

Suggested Answer

Success Criteria	Answer
#1a	Sources A and B are similar in showing that Castro believed that Cuba's interests were sidelined in Superpower negotiations to end the crisis. Castro, in Source A , asserts that the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey as a condition for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba "was contradictory to the theory that the missiles were sent for the defence of Cuba," suggesting that Castro perceived Cuba's security was not prioritised and instead, Cuba was used as an "exchange token" for the USSR to improve its position in the nuclear arms race. Similarly, Castro, in Source B , asserts that "American guarantees have no great significance for us," and the US continued to pose a threat to Cuba with "the blockade" that "existed [before]," suggesting that Castro believed the deal did not benefit Cuba's interests.
#1b	The similarity in views is due to their shared historical context. During the negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev on 27 October 1962 to defuse the crisis, Castro was not consulted and was kept in the dark. The decision to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba was made without consulting Castro. Castro only discovered through a third party on 28 October that Khrushchev had made a deal behind his back. The deal left Castro without a nuclear deterrent against American aggression, and also did not address the ongoing economic blockade and covert operations against Cuba, leaving Cuba vulnerable. Thus, both sources expressed Castro's frustration with the USSR for the way the crisis was handled.
#2a	Sources A and B are different in showing the extent of Castro's dissatisfaction with the USSR's actions to end the crisis. Castro, in Source A , is critical and resentful of Khrushchev's actions. Castro suggests that Khrushchev had intentionally wanted to withhold the secrets of Superpower negotiations i.e., the trading of missiles in Turkey for the missiles in Cuba from Castro, and Khrushchev's slip of the tongue led to Castro discovering "the last thing that Nikita wanted me to hear." In contrast, Castro, in Source B , is more measured in his words, where he reminds Mikoyan that Cuba had agreed to "the withdrawal of the Soviet bombers only in order to help the Soviet Union" end the crisis, while reminding him that this had made Cuba's "situation...worse."
#2b	The difference in views is due to the differing purposes of the two sources. Source A was from Castro's recollections of a discussion with Khrushchev during his visit to the USSR in 1963, when he belatedly discovered from Khrushchev's slip of the tongue that the US had removed their Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the deal for the USSR's removal of missiles from Cuba. Given that he was sharing his incident at a conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis held in Havana in 1992, Castro could have been motivated to remind his international audience of Soviet betrayal, thus explaining the high level of disdain for Khrushchev in Source A. In contrast, Source B was from a conversation Castro was having with Mikoyan in November 1962, after the crisis had ended and Soviet missiles had been removed from Cuba. In addition, Soviet bombers were also to be removed, reducing the military deterrents Cuba had enjoyed earlier. Hence, in this conversation, he was likely seeking to persuade Mikoyan to provide more security guarantees, thus explaining why he was more measured in his dissatisfaction.

1b. How far do Sources A-E support the assertion that Khrushchev's motivation to put missiles on Cuba was to help Cuba defend itself? [30]

Suggested Answer

Success Criteria	Answer
#1	The assertion implies that Khrushchev's decision to place missiles on Cuba was motivated purely by his desire to protect Cuba from an American invasion. Sources B and E support the assertion by showing that Khrushchev's decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba was to help Cuba defend its sovereignty against American invasion threats. In contrast, Sources A, C, and D challenge the assertion by suggesting that Khrushchev was motivated by strategic calculations related to Superpower rivalry in the context of the Cold War.
#2	Sources B and E support the view that Khrushchev's main motivation was to help Cuba defend itself. In Source B , Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan reminds Castro that the Soviet Union's military presence helped prevent an imminent American invasion, reminding Castro "how the Americans were preparing an operation under the code name 'Ortsac'... They were preparing to land 20,000 marines!" This suggests the deployment of weapons to Cuba was intended to deter American aggression. This view is shared by Source E , where Khrushchev's official report to the Supreme Soviet, justifies the deployment of missiles on humanitarian and defensive grounds. He explains that the USSR acted "at the request of the Cuban Government," and that their "motives [were] exclusively humanitarian," aimed at protecting Cuba against "a real threat of invasion." Together, these sources portray the missile deployment as a protective response to U.S. hostility and intervention.
#3	Sources B and E offer weak evidence that Khrushchev's main motivation was to defend Cuba. Contextually, both sources referred to the invasion threats Cuba faced after the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and during Operation Mongoose that aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime. The invasion threats came on the back of deteriorating US-Cuba relations where the US had imposed an economic embargo in retaliation to Castro's alignment to the USSR and nationalisation of US enterprises and property in Cuba. Thus, in Source B, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan reminds Castro that Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba to deter an imminent US invasion, suggesting that Source B offers fair evidence to support the assertion. However, the source, from a private conversation between Castro and Mikoyan, also reveals Castro's scepticism about

Success Criteria	Answer
	Mikoyan's claim. Given Castro was not consulted by Khrushchev when he negotiated with Kennedy to defuse the crisis and the resultant outcome, such as the continuation of American economic embargo, was not entirely satisfactory to Cuba, Mikoyan's claim was likely made to placate Castro, weakening the reliability of his claim. In the same context as Source B, Source E, from Khrushchev's statement to the Supreme Soviet, also offers fair evidence that defending Cuba was one motivation for the deployment of missiles to Cuba. However, as Khrushchev was likely trying to defend his decisions in front of the top law-makers in the Supreme Soviet after his embarrassing retreat from Cuba, by emphasising the USSR's altruistic intervention as necessary to defend a poor nation from American aggression, Source E is not entirely convincing as evidence. The claims made by Mikoyan in Source B and Khrushchev in Source E are contradicted by Source A where Castro revealed that Khrushchev unwittingly revealed to him that Cuba was used as an exchange token for the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, reflecting Khrushchev's strategic calculations. Khrushchev's decision to place missiles on Cuba was also intended to offer a short-term solution to overcome the USSR's weakness in ICBMs by leveraging on Cuba's strategic location to deploy its shorter-ranged missiles. On balance, Sources B and E offer weak evidence to support the assertion.
#2	In contrast, Sources A, D, and C challenge the idea that Khrushchev was primarily motivated by the defence of Cuba and suggest Khrushchev had strategic calculations in relation to the wider Superpower rivalry in the Cold War. In Source A, Castro expresses his disillusionment upon learning that Khrushchev secretly traded the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba for the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, expressing dismay that Cuba was "being used as an exchange token." This suggests Cuba was a pawn in a larger Cold War bargain related to the USSR's desire to achieve balance in the nuclear arms race. Strategic considerations are also depicted in Source D, the British cartoon titled "Over the Garden Wall." It shows Khrushchev in the shade thrown by the branches labelled "Turkey", "West Germany", and "Japan, of a large tree labelled "US bases", suggesting that the US had several military bases threatening Soviet security. In comparison, Khrushchev had only just planted a small tree with a small branch labelled "Cuba". These features imply the reason why Khrushchev established a military base on Cuba was to break the US' strategic encirclement of the USSR, not to defend Cuba per se. Similarly, Source C, featuring the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, raises suspicions that Khrushchev was motivated by the need to achieve strategic "balance" in the nuclear arms race as well as the desire to use "Cuba" to "bargain" for West Berlin that Khrushchev had coveted. This highlights broader geopolitical goals rather than simply a concern for Cuba's defence. Together, these sources suggest that the missiles served strategic Soviet interests more than Cuban protection.
#3	In comparison to Sources B and E, Sources A, D, and C offer stronger evidence to show that Khrushchev's main motivation was strategic, rather than simply to defend Cuba. sources A and D should be understood in the context of the nuclear arms race, where the USSR was lagging behind in the development of ICBMs while enjoying relative strength in MRBMs and IRBMs. Furthermore, the US had established several military bases, some with nuclear missiles deployed, such as in Turkey, to encircle the USSR. Thus, Khrushchev's deployment of missiles on Cuba was a short-term measure to gain leverage over the US in the nuclear arms race. Khrushchev subsequently demanded for the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey as an added condition for the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba. This consideration is thus aptly revealed in Source A, from Castro's testimony about Khrushchev's unwitting revelation that the US traded Jupiter missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba. Although Castro was deeply aggrieved by the betrayal that explains his resentment in Source A, given that Khrushchev's slip of the tongue was in relation to the letters he exchanged with Kennedy, primary sources that had since been declassified, Source A does provide reliable evidence to challenge the assertion. In the same context as Source A, Source D, the British political cartoon, also accurately reflects the wider strategic issues at stake between the USSR and the US, and Khrushchev's desire to overcome the strategic encirclement through missile deployment in Cuba. Thus, both Sources A and D offer strong evidence that Khrushchev was mainly motivated by strategic calculations, and less by the defence of Cuba against American aggression. Cuba's significance in the global Cold War especially in connection to the Cold War in Europe forms the context of Source C. At the Vienna Summit in 1961, in the context of the ongoing Berlin Crisis, Khrushchev had aggressively challenged Kennedy over the status of West Berlin. He reiterated threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and

Success Criteria	Answer
	to potentially limit Western access to West Berlin. Given this context, while Source C reveals American perceptions of Soviet intentions, Rusk's comments made in an internal meeting between Kennedy and his advisors lend some weight to the interpretation that Soviet motives were tied to global strategic manoeuvring. On balance, Sources A, C, and D offer stronger evidence to challenge the assertion.
#4	In conclusion, the evidence in the sources leans more towards challenging the assertion that Khrushchev's primary motivation for placing missiles in Cuba was to help Cuba defend itself. While Sources B and E suggest a genuine Soviet concern for Cuban security highlighting the real threat of American invasion and framing the deployment of missiles as a deterrent, these perspectives are largely framed as Soviet justifications. On the other hand, Sources A, D, and C present a more critical view, revealing how Cuba was treated as a bargaining chip in Cold War diplomacy and how the missiles served larger Soviet strategic goals. Thus, the assertion is not fully supported, and the evidence overall suggests Khrushchev's motives were more complex and strategic than simply to help Cuba defend itself.

