty was cultivated through patronage, promotions, and increased budgets, binding its institutional interests to the survival of Marcos's regime. This alignment allowed Marcos to transit into authoritarian rule by relying on the military elite's coercive capacity to dismantle organised political opposition, quell mass protests, and neutralise armed insurgencies that threatened his continued rule beyond his elected term.
- In Indonesia, the military elite played a crucial role in aiding Suharto's establishment of the New Order regime. Following the alleged communist coup attempt in September 1965, General Suharto mobilised the army's organisational and coercive capacity to crush the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and suppress leftist sympathisers through widespread arrests, killings, and intimidation, allowing him to rid the PKI and pave the way for his bid for power. While Suharto was a military officer, he transitioned into civilian leadership by transferring executive authority from Sukarno in March 1966 and establishing the New Order in 1967, which operated under the guise of a civilian government. That said, the military's *Dwifungsi* doctrine institutionalised its dual role in politics and administration that enabled Suharto to set up the New Order with an assured foundation. This demonstrates that the military elite had been able to play a role in supporting the dismantling of previous government structures, even when governments remained civilian governments.

[#2d] Hence, in these cases, the military elite were essential enablers who propped up authoritarian governments in Southeast Asia without necessarily assuming formal political office themselves, as their cooperation had legitimised authoritarian governance and prevented the emergence of political challenges and popular opposition.

Para 3

[#2a] Furthermore, while the military elite played a crucial role in dealing with political challenges and popular opposition, they have often been emboldened by Cold War aid and support, which empowered them to replace existing governments. [#2b] The context of the Cold War meant that Southeast Asia was a strategic battleground, where the United States provided military elites with resources, training, and political legitimacy that enhanced their ability to replace or dominate existing governments in the pursuit of containing communism. That said, the military elites were still often the drivers of coercive action that had proved themselves as better alternatives to the existing weaker democracies.

[#2c]

- In Thailand, Sarit's coups in 1957 and 1958 were supported by extensive US military aid, which had transformed the Royal Thai Army into one of the best-equipped forces in the region. Between 1951 and 1957,

the United States provided over \$100 million in military aid to Thailand, equipping the army with modern weaponry and training, and enabling the construction of critical infrastructure such as roads and communication networks. During Sarit's regime, which coincided with the Second Indochina War, the US contributed an additional \$75 million in military aid and \$45 million in economic assistance, in exchange for permission to launch air operations against communist positions in Vietnam from Thai bases. The US's endorsement of Sarit as a reliable anti-communist partner further emboldened him to dismantle parliamentary institutions, ban political parties, and rule by decree.

- Similarly, in Indonesia, General Suharto's rise to power had been facilitated by significant covert support from the US, which had enabled the establishment of an authoritarian regime. During the early 1960s, Sukarno's relationship with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) had raised fear in the United States that Indonesia might fall to communism. As such, the US embassy and the CIA provided intelligence on PKI leaders, members, and supporters, allowing the military to carry out widespread arrests, killings and torture which effectively eliminated the PKI as a political force. As such, with the PKI eliminated, Suharto was able to marginalize Sukarno and become acting president in March 1967, inaugurating the New Order a year later. As such, the US's support had reinforced Suharto's coercive capacity and political legitimacy, facilitating a decisive military takeover and the establishment of an authoritarian regime.
- That said, in both cases, it was ultimately the leaders who directly took action and seized power to establish an authoritarian regime. In Indonesia, it was Suharto and the Indonesian military who orchestrated the arrests, killings, and suppression of communist networks from October 1965 to February 1966. In a similar fashion, Sarit's strategic planning, organizational unity, and readiness to deploy force allowed him to stage the coups of 1957 and 1958.

[#2d] Therefore, while external support enhanced the capabilities of the military elite, it was the elite who often strategically deployed violence, repression, and political manipulation to entrench authoritarian regimes.

Conclusion:

[#3a] In conclusion, the rise of authoritarian governments in independent Southeast Asia can be largely attributed to the military elite, albeit as part of a complex interplay of factors. In many cases, military elites directly dismantled fragile democratic institutions and established authoritarian regimes by centralising political power within their ranks. In other instances, they acted as indispensable enablers, in reinforcing civilian leaders in their bid to establish authoritarian regimes by providing the coercive effort needed to achieve this outcome. Furthermore, Cold War geopolitics significantly empowered these military elites through external aid and legitimacy, enhancing their capacity to dominate or replace governments under the guise of combating communism. Nevertheless, it was ultimately the military elites' strategic use of violence, repression, and political manoeuvring that allowed authoritarianism to take root. [#3b] Therefore, the military elite were ultimately the primary drivers behind the establishment of authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia during this period.

3. To what extent was the appeal of Communism an obstacle to the governments' ability to consolidate power after independence? [30]

Question Analysis

Focus:

- Topic: Factors affecting consolidation of power
- Timeframe: Independence to 2000

Concept:

- Change and continuity
- Diversity

Criteria:

- Concept: Temporary (short-term) vs Sustained (long-term)
- Content: Appeal of Communism - how far was it reduced by effective government responses and external intervention and thereby posed less of an obstacle over time?

Indicative Content

Introduction:

[#1a] Southeast Asian governments' ability to consolidate power was affected by various obstacles such as Communist insurgencies, democracy movements, domestic socioeconomic challenges, and external Cold War developments. [#1b] To assess how far the appeal of Communism was an obstacle, this essay will evaluate the extent to which the appeal of Communism that fuelled popular support for Communist movements undermined governments' power and legitimacy, in comparison with other obstacles. [#1c] The appeal of Communism was undoubtedly a major challenge, which often took the form of armed rebellions that directly threatened state authority and offered alternative visions of governance. However, its ability to undermine consolidation varied across Southeast Asia and was often contingent on leadership performance and Cold War dynamics. In many cases, over time, the appeal and strength of Communism was reduced through decisive counterinsurgency measures and effective government performance, limiting their ability to dislodge incumbent regimes. Furthermore, the appeal of Communism as an obstacle was weakened over time by external US intervention to aid anti-Communist regimes in containing Communist expansionism. [#1d] Thus, while the appeal of Communism represented a major obstacle at first, it was mostly contained over time.

Points of Argument:

Para 1 (note: the argument must emphasise the appeal of Communist, not simply Communist rebellions)

[#2a] The appeal of Communism was undoubtedly a major challenge, often taking the form of armed rebellions that directly threatened state authority and offered alternative visions of governance. [#2b] Several Southeast Asian governments established at independence faced sustained Communist rebellions that aimed at overthrowing these regimes.

[#2c]

- In South Vietnam, the Viet Cong insurgency **fuelled by the appeal of Communism to the disgruntled South Vietnamese population** was severe. It posed a constant armed threat to the US-backed Diem regime, **drawing rural support by capitalising on grievances over corruption and land inequality**, and receiving substantial backing from North Vietnam. The Viet Cong's grip on the rural areas prevented the Diem regime and subsequent military leaders from developing any form of political legitimacy and control in the countryside through the 1950s to the 1970s.
- In Burma, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), namely the "White Flag" Communists, quickly rebelled just eight months after independence in 1948, **drawing on its strong rural base and political prestige from leading anti-Japanese resistance**. Its influence extended through trade unions and peasant organisations with nearly one million members by the late 1940s, enabling it to organise large-scale strikes and sustained insurgency that drained the government's resources through the 1950s.

[Other possible case studies]

- In the Philippines, after the Democratic Alliance, a leftist party comprising various communist and labour organisations was prevented from taking office despite winning seats in the 1946 elections on allegations of

fraud and violent campaign tactics, the Hukbalahaps, the armed wing of the movement embarked on a lengthy rebellion from 1946 to 1953 **drawing upon mass support from impoverished farmers and labourers in central Luzon.**

- In Thailand, with Sarit's passing, opposition to the Thai government began to coalesce around various alternative political structures, one of which was the Communist Party of Thailand. By the late 1960s, communist rebellion had erupted within the country's rural north and northeast territories, **capitalising on rural grievances against the Bangkok government.** This was intensified in the 1970s, after the Thammasat University massacres of 1976, when many leftist leaders fled Bangkok to join up with these communist insurgents. This broadened communist party recruitment and made communism a viable challenge to the government.

[#2d] Across these cases, Communist movements presented not only a military challenge but also an ideological alternative that could **mobilise mass support**, making them a significant obstacle to the consolidation of power.

Para 2 (show how far the appeal of Communism as an obstacle was reduced - use the levers of power and legitimacy to show this)

[#2a] However, in many cases, over time, the appeal and strength of Communism was reduced through targeted government responses, limiting their ability to dislodge incumbent regimes. [#2b] With the exception of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, several Communist mass movements were largely contained through decisive counterinsurgency measures using military power and effective government performance, limiting their ability to dislodge incumbent regimes, weakening the argument that the appeal of Communism was a major obstacle to the consolidation of power.

[#2c]

- The challenge posed by the Communist Party of Burma was met with decisive military actions from the military government under Ne Win. After a failed attempt at negotiations in 1963, Ne Win executed the Four Cuts campaign, a coercive effort to cut off links to food, funds, intelligence, and recruits for the BCP, and by the 1980s, the communist threat was extinguished.
- The Huk rebellion in the Philippines was largely contained after President Magsaysay's administration, grounded in anti-corruption and mass outreach, undertook substantive socio-economic reforms, such as the construction of rural wells and clinics, price control on basic goods, and land amnesty for surrendered Huks, and introduced direct avenues for citizen grievances. These measures quickly neutralised the Hukbalahap rebellion, with democracy's legitimacy and performance sapping Communist appeal.

[Other case studies]

- The strong appeal of the PKI reflected by its massive membership that had fuelled Sukarno's grip on power during Guided Democracy was decisively weakened in the wake of the Gestapu incident. Suharto, with CIA support, implemented large-scale anti-Communist purges that uprooted the PKI's organisational base across Indonesia. Suharto's New Order subsequently stabilised the nation through centralised rule and substantial economic growth in the 1970s-1980s, rendering the Communist movement largely irrelevant.

[#2d] Thus, in the longer term, the appeal of Communism was largely extinguished in several Southeast Asian countries with a combination of effective governance and coercive measures.

Para 3 (show how external developments affected the strength of Communist movements)

[#2a] Furthermore, the appeal of Communism as an obstacle was weakened over time by significant external US intervention to aid anti-Communist regimes in containing Communist expansionism as well as the decline of Communist aid from external Communist powers. [#2b] US intervention largely took the form of military and economic aid that significantly enabled anti-Communist governments to strengthen economic development to improve equity, while reinforcing their coercive capabilities against Communist movements.

[#2c]

- Given the triumph of communism in Indochina, American aid was forthcoming in helping the Thai military government combat the growing communist insurgency. The military regime received US\$45 million in economic aid and \$75 million in military aid by 1969 and used this to strengthen their military operations against the communists operating in the rural areas.
- In the Philippines, the US gave over US\$3 billion in aid and military support from 1962 to 1983 to the Marcos regime in exchange for base rights. The military aid helped him maintain the military's capacity to contain the uprisings from the New People's Army as well as the Moro National Liberation Front at the same time.

- Furthermore, the reduction of Chinese aid to the CPB after Sino–Burmese rapprochement in the 1970s contributed to the weakening of the CPB as a political force. Similarly, the rural insurgency by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) quickly collapsed when Chinese aid was cut in the late 1970s.

[#2d] Thus, Cold War developments did contribute to the appeal of Communism becoming less of an obstacle over time.

Conclusion:

[#3a] In conclusion, while the appeal of Communism was undoubtedly a major challenge that directly threatened state authority and offered alternative visions of governance, its ability to undermine consolidation varied across Southeast Asia and was often contingent on leadership performance and Cold War dynamics. In many cases, over time, the appeal and strength of Communism was reduced through decisive counterinsurgency measures and effective government performance, limiting their ability to dislodge incumbent regimes. Furthermore, the appeal of Communism as an obstacle was weakened over time by external US intervention to aid anti-Communist regimes in containing Communist expansionism. [#3b] Thus, while the appeal of Communism represented a major obstacle, it was mostly contained over time.

4. “The way the governments prioritised economic aims was central to the economic transformation of independent Southeast Asian countries.” How far do you agree with this statement? [30]

Question Analysis

Focus:

- Topic: Factors shaping economic change in Southeast Asian countries
- Timeframe: Independence to 2000

Concept:

- Cause and Consequence
- Change and Continuity
- Diversity

Criteria:

- Content: Government's prioritization of economic aims (growth, equity, nationalism) in shaping models and approaches and sectoral development; vs external conditions
- Concept: Decisive vs. contributing factors

Indicative Content

Introduction:

[#1a] The economic transformation of independent Southeast Asian countries was marked by rapid industrialisation, diversification of economies, and integration into global markets and had been shaped by a complex interplay of domestic and external forces. [#1b] In order to determine whether the way governments prioritized economic aims was central to the economic transformation, the essay will evaluate whether the way that governments prioritized economic aims like growth, equity or nationalism over time had been decisive for economic transformation. [#1c] It can be argued that the way governments prioritised economic aims was decisive for economic transformation, as it fundamentally shaped the model and approach each country adopted, thereby setting the trajectory for long-term development. Furthermore, the way that governments had prioritized economic aims had further been decisive in guiding sectoral development and resource allocation. However, while government prioritisation of economic aims was the decisive internal driver of transformation, its success was rarely sufficient on its own and ultimately depended on the interplay between coherent domestic strategies and a favourable external context shaped by external aid and favourable international context. That said, it was still up to governments to capitalize on such opportunities. [#1d] As such, it can be argued that the way that governments had prioritized economic aims had been central for economic transformation.

Points of Argument:

Para 1

[#2a] It can be argued that the way governments prioritised economic aims was decisive for economic transformation, as it fundamentally shaped the model and approach each country adopted, thereby setting the trajectory for long-term development. [#2b] Some governments chose to place a sustained focus on self-sufficiency and economic nationalism, while others had chosen to shift their focus towards growth over time. As such, this ultimately determined the degree of integration into global markets, flow of foreign capital and pace of industrialization, which in turn shaped the economic transformation of Southeast Asian economies.

[#2c]

- For example, Singapore's government prioritisation of growth over other economic aims shaped its adoption of a capitalist, export-oriented development model that drove rapid economic transformation. In order to integrate Singapore into global markets, the state established the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) in 1968 to develop industrial estates, which attracted multinational corporations and concentrated over 70% of manufacturing by the 1980s. Simultaneously, the government built a robust financial sector: the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) was created in 1968 to finance industrial projects, while the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), founded in 1972, regulated banks and maintained monetary stability - key for fostering foreign investment. These strategic moves reflected a policy framework that prioritised growth through market efficiency and openness, enabling Singapore to shift from labour-intensive exports like textiles to higher-value electronics and financial services by the late 1970s. As such, Singapore's case demonstrates that the

way governments had prioritized economic aims had shaped its economic transformation as it had determined the model and approach Singapore had taken.

- In contrast, driven by a prioritisation of economic nationalism and state control, Burma's government adopted a socialist economic model heavily influenced by Soviet-style central planning and Chinese agrarian collectivisation. Under Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism" from 1962, the government nationalised key industries and imposed strict import substitution policies, prioritising self-sufficiency instead of opening up its economy. By 1963, private imports were banned, and banks nationalised, ending significant foreign commercial presence. The government focused on developing heavy industries like tractor assembly and ceramics, but these sectors remained underdeveloped due to scarce imported inputs and limited foreign capital. Consequently, rising poverty and shortages plagued the country, and by the late 1980s, Burma's economy had effectively collapsed, underscoring how prioritisation of socialist isolationism severely hindered its economic transformation.

[#2d] Hence, it can be argued that the way governments had prioritized economic aims was central for transformation as it shaped the model and approach adopted by each country, which had a bearing on the extent of development and economic transformation.

Para 2

[#2a] Furthermore, the way governments prioritised economic aims was decisive in shaping sectoral development and the allocation of resources, thereby influencing which sectors of the economy became the main drivers of transformation. [#2b] In many cases, governments channelled investment and support towards export-oriented manufacturing, modernised agriculture, or high-value financial services. The governments' prioritization of aims determined which sectors get prioritized and modernized most extensively and thus played a critical role in driving the economic transformation of Southeast Asian countries.

[#2c]

- In Indonesia, Suharto's government prioritised equity and agricultural self-sufficiency initially and thus focused on agricultural modernization, particularly through the Green Revolution-inspired programmes initiated in Repelita I (1969). By promoting high-yield rice varieties and expanding irrigation infrastructure, alongside implementing BIMAS and INMAS programmes that provided subsidised credit, fertilisers, and technical support to farmers, the government significantly boosted rice production and rural incomes. Rice output more than doubled from 11.7 million tons in 1968 to 26.3 million tons in 1986, drastically reducing rice imports and improving food self-sufficiency. This focus on the rural sector not only supported economic growth by stabilising food supplies but also generated employment in production and marketing, demonstrating how targeted government prioritisation of agricultural self-sufficiency played a decisive role in Indonesia's broader economic development.
- Similarly, Thailand's government prioritization of nationalism and self-sufficiency first before shifting towards growth played a crucial role in shaping its economic transformation. With earlier focus on nationalism, Thailand initially focused on import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) through state-owned enterprises and protective tariffs under Phibun and Sarit. However, recognising the limits of ISI, the government moved towards prioritizing growth and shifted towards export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) in the early 1970s, promoting industries like automobiles, electronics, and textiles through incentives and infrastructure such as industrial estates and export processing zones. Simultaneously, the government diversified its economic priorities by investing heavily in tourism infrastructure and marketing, turning services into a significant revenue source. As such, the adaptation and shifts in prioritization of economic aims over time, by shifting from a focus on nationalism to a focus on growth, shows the way that Thailand's evolving economic aims shaped sectoral development and contributed to its broader economic transformation.

[#2d] As such, this demonstrates that government prioritisation of different economic aims at different times was central to Southeast Asia's development, as it shaped sectoral growth and determined which industries became key drivers of economic progress over time.

Para 3

[#2a] However, while government prioritisation of economic aims was the decisive internal driver of transformation, its success was not sufficient on its own and ultimately depended on the interplay between coherent domestic strategies and a favourable external context shaped by external aid and international context.

[#2b] External factors like Cold War aid and greater MNC activities and a freer flow of trade and investments in the global economy had reinforced and shaped Southeast Asia's development by providing crucial financial resources, technology transfer, and access to international markets that bolstered governments' efforts to

transform their economies. That said, the mere presence of these opportunities did not guarantee transformation, and this ultimately still depended on how governments chose to prioritize their economic aims and capitalize on such opportunities.

[#2c]

- In the Philippines, external aid and favourable international conditions played a significant reinforcing role in shaping economic development. Following independence, the 1946 Bell Trade Act institutionalised economic dependency by granting the US extensive trading privileges and “parity rights,” which limited the Philippines’ ability to fully control its own economic resources. However, the Philippines benefited substantially from US military and economic aid during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, which provided vital financial support and increased export opportunities, particularly as the country hosted US bases and supplied war-related goods. This external assistance bolstered the government’s efforts to stabilise and grow the economy during a turbulent period. However, despite these favourable external conditions, when Marcos came to power, his economic aim focused on prioritizing nationalism by granting monopolies to his cronies, bucking the trend towards the EOI and in the process, wasted the economic aid that had been given to the Philippines through the Cold War.
- Similarly, In Indonesia under Suharto, economic transformation during the late 1960s and 1970s had been largely reinforced by external factors. The Green Revolution provided high-yield rice varieties, modern irrigation systems, and improved farming techniques, which supported their introduction nationwide through government programmes such as BIMAS (Mass Guidance) and INMAS (Mass Intensification). Furthermore, in industrial development, Japanese foreign direct investment provided capital, technology, and managerial expertise for manufacturing and export-oriented industries, particularly in textiles, automotive, and electronics, expanding industrial capacity and boosting exports. These external contributions complemented Suharto’s domestic strategies in the 1980s, though the successful overall transformation and ability to capitalize on these opportunities had been a result of Suharto’s ability to prioritize and shift different economic aims over time, pivoting from focusing on nationalism to focusing on growth.

[#2d] Thus, it can be argued that external aid and favourable global conditions played important supporting roles in Southeast Asia’s economic development given that the governments’ prioritization of aims had not been sufficient to determine development. That said, ultimately, it was the governments’ prioritization of aims that shaped how effectively the external developments were utilized.

Conclusion:

[#3a] In conclusion, the economic transformation of independent Southeast Asian countries was shaped significantly by how governments prioritised their economic aims. Ultimately, the governments’ prioritisation determined the development models adopted and guided sectoral growth and resource allocation, determining the country’s overall development progress. However, this internal driver was not sufficient to explain the overall development and the trajectory of development had often been reinforced by favourable external conditions, including international aid and global economic trends. That said, it was still the ability of governments to strategically prioritise and capitalise on both domestic and external opportunities that ultimately defined the pace and extent of economic transformation across the region. [#3b] Therefore, government prioritisation of economic aims was arguably the central factor in shaping Southeast Asian economic development.

5. How far did the independent Southeast Asian countries reduce their reliance on agriculture for economic development? [30]

Question Analysis

Focus:

- Topic: Relative importance of sectors to economic development
- Timeframe: Independence to 2000

Concept:

- Cause and Consequence
- Change and Continuity
- Diversity

Criteria:

- Content: Agriculture, industry, financial services
- Concept: Degree of dependence (e.g., driver vs. reinforcing)

Indicative Content

Introduction:

[#1a] The economic development of Southeast Asian countries was characterised by the diversification of economic sectors over time. [#1b] To evaluate the extent to which countries reduced their reliance on the agricultural sector for economic development, the essay will assess how far agriculture was displaced by industry and financial services as drivers of growth and equity over time. [#1c] Most economies shifted from initial heavy reliance on agriculture to industrialisation as the main driver of growth and equity over time. Furthermore, the desire by governments to sustain rapid growth saw a turn towards financial liberalisation, further lowering agriculture's relative importance to economic growth. However, agriculture remained vital for equity, rural livelihoods, and food security for many countries, suggesting that the sector remained relevant despite the increasing importance of industry and financial services to economic development. [#1d] Hence, while most Southeast Asian economies did move decisively towards industrial and financial sectors as the key sectors for growth, reducing the reliance on agriculture over time, agriculture's role remained critical to rural prosperity and food security which formed an important basis for sustained economic development.

Points of Argument:

Para 1

[#2a] Most economies shifted from initial heavy reliance on agriculture to industrialisation as the main driver of growth and equity over time. [#2b] At independence, most economies relied heavily on agriculture to generate initial capital for investment, improve food security, and address rural poverty. However, from the 1950s to the 1960s, governments began to pursue industrialisation as the path to faster and higher-value economic growth, which could better generate employment and reduce overall poverty.

[#2c]

- Recognising the limitations of overreliance on agricultural exports due to the volatility of commodities and the need to diversify the economy, in the 1950s and 1960s, most countries embarked on Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), funding early industrial plants (steel, sugar, textiles) using capital from agricultural export surpluses.
 - Diversifying beyond the agricultural sector, Burma's 1952 Pyidawtha Plan set up state steel and sugar mills. Malaysia and Thailand developed early manufacturing such as tin smelting and textile spinning. The Philippines nurtured food processing and consumer goods sectors.
 - While ISI helped to expand countries' domestic industry, its impact was ultimately limited by small internal markets and inefficiency.
- By the late 1960s and 1970s, there was a pronounced pivot to Export-Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) in nearly every capitalist-led country, reinforcing reduced reliance on agriculture for growth.
 - In Malaysia, in the 1960s-1970s, the state established industrial estates and free trade zones and moved to EOI. The Penang Free Trade Zone (1972) attracted electronics assembly plants from firms like Intel and Hewlett-Packard. By the 1980s, manufacturing's GDP share surpassed agriculture's. While palm oil

and rubber earned foreign exchange, growth and job creation increasingly came from industrial and export processing zones. The expansion of industries created more employment opportunities, and this could be seen in the shift of rural labour to urban employment over time.

- In Indonesia under Suharto, with a mixture of developing the oil and gas industry through Pertamina and riding on Japanese FDI to develop a thriving EOI sector, oil and manufacturing revenues surpassed agricultural revenues as the major contributor to Indonesia's GDP, while creating more employment opportunities. Moreover, the modernisation of the agricultural sector released surplus labour to fuel urban manufacturing, accelerating the relative decline of agriculture in GDP terms.

[#2d] By the 1980s, in much of the region, industry generated more GDP and export value than agriculture, marking a clear reduction in reliance on agriculture as the main growth engine.

Para 2

[#2a] Furthermore, the desire by governments to sustain rapid growth saw a turn towards financial liberalisation further lowering agriculture's relative importance to economic growth. [#2b] From the 1980s to the 1990s, to sustain rapid growth, governments began to embrace financial liberalisation and integration into global capital markets, a process that attracted more foreign investments and liberalised domestic capital flows that tended to focus on industrial development and other services, further deepening the structural shift away from agriculture.

[#2c]

- In Thailand, in the 1980s, financial reforms allowed foreign banks greater entry and relaxed lending rules, with investment inflows largely concentrating on industrial expansion, property, and services. By 1995, agriculture's GDP share had fallen below 12% and manufacturing and finance were the clear engines of growth.
- Similarly, in Indonesia, with Suharto's financial deregulation policies in the 1980s, relaxed interest rate controls, licensing, and entry barriers to foreign banks created more access to credit that tended to flow into manufacturing, trade, and urban infrastructure, with agricultural investment less of a priority, further reinforcing its decline as an important sector.
- In Vietnam, the Doi Moi reforms that liberalised trade and reduced restrictions on joint ventures, led to greater FDI inflows into the burgeoning manufacturing sector, and encouraged the Vietnamese government to develop financial services to fuel this expansion. This process reinforced the rising dominance of industrial development and financial services over agriculture in the economy.

[#2d] Hence, in a more diversified economy that derived growth from a range of sectors, the shift towards greater reliance on financial services intensified the reduction of agriculture's role in countries' economic development.

Para 3

[#2a] However, agriculture remained vital for equity, rural livelihoods, and food security for many countries, suggesting that the sector remained relevant despite the increasing importance of industry and financial services to economic development. [#2b] Despite its declining share of the GDP, governments continued to channel significant resources into rural development.

[#2c]

- Indonesia's Green Revolution under Suharto whose government implemented BIMAS and INMAS to support farming education while modernising irrigation and farming technology dramatically increased rice yields, raised rural incomes, and ensured the regime's legitimacy. Indonesia was able to achieve rice self-sufficiency by 1984, and agriculture remained a major sector alongside the industrial sector.
- With sustained focus on agriculture, Vietnam's post-Đổi Mới agricultural reforms facilitated the shift from collectivisation to family-based production, where land reform policies allowed farmers to dispose of additional surplus on the open market. This led to massive output gains, making it a top rice exporter by the 1990s, and facilitated rapid rural poverty reduction, reflecting agriculture's consistent importance to economic development.
- In stark contrast, in Burma and later Myanmar, persistent underinvestment in agriculture led to stagnation and rural impoverishment, and because of its underdevelopment, it was not able to provide capital for industrial development and contributed to a weak foundation for economic development, resulting in Burma classified as a Least Developed Country in 1987.
- [Other Case studies] Thailand.

[#2d] Thus, the agricultural sector remained relevant despite the increasing importance of industry and financial services to economic development.

Conclusion:

[#3a] In conclusion, most economies shifted from initial heavy reliance on agriculture to industrialisation as the main driver of growth and equity over time. Furthermore, the desire by governments to sustain rapid growth saw a turn towards financial liberalisation, further lowering agriculture's relative importance to economic growth. However, agriculture remained vital for equity, rural livelihoods, and food security for many countries, suggesting that the sector remained relevant despite the increasing importance of industry and financial services to economic development. [#3b] Hence, while most Southeast Asian economies did move decisively towards industrial and financial sectors as the key sectors for growth, reducing the reliance on agriculture over time, agriculture's role remained indispensable to rural prosperity and food security which formed an important basis for sustained economic development.