



HWA CHONG INSTITUTION
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
Higher 2

**CANDIDATE
NAME**

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CT GROUP

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**INDEX
NUMBER**

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HISTORY

9174/02

Paper 2 Developments in Southeast Asia (Independence – 2000)

September 2025

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

3 hours

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

Write your **name** and **CT class** clearly in the spaces at the top of this page.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Attempt **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

Please start **every question** on a *fresh* page and label each question clearly.

If you did not manage to attempt a question, write down the question number you would have attempted on the cover page of the booklet.

At the end of the examination, **insert** any additional 4-page booklets used for responses into the 12-page booklet.

This document consists of **4** printed pages, excluding the coverpage.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

ASEAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

1. Read the sources and then answer the question.

Source A

While ASEAN's declared objectives were economic, social and cultural, all knew that progress in economic cooperation would be slow. The fall of Saigon to the communists in April 1975 increased our sense of danger from subversion and insurgency. ASEAN had to undertake economic development more effectively to reduce domestic discontent. At a bilateral meeting with Suharto in Bali in September 1975, I tried to persuade him to agree to set economic targets for ASEAN at its first summit, and to go for a trade liberalisation policy starting with a 10 percent reduction by member countries of tariffs on selected items and leading eventually to a free trade area. Suharto's close aide later told our ambassador that after [he] met me, his technocrats had advised him against free trade.

From the memoirs of Singapore's founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, published in 2000.

Source B

We are fully aware – at its early stage – that the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme will cover only several products, and applied to Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. In due course, on par with the conditions and readiness of the respective countries, we will also implement it for the rest of other ASEAN countries in accordance with the timetable we commonly agreed upon.

It is with full awareness that we designed the CEPT with its format we currently possess. As an initial stepping stone to implementing the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), we decided to limit its application only to some varieties and groups of products. This is critical in helping to address any worries that any given country would be sacrificing rather than gaining benefits from this scheme. In unison, we (ASEAN member states) successfully developed this agreement. This has proven ASEAN's ability to take concrete, realistic steps towards engaging in deeper economic cooperation.

Adapted from a speech delivered by then Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri, at an ASEAN Free Trade Symposium, 2002.

Source C

Still, intra-ASEAN trade did not grow much. As the negotiation of the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) was done product by product, the tendency of the ASEAN member-countries, true to the protectionist spirit and import-substitution policies of the time, tend to include items that were not likely to be extensively traded. The inclusion of snow ploughs and nuclear reactors became the object of derision in knowing circles.

Tariff rates were not brought down; those ASEAN products that were covered were only given 25 to 50 per cent discounts on high tariffs. At their 1991 meeting, the economic ministers observed that, while intra-ASEAN trade in items covered by the PTA had grown from \$121 million in 1987 to \$578 million in 1989, it accounted for an “insignificant” proportion of total intra-ASEAN trade.

From a book by Rudolfo Severino, a former ASEAN Secretary-General published in 2006.

Source D

The ASEAN countries made a momentous step forward in launching AFTA by finalising the list of products facing rapid reduction and elimination of their tariffs through the CEPT scheme. AFTA adds a total of 321 items to the original list of items scheduled for tariff reduction and deletes 516 items from the temporary exclusion list. The CEPT scheme, implemented on January 1, 1994, proposes reductions under two programs: fast-track, now with 15,201 items scheduled for this type of reduction, and normal track, covering 25,837 items. Prompted in part by the January 1, 1994, implementation of NAFTA and by the impending changes to GATT produced by the completion of the Uruguay Round, ASEAN leaders now urge a significant departure from AFTA's original sluggish pace. Additionally, several ASEAN economic ministers now call for the extension of the scope of AFTA beyond the manufacturing sectors. This quickened pace, proposals for increased application of AFTA, and the launching of the CEPT scheme all indicate that AFTA remains one of ASEAN's main priorities.

From an academic article published in 1994.

Source E

Since the 1990s, efforts at economic integration had been accelerated. Yet, trade among the ten Southeast Asian countries remain relatively low at only 24% of total exports, as compared to 22% in 1993. The ASEAN Way of upholding sovereignty contributes to encouraging protectionism among member states, particularly the newer ones. At the end of the day, the ASEAN Way may help encourage interaction among member states, but it cannot trump their individual national interests.

ASEAN is unable to draw up any kind of treaty like the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community. A treaty with clear rules and procedures would have arguably bound and guaranteed commitment from member-states. Yet, this was

fundamentally at odds with the ASEAN political culture, which holds sovereignty and non-interference sacred. As ASEAN remains committed to these norms, it faces a tougher time in creating institutional structures that are essential in enhancing intra-trade ties and deepening economic integration.

An excerpt from an academic article published in 2004.

Source F



A cartoon in an online newspaper published in 2022.

Now answer the following questions:

- a)** Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on Indonesia's attitude towards regional economic cooperation. [10]
- b)** How far do Sources A-F support the view that ASEAN has failed to promote regional economic cooperation since its inception? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2** To what extent was the use of constitutional processes and elections the most effective approach to consolidating power in post-colonial Southeast Asian states? [30]

OR

- 3** “National unity in Southeast Asia was nothing more than a façade.” How far do you agree? [30]

AND

- 4** To what extent were developments in the finance sector beneficial to Southeast Asian economies? [30]

OR

- 5** “Post-war geopolitics impeded Southeast Asian economic development.” How far do you agree? [30]

END OF PAPER

Acknowledgements:

Source A Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor, Singapore, From Third World to First, 2000.

Source B Megawati Soekarnoputri, President of the Republic of Indonesia, ASEAN Free Trade Symposium, 2002.

Source C Rudolfo Severino, ASEAN Secretary-General, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former Secretary-General, 2006.

Source D Deborah A. Haas, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, American University International Law Review, Volume 9: Issue 3 Article 4, 1994.

Source E Morten F. Greve, ASEAN down the 'EU Way'?, 2004.

Source F Sourav Roy, cartoonist, More Concerns than Consensus in ASEAN at 55, New Indian Express, 26 August 2022.

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