

YIJC H1 HISTORY GCE A LEVEL THEME II (Syllabus: 8838)

THE COLD WAR & EAST ASIA: 1945 – 1991



CHAPTER 1 – CHINA & THE COLD WAR: 1950 - 1991

a) Development of Sino-Soviet Relations

- i. **Cooperation:** Treaty of Friendship (1950) & Korean War (1950 – 1953)
- ii. **Worsening:** Romanian Workers' Party Congress (1960) & Border Conflict (1969)
- iii. **Rapprochement & Normalisation:** Summit (1989)
- iv. **Factors Shaping Relations:** Security Interests, Ideology, Developments in Superpower & Sino US Relations

b) Development of Sino-US Relations

- I. **Confrontation:** Korean War (1950 – 1953), US Support for Taiwan
- II. **Rapprochement & Normalisation:** Nixon's Visit to China (1972) and Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (1979)
- III. **Factors Shaping Relations:** Security Interests, Ideology, Developments in Superpower & Sino Soviet Relations

CHAPTER 2 – JAPAN & THE COLD WAR: 1952 - 1991

a) Development of Japan: US Relations

- i. **Alliance & Tensions:** Security Alliance, Share of Defence Burden, Economic Relations (Aid, Trade, Market Access)
- ii. **Factors Shaping Relations:** Japan's Economic Status, Japan's Domestic Politics (Differences over Japan's Alliance with US, Role of Japan's Security Forces, Consensus on Nuclear Weapons), Japan's Perceptions of Communist Threat, US Cold War Strategy

b) Japan's Other Responses to Cold War

- I. **Political Responses:** Impact of Relations, Engagement of China
- II. **Economic Responses:** Impact of Relations, Engagement of China & SEA

¹ <https://www.timemaps.com/history/east-asia-1960ad/>



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Theme II	THE COLD WAR AND EAST ASIA (1945–1991)	
	How did the Cold War play out in East Asia? What role did East Asia play in the Cold War?	
OVERVIEW	MAKING CONNECTIONS	
In this theme, students will examine how the Cold War impacted developments in East Asia, through the lens of two key regional actors – China and Japan. While the European theatre of the Cold War reflected the clear East-West divide, East Asia served as a second front where superpower relations with China and Japan revealed a more complex interaction in light of regional developments. In addition, through their foreign policies towards the superpowers and other Asian countries, China and Japan sought to influence the Cold War for their benefit, with varying outcomes. By analysing these developments, students will come to appreciate the Cold War through a multi-polar lens.	Today, China and Japan remain key in shaping political and economic developments in East Asia. Beyond their political influence as regional players, both are also recognised as major powers globally. Much of their global influence today can be traced to the Cold War period, and their relations with the two superpowers. Relations between China, Japan and the USA are pivotal to understanding regional stability and economic growth today. The study of this theme provides students with the essential historical context to understand the complex relationships and the legacy of the Cold War in shaping today's geopolitical and economic landscape in East Asia.	
CONCEPTS (Students understand:)	CONTENT (Students study:)	LEARNING OUTCOMES (Students are able to:)
<u>Historical Concepts</u> - accounts - chronology - evidence - historical empathy - cause and effect - change and continuity <u>Content Concepts</u> - Cold War - cooperation - security - ideology - diplomacy	China and the Cold War (1950–1991) - Development of Sino–Soviet relations - Sino-Soviet cooperation: Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1950), Korean War (1950–1953) - worsening Sino–Soviet relations: Romanian Workers' Party Congress (1960), Sino–Soviet border conflict (1969) - Sino–Soviet rapprochement and normalisation of relations: Sino–Soviet Summit (1989) - factors shaping Sino-Soviet relations: security interests, ideology, developments in superpower and Sino–American relations - Development of Sino–American relations - Sino-American confrontation: Korean War (1950–1953), USA's support for Taiwan - Sino-American rapprochement and normalisation of relations: Nixon's visit to China (1972), establishment of diplomatic relations (1979) - factors shaping Sino–American relations: security interests, ideology, developments in superpower and Sino-Soviet relations	- evaluate the development of China's and Japan's relations with the superpowers during the Cold War - evaluate the factors that shaped China's and Japan's relations with the superpowers during the Cold War - evaluate the responses of China and Japan to the development of the Cold War.

² chrome-extension://efaidnbmninnbpcjpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.seab.gov.sg/docs/default-source/national-examinations/syllabus/alevel/2024syllabus/8838_y24_sy.pdf

OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH US & USSR

IDEOLOGICAL BONDS & THEORY: NOT DETERMINISTIC

<u>CHINA – US</u>	<u>CHINA – USSR</u>
<i>Ideological stereotypes of the inherent global clash between Communism and Capitalism sowed fear and tension as each side believed that the other will set out to destroy them.</i>	<i>Ideological stereotypes of the inherent global clash between Communism and Capitalism made China and USSR come together in partnership to strive to destroy the capitalists.</i>


UNDERLYING REALISTIC SECURITY & STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS: POWER & RESPECT

<u>CHINA – US</u>	<u>CHINA – USSR</u>
→ Feared a repeat of Korean War movement of US forces near China's borders → China wanted to gain back Taiwan & recognition of 'One China' → China wanted US help to counter Soviet threat and to consolidate China's resources → US wanted to get out of Vietnam → US & China wanted economic gains.	→ China initially wanted Soviet assistance → China did not want to be bullied as in 1950 → China deserves to lead the World Communist Movement according to China's version and strategy over ideology. → China wanted safety after border clashes → China wanted to use US against USSR and focus on conserving its resources against USSR given the border threat.

	<u>CHINA – USSR</u>	<u>CHINA - US</u>
1950s	Started with "Friendship" in Appearance: 1950 Treaty Intensified over time to growing mistrust and conflict from 1956 → <i>Personality Clash with Khrushchev</i> → <i>Ideo Direction & Strategy</i> → <i>Leadership & Respect Globally</i>	Started with Hostility in Appearance & Reality → <i>Ideo beliefs and stereotype</i> → <i>Taiwan & Tibet</i> Intensified over time after Korean War → <i>Direct fighting after Yalu River incident</i> → <i>Taiwan</i> → <i>UN Membership & Trade</i>
1960s	Continuation of Personality Clash → <i>Mao vs Khrushchev</i> Worsening Split and Rivalry → <i>Diplomatic Split</i> → <i>Military Clash</i> → <i>Desire for Power & Respect</i>	Continued Tensions & Rivalry → <i>Taiwan & Vietnam</i> → <i>Decolonization Movements in 3rd World</i> → <i>China's Cultural Revolution chaos</i> Increased Realization of Mutual Needs & Benefits by 1969 given Urgent Context to both sides → <i>Vietnam War Struggles by US</i> → <i>Worsening Security from Sino-Soviet clash</i> → <i>Cultural Revolution Chaos in PRC</i>
1970s & 1980s	Continuation of Split & Differences China worked with US to counter Soviet influence Normalisation in 1989 after Gorbachev-Deng Xiaoping Summit in Beijing	Adoption of Realpolitik to gradually become 'friends' for Mutual Benefits & Respect Differences Remain BUT were put aside to work on Common Benefits to the unhappiness of allies

Chapter 1A:
Development of Sino-Soviet Relations
Positive to Negative Deterioration: Why / How / Effects / Expected?

1950s	Cooperation	<i>(Stalin & Mao)</i> 1950 Treaty of Friendship Korean War: 1950 – 1953
1950s 1960s 1970s	Worsening	<i>(Khrushchev & Mao)</i> <i>(Khrushchev / Brezhnev & Mao / Deng)</i> 1960 Romanian Workers' Party Congress 1969 Border Conflict
1989	Rapprochement & Normalisation	<i>(Gorbachev & Deng)</i> 1989 Summit



Inquiry - Deeper Thinking & Critique
a) Were they even close and equal in their 'friendship' in 1950??
b) Unhappiness over Subordinated Position?

In times of crisis, the Soviet Union's leaders were capable of shelving ideological affinity, and act on strictly pragmatic realist calculations. The Sino-Soviet conflict created that kind of crisis:

<i>Moscow</i>	<i>Beijing</i>
Ironically played power politics against a former comrade in arms still bound to the USSR by a 1950 treaty of alliance.	Placed national interests above the global revolutionary dimensions of their foreign policy – <i>willing to forsake Communist bloc unity and even work together with the USA in the 1970s in rapprochement against the USSR!</i>
A common ideology was devalued as a meaningful bond in Beijing and Moscow, and marked a turning point for the Cold War in complicating superpower relations as the three (US, USSR, China) tried to play each side against the other. The reasons that brought about this remarkable transformation in Sino-Soviet ties had deep roots.	

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS OVER TIME

<u>CHANGE</u> <i>in China's Attitude & Actions towards USSR</i>	<u>CONTINUITY</u> <i>In China's Attitude & Actions towards USSR</i>
- From Outward Reverence & Respect for Soviet leader Stalin → <i>To Outright Disdain for Khrushchev over Ideological Direction, Foreign Policies & Personal Treatment</i> - From Dependence on USSR → <i>To a Firm Belief in Self Sufficiency without USSR</i>	- Belief in Ideological Strategy of the Impt of Peasants as the Basis to Revolution - Belief that the USSR should be firmer in confronting the US in the Cold War - Belief that the USSR should respect China

COOPERATION	 WORSENING	 RAPPROACHEMENT & NORMALISATION
Common Ideological Bonds & China's Need for Recognition & Assistance 1950 Treaty of Friendship 1950 – 1953: Korean War (Common Enemy: South Korea & US / UN army) <u>Do not be simplistic: In reality....</u> - Unequal relationship as China was treated as a subordinate	Ideological bonds could not hold the relationship: Divergence with Differing Ideological Interpretations / Strategies to Advance Communism and Unequal Balance of Power led to a Strong Desire for Security / Superiority in Determining Border Boundaries: Mutual Criticisms & Border Fighting 1960 Romanian Workers' Party Congress 1969 Border Conflict between Soviet Union & China	Developments in the USSR with Gorbachev assuming power amidst rising economic woes & Cold War Reduction in Tensions (US-USSR) 1989 Summit: Gorbachev & Deng Xiaoping <u>Do not be simplistic: In reality....</u> - Unequal Economic Dynamics: USSR urgently needed China's help - Political Strains: Fear of influencing impact from Gorbachev's glasnost on China's domestic population & CCP's grip on power

<u>Analysis & Evaluation:</u> <u>DEVELOPMENT of China (Sino) - Soviet Union Relations over Time</u>
The Sino-Soviet alliance contained the seeds of its own destruction from as early as the unequal 1950 treaty that <i>ideologically split openly during Khrushchev's time</i> as shared Marxist roots – <i>the supposed strength of the alliance</i> – proved insufficient to hold it together. The principles of equality and fraternity that the Sino-Soviet alliance stood for publicly as seen in the 1950 Treaty of Friendship were in practice difficult to achieve. The <i>pretence of equality as marked by the public 1950 Treaty of Friendship did not compensate for staggering power & status inequalities whereby China was clearly always treated inferiorly with Soviet arrogance</i> as a subordinate from as early as Stalin's leadership. Meanwhile, Soviet leaders blamed the Chinese for monstrous ingratitude and continued on their intransigence that WORSENING the relationship in the 1960s into a war of words in the form of mutual criticisms that culminated in direct fighting along the border dispute between the Soviet Union & China in 1969.

Surface / Façade	In Reality....
There was a façade of Communist monolithic / single unity bloc in 1950 but relations publicly <u>turned sharply</u> for the worse in the <u>early 1960s</u> as the larger problems <u>buried beneath</u> opened up via a barrage of <u>ideologically charged verbal criticisms</u> .	The problems of <u>sheer inequality and the power struggle</u> for <u>supremacy and security to feel safe from and over the other</u> that <u>resulted in</u> public criticisms and humiliation for both sides at various points was the <u>most important</u> reason for the collapse of the Sino Soviet alliance. <u>Cold War developments in the 1980s</u> then helped to normalize relations as China and the USSR <u>reacted to events to be safe</u> as they <u>adjusted and toned down their ideological disputes</u> .

<u>Reason 1</u> Security Interests: Desire to be Safe & Respected <i>(Displays of Independence & Attempts at Control: Prestige, Power Status, Security)</i>	<u>Reason 2</u> Ideological Differences & Visions <i>(Peasants vs Workers) (Coexist vs Confrontation) (Stalinist vs Revisionism)</i>	<u>Reason 3</u> Developments in Superpower & Sino-Soviet Relations
- USSR: Khrushchev needed to boost his popularity after 1962 CMC fiasco - China: Mao needed to get rid of his internal critics during GLF, and also to boost his standing, image, and political power after the fiasco of the GLF that even saw him giving up his State Chairmanship of China. - Border Security for USSR & China: Clashes in 1969	- China: Mao felt that as the senior leader in the Communist bloc after Stalin's death, he should be the new leader and PRC should not be treated inferiorly. - USSR: Mental 'lenses' that shaped mind-sets of seeing the Chinese as inferior that affected the subsequent actions taken towards the PRC to be 'unequal' in a subordinate manner by Moscow.	- Cold War developments in the 1950s – 1970s WORSENERED relations as it made China & USSR feel more threatened in their security that made them determined to push their vision and ideas forward. - Cold War developments in the 1980s then helped to NORMALIZE relations as China and the USSR reacted to events to be safe as they adjusted and toned down their ideological disputes.
<u>EVALUATION</u> - Which of these reasons is the ROOT reason? How / why so? - Which of these is the OVER-ARCHING / UNDERLYING reason? How / why so? - Which of these is a MINOR reason? How / why so?		

INQUIRY:

- 1) ***How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?***
- 2) ***Were developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship a surprise?***

COOPERATION: 1950s

Common Ideological Bonds & China's Need for Recognition & Assistance

- **1950 Treaty of Friendship & Alliance**
- **1950 – 1953: Korean War (Common Enemy: South Korea & US /UN army)**
- **HOWEVER.....signs of tension and dissatisfaction by China over Soviet treatment and responses towards China in a subordinate and disrespectful manner.**

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (Feb 1950):

Masked Deeper Unhappiness over Ideo Direction & Power between USSR & China

- Background: Chinese Civil War between CCP (Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao) and its rival GMD (Guomindang, led by Chiang Kai Shek)
 - The USSR became more enthusiastic about the CCP ONLY after Mao's CCP had won the civil war – the Soviet press poured praise and admiration on Mao and the new PRC. During the civil war, Stalin actually did not provide help to Mao's CCP.
 - Mao was invited to Moscow in 1950, and it led to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. Negotiations for this treaty, however, were slow because China's need for the alliance was greater than Russia's need.
 - As China was isolated from the West because it was a Communist state, Mao needed a powerful ally. Moreover, there was an obvious ideological affinity between China and Russia. Mao even described the USSR as 'our best teacher from whom we must learn.'
 - Stalin had less to gain from the treaty, but in the aftermath of WWII, the Russian economy needed to be rebuilt. Establishing a new trading partner was in the USSR's interest.
- In the treaty, USSR promised economic assistance and Soviet expertise to China, along with protection against 'Japanese militarism', by which it meant capitalist nations. It included a guarantee that the USSR would come to China's aid if China was involved in conflicts with any capitalist nation.
- The treaty allowed China to begin economic modernisation as witnessed in the evidence:
 - *Soviet planners & engineers initially developed 200 Chinese construction projects in the 1950s*
 - *There was a six-fold increase in Sino-Soviet trade from 1950-1956 and by 1956, 60 per cent of Chinese trade was conducted with the USSR.*
 - *The USSR educated 9313 Chinese technical experts in top Russian universities and over 38000 Chinese workers were given vocational training in Siberia.*

- *Traditional buildings were pulled down for Soviet-style constructions and Soviet scientific technology was prioritized in China over Western technology.*
- *The PRC also accepted that Soviet military assistance was necessary, at least until they had their own nuclear programme.*
- However, PRC was offended by the rather 'unfriendly' treatment received. The Soviets had been superior in their dealings with PRC officials and had not bothered to put on any entertainment for their guests, and Mao thought the accommodation given to the Chinese was poor. In fact, the U.S. State Department referred to the alliance as 'Moscow making puppets out of the Chinese' and Nikita Khrushchev later said of the Treaty, 'It was an insult to the Chinese people.'
- Indeed, it was soon clear that the USSR wanted to exploit the treaty in its own favour – Soviet aid amount to \$300 million in loans but was repayable with interest and Mao also had to recognize Soviet control over Outer Mongolia and influence in Manchuria.

Korean War (1950 – 1953):

Lingering Tensions & Mistrust BUT Consolidated Unequal Friendship

- **Background: Divided Korea and Civil War between Nationalist (Kim & Rhee) out to unite the country under their respective rule**
- **Recap: STAGES OF KOREAN WAR & INTENSIFICATION OF CONFLICT**
 - a) *Invasion by North Korea (Background Support by Stalin & Mao)*
 - b) *US Intervention & UN Security Council Resolution*
 - c) *Successful Defense after US/UN Intervention*
 - d) ***Adoption of Policy of Roll-back against North Korea***
 - e) ***Involvement of China & Return to 38th Parallel***
- Stalin did give some help to the Chinese and North Korean forces but caution was the keynote of the Soviet approach. Stalin carefully avoided any action that might result in war with the US: *Russian pilots flying MiG-15s were under orders not to enter South Korean airspace while Russian intelligence officers who interrogated UN prisoners of war wore Chinese uniforms.* This strategy suited Stalin and his interests as he never wanted war with the US and wanted China to bear the brunt of any costs in the war.
- When American forces under the UN flag came close to the Chinese border near the Yalu River, Stalin encouraged the PRC to send troops into Korea while the Soviets gave material assistance only. China sent a million 'volunteers' to intervene in the Korean War and Mao bitterly complained when the Soviets demanded that China pay \$1.35 billion for Soviet equipment and supplies, and Mao lost a son in the war.
- All these HAD THE EFFECT of making China unhappy at how UNEQUAL & UNFAIR the Soviets were making use of China in the conflict. Because the Soviets had made the Chinese pay the entire bill, it helped to rally the Chinese to their own CCP and made them more determined to stand alone: Mao emphasised that it was Chinese, not Soviet blood that had been spilled for 'international Communist cause'. However, with resources spent during the war, it was more difficult to unite Taiwan now.

- Nevertheless, the Korean War consolidated the Sino-Soviet friendship. The huge cost of it increased China's dependence on the USSR, and China turned to the USSR for aid to help rebuild their war-shattered economy. For the USSR, the war proved China's worth as an ally. Stalin acknowledged that China played a crucial role in acting as a buffer between UN troops and the Soviet border.
- Following the Korean War, there were two further Sino-Soviet agreements (1953 & 1954). The USSR agreed to:
 - *A significant package of aid for China's first Five-Year Plan, including a bigger loan than had been agreed in 1950*
 - *Help China build power plants*
 - *Hand over Lushan naval base to China, located on the border between the two countries*
 - *Increase trade with China.*

HOWEVER.....Do not be simplistic: In reality there were already ideological differences, tensions and lack of Soviet support towards China as an equal in the 1950s...

- Unequal relationship as China was treated as a subordinate
- Lack of genuine full support from the USSR: Relations were tense and Mao's contact with Moscow was neither gratifying nor pleasant. Historically, Stalin had aligned with the Nationalist Government or Guomindang (GMD), urging the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to cooperate, and when civil war erupted after 1945, the Soviets provided very limited support.
- Stalin was fearful of a ***potential rival*** in Mao for leadership of the Communist World. Stalin's main focus was NOT on Asia but on Europe as he needed to revive USSR after a draining WWII! Hence Stalin did not fully support Mao in the civil war against the Guomindang.
- Mao was convinced that Stalin wanted a divided and weak China to leave the USSR dominant in Asia
 - saw Stalin's policies as rooted in self-interest, rather than true revolutionary doctrine. Mao later said in 1945 Stalin refused China permission to carry out a revolution and that he had told them, "Do not have a civil war: collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek. Otherwise the Republic of China will collapse". Mao therefore believed that Stalin saw him as another rival like Tito, rather than a true revolutionary.
- Before the signing of the 1950 Treaty, during Mao's visit to Moscow in 1949, the main reception for the Chinese delegation was held in the old Metropole Hotel. For days on end Mao was isolated, waiting for Stalin to arrange meetings. No one else could meet with him until Stalin had, and Stalin was taking his time.
 - *Offended by 'unfriendly' treatment in Moscow*
 - *Poor accommodation*
 - *No entertainment provided*
 - *Insultingly apparent to all including the US*
 - *Tolerated and still had respect for Stalin as senior leader & accomplishments*

- Stalin's death....Set Stage for Pre-Existing Tensions to Exacerbate
 - *Although Mao had some respect for Stalin, in particular his's firm methods of political rule, there had been tensions and suspicions in the relationship between Mao and Stalin. It has even been suggested that Stalin delayed the end of the Korean War in order to exhaust the PRC. Therefore, when Stalin died in 1953, it was possible that relations would improve. A truce was signed in the Korean War soon after Stalin's death and, to a certain degree, there was a relaxation in tension, referred to by historian Michael Lynch as something of a 'honeymoon' period.*
 - *The new Soviet leaders appeared willing to supply further loans and technology to China, as well as making their treaties more equal and facilitate easier credit for the PRC.*
- The period 1954-1960 was significant because of the growing erosion of trust between the USSR and China. During this period, China began to emerge as an ideological rival to the USSR: it was no longer clear that the USSR alone led the communist world.
- Mao was less inclined to follow the new Soviet leader (Khrushchev) because of Soviet reluctance to back China's strategic aims in Taiwan and his reluctance to stand up to the USA in the Cold War.
- The personal relationship between Mao and Stalin's successor Khrushchev also suffered because of Mao's willingness to snub Khrushchev and disagree with him publicly in the 1960 Romanian Workers' Party Congress.

INQUIRY:

- 1) ***How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?***
- 2) ***Were developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship a surprise?***

WORSENING: 1950s, 1960s, 1970s

Ideological bonds could not hold the relationship: Mutual Criticisms & Border Fighting Clashes

- **Immediate Background to Open Split with Publicly Seen Tensions in 1960:**
 - *1956-1957: New Soviet leader Khrushchev's Foreign Policy ("Peaceful co-existence")*
 - *Khrushchev's Growing Personal Rivalry with Mao*
 - *Taiwan Straits Crises (1954-1955 & 1958)*
 - *Growing Competition for Leadership of World Communist Bloc*
- **Mutual Public Criticisms: 1960 Romanian Workers' Party Congress**
- **Direct Fighting Clashes - 1969 Border Conflict between Soviet Union & China**
 - *Background: China's Reaction to 1968 Prague Spring*
 - *Chinese & Soviet Military Buildup along Borders*
 - *Clashes in Zhenbao & Tielieketi Incident*
 - *Soviet Nuclear Threats*
 - *1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*
 - *Competition for Influence in Indochina: 1960s – 1980s*
- **Significance: Divergence with Differing Ideological Interpretations / Strategies to Advance Communism and Unequal Balance of Power led to a Strong Desire for Security / Superiority in Determining Border Boundaries: Mutual Criticisms & Border Fighting**

Background to 1960 Congress:

Personality Clash & Differences in Ideological Approaches with New Soviet Leader Khrushchev

1956:

- With relations already shaky, the growing rift between the two communist powers continued to widen in 1956 where the seeds of discord were sown. In his speech to the 20th party Congress, with nuclear war looming, Khrushchev sought to create global stability by advocating a doctrine of 'Peaceful Coexistence' with the West.
- Furthermore, by restoring relations with Yugoslavia, led by Tito, whom Stalin had denounced in 1947, this irritated and shocked Mao, who had supported Stalin ideologically and politically.
- In the same speech Khrushchev also spoke out against Stalin's 'cult of personality' and his crimes, suggesting that Stalin had 'put himself above the party'. Khrushchev also criticized Stalin's regime for imposing monolithic control over the USSR and its satellite states.

Significance: Analysis

- Mao interpreted it as a direct insult and attack as he had ruled China in a similar way to Stalin. Mao was keen to develop his own personality cult and saw himself as a natural successor to Stalin.
- Mao viewed Khrushchev's policy of 'Peaceful Coexistence' as 'heresy' and a 'revisionist' policy, i.e. deviating away from the Marxist-Leninist notion of the inevitability of war with capitalism.
- Mao believed that 'continuing revolution' with the West was the only way to ensure the victory of Communism and negotiating with the West was a betrayal of true communism according to Mao.

Deeper Analysis of Significance & Effects:

Was the 1956 incident really that impactful in worsening relations and cause a split?

- In June 1957, a group of Khrushchev's opponents led by Molotov within the C.P.S.U. Presidium (the so-called anti-Party group) united in an attempt to remove Khrushchev from power. They resented the manner in which Khrushchev was using the de-Stalinization theme to boost his own prestige. Yet, at a crucial moment in the struggle, the Chinese appear to have come out behind Khrushchev, who subsequently was able to rally the numbers within the C.P.S.U. Central Committee to outvote his opponents.
- Khrushchev's behaviour immediately after June 1957 suggests strongly that he saw himself as being under some obligation to the Chinese. In July, he stated publicly that China "especially" had the right to build socialism in accordance with her national characteristics. At the same time, Pravda declared that Mao's theory of non-antagonistic contradictions contained points of significance for Marxist/Leninist theory - the first time the Soviets had made such an admission.
- For Beijing, however, the most important thing to emerge following Khrushchev's confrontation with the anti-Party group was an agreement "on new technology for nuclear defence" concluded on October 15, 1957, under which Beijing have since claimed they were to be provided with "a sample of an atomic bomb and the technical data".
- Analysis: *The October 1957 agreement clearly marks a high point in Sino-Soviet relations, and it seriously weakens any hypothesis which identifies events prior to October 1957 as the basis of the Sino/Soviet dispute.*

1957 Moscow Conference:

Mao's Attempt to Challenge Soviet Leadership & Ideological Interpretation

- In November 1957, Khrushchev convened a special meeting of World Communist Parties in Moscow to try and resolve differences. Mao was in attendance, and despite approving a declaration that promised future cooperation, he voiced opposition to Khrushchev's policies and made a series of speeches warning Moscow to abandon 'revisionism' and to return to the true Marxist-Leninist path.
- In a series of speeches, Deng Xiaoping out-argued the leading Soviet theorist, Mikhail Suslov, by asserting that the proletariat revolution could only come about through armed force.
- Significance: This angered and humiliated Moscow as it became clear that Mao was attempting to challenge USSR's leadership by presenting the PRC as the 'real' defenders and leaders of international revolutionary communism.

2nd Taiwan Straits Crisis, August 1958:

Ideology affects Leaders' Actions to be Leader of Communist World

- Mao was determined to prove that the PRC was the true, revolutionary government globally and sought to consolidate control; one of which was renewed aggression against Taiwan and the PRC bombarded its islands (Quemoy and Mastu) in the early 1950s, but had been deterred from further action by the U.S. 7th fleet patrols of the Straits.
- Without discussing it with the Soviets, Mao ordered a build-up of troop manoeuvres. Shortly after Khrushchev left Beijing, Mao ordered the bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu; a symbolic display of independence from the Soviet Union and a test of USSR's commitment to China.
- BUT the US stood by Taiwan and offered assistance by sending its navy forces to Taiwan under the terms of the 1954 US-Taiwan defence treaty. To de-escalate, **Khrushchev told the US that an attack on China would be deemed as an attack on the USSR, but also told Mao to strive for a peaceful resolution on the issue of Taiwan based on his foreign policy focus on 'peaceful coexistence'.**

Significance to Sino-Soviet Relations:

- The Second Taiwan Crisis convinced Mao that Khrushchev could not be relied on to advance China's strategic interests. Furthermore, it confirmed Mao's belief that Khrushchev was a 'revisionist' in favour of compromise with capitalism rather than revolution.
- *The effects of the Taiwan Crisis were thus negative for Sino-Soviet ties as it triggered a breakdown in relations in making Moscow thoroughly rethink its support of the Chinese nuclear programme. The Soviets started to procrastinate over their aid; then they summoned their scientists back to the USSR "for vacation"*
- *Finally in June 1959, they informed China that Moscow would not deliver the promised sample atomic bomb due to 'ongoing international negotiations on the limitations of nuclear weapons'.*

October 1959: Khrushchev's Visit to China

- During this visit, Mao exploded when Khrushchev, suggested that Mao demonstrate “goodwill” and return to the US 5 Americans whom the Chinese army had taken captive during the Korean War. Mao concluded that for the sake of improving relations with the imperialists, the Soviet leader was willing to betray socialism.
- Evidence: Mao also used this opportunity to snub the Russian leader in public. On Khrushchev's arrival, no guard of honour met him, and no microphone was provided. In private, Khrushchev made fun of the Chinese, rhyming Chinese names with Russian obscenities.
- ***Significance: Far from restoring good relations, the meeting degenerated into a bitter exchange of insults & outraged both leaders mutually.***

Effect Outcome - June 1960 Romanian Workers' Party Congress

War of Words: Mutual Criticisms

<i>China</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>
• China publicly berated Soviet leader Khrushchev for his 'patriarchal, arbitrary and despotic attitude' • Back in China, the Chinese government attempted to win over the Soviet aid workers and turn against the Soviet government. • Mao rejected Khrushchev's invitation to him to visit the USSR • Mao was happy when the Soviet experts were withdrawn from China as he saw this as China's 'Second Liberation' in driving out the last dominant foreign presence from Chinese soil. • Mao ordered for Chinese boffins to piece together various blueprints left shredded by the departing Soviet nuclear scientists and to embark on an independent research programme (Project 596) before achieving the detonation of an atomic bomb in 1964.	• Khrushchev equated Mao with Soviet outcast Trotsky in noting how Mao's calls for 'continuing revolution' sounded like Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' calls. • At the Bucharest Congress, Khrushchev denounced Mao personally as an 'ultra-leftist' and the CCP of 'spitting in our faces'. • Soviets also took up the cause of one of Mao's purged Chinese leaders, Gao Gang, who had opposed the CCP's anti-Soviet course in relations. • Khrushchev jeered at the CCP: "Since you love Stalin so much, why don't you take his corpse to Peking?" • 16 July: Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the 1390 scientific and technical experts from China, and to not bring any replacements. • More than 300 major contracts and technical projects were scrapped with immediate effect. Supply of important equipment and materials to be discontinued. • Inside the Soviet Union, ordinary Russians were proud of their country's epic assistance to the PRC and were not delighted to see it curtailed / stopped.

Background to 1969 Border Clashes:
Prague Spring - Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968

- During his leadership of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev followed a 'Stalinist' foreign policy, and in the 'Brezhnev Doctrine', the Soviet Union states that to maintain order in Eastern Europe, the satellite states had to accept Soviet leadership.
- When Czechoslovakia attempted to assert some independence, the Brezhnev Doctrine was put into practice, and in 1968 Soviet tanks were sent to crush the period of liberalization now known as the 'Prague Spring'. This invasion undermined the USSR's standing with other Communist states. Mao condemned the use of force against Czechoslovakia. This was not only because the Soviet Union was no longer behaving in a 'truly socialist' manner in his eyes, but also because he was worried that Soviet military might and the Brezhnev Doctrine could be turned against China.

1969 Border Conflicts in Zhenbao & Tielioketi: Security Fears over Territorial Integrity

- By the end of the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet relationship had become increasingly belligerent and complicated by how both side's leaders had become largely discredited by their own policies by 1969.
 - *For China, Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution to eradicate 'China's Khrushchevs' inside the CCP and cleanse the country of Soviet 'Revisionism' brought about huge chaos and problems that affected Mao's image.*
 - *For the USSR, its leadership in the world communist movement was damaged by the brutal invasion of Czechoslovakia in the 1968 Prague Spring to enforce the Brezhnev Doctrine that gave Moscow the right to invade to protect the world communist movement from deviations.*
- Both also had nuclear weapons and continued to criticize each other. In 1967, China developed its first hydrogen bomb and the alarmed USSR stationed over 50 divisions along its China border.
- The hostility came to a head in violent clashes along their mutual border. The PRC denounced the Soviets as 'imperialists', no different from the Tsars of old, as they still had not returned territory taken from the Chinese in the 19th century. Earlier on in 1962, border disputes increased to a new level along the Xinjiang frontier and the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Both sides increased the numbers of troops facing one another across the border.
- In 1969, the frontier dispute erupted into proper war. According to the Chinese, the Soviets had violated China's border 4189 times up to 1969. The Red Guards intensified the problems between China and Russia, signalling their contempt for Russia by crossing the Sino-Soviet border into Soviet territory.
 - The tension boiled over into actual fighting on 2 March 1969 on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River that demarcated the Soviet-Chinese border.
 - A Soviet military team was ambushed by a waiting Chinese border patrol unit, killing over a dozen Soviet soldiers; although the PRC claimed the reverse by stating that it was the Soviets who attacked the Chinese border patrol.

- In the next 2 weeks of March 1969, hundreds of Chinese & Soviet troops had fights for the control of Zhenbao (Damansky) island, with tens of thousands of artillery rounds fired that resulted in the deaths of soldiers on both sides of the conflict.
- The border conflicts of 1969 also served political agenda of Mao who needed a military victory at that time to rally, hype and glorify himself after the failure of the Cultural Revolution. Not surprisingly, at the April 1969 CCP Party Congress, Mao took the opportunity to showcase the Chinese battle heroes of Zhenbao.
- By August 1969, there was clearly the possibility of all-out war between the two Communist states as more border fights occurred now in China's region of Xinjiang with fierce gunfights in places such as Tielieketi, that resulted in soldiers on both sides being killed again. The August 1969 Tielieketi incident saw the Soviets eliminating and capturing Chinese soldiers, and the Soviets even alleged that this clash occurred after persistent border violations by the Chinese soldiers who even had cameras to record the incident to show the world that it was the Soviets' fault.
- The USSR was so incensed at continued Chinese provocation that Moscow even seriously considered a nuclear strike against China. Mao feared a Soviet invasion and possible nuclear strikes, so he ordered that tunnels be dug and supplies stored in preparation. Fighting continued sporadically for most of the year. In the end, there was no escalation to all-out nuclear war, but it was a near brink.
- For China, the 1969 border conflicts showed that it needed to become stronger to counter the USSR's security threat and Mao ordered a nation-wide buildup of China's strategic depth and capabilities and sped up the logistical preparations for the event of a protracted war with the USSR.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979

- Soviet troops entered to install a pro-Soviet communist regime in Kabul. This invasion occurred after a new Islamic government took control of Afghanistan and there were fears of Islamic fundamentalism spreading to the Muslim republics in the Soviet Union that may breakaway and threaten the USSR and Communist Party's rule of USSR as a single entity.
- This invasion confirmed US fears of growing Soviet assertiveness but also caused worries in China who saw this as a possibility and prelude to China being invaded by the USSR if the Soviets could do the same to neighbouring Afghanistan.

INQUIRY:

- 1) ***How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?***
- 2) ***Were developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship a surprise?***

RAPPROACHEMENT & NORMALISATION: 1989

- **1986 Gorbachev's Vladivostok Speech & Deng Xiaoping's 'Three Obstacles'**
- **May 1989 Sino-Soviet Summit: Changing Security Interests, Gorbachev's Priorities & Foreign Policy, Taiwan, End of Cold War, Normalized Bilateral Relations under 5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence**
- **Cold War developments in the 1980s helped to NORMALIZE relations as China and the USSR reacted to events to be safe as they adjusted and toned down their ideological disputes.**

Background: 1986 Vladivostok & Deng Xiaoping's 3 Obstacles

- Three Obstacles to improving Sino-Soviet ties
 - 1) Concentration of Soviet troops along China's border
 - 2) Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
 - 3) Soviet Support for Vietnam's Military Occupation of Kampuchea / Cambodia
- 28 July at Vladivostok: Gorbachev promised some initial steps to remove the Three Obstacles and pull out a significant number of troops from Outer Mongolia & Soviet Far East in conjunction with the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.
- Why so?
 - *Background: Urgent domestic situation in the USSR with the weakening state of Soviet economy & Gorbachev's foreign policy priority of ending the Cold War*
 - *Soviet officials were keen to resume border trade with the provinces of north-eastern China to take advantage of the rapid surge in production of Chinese consumer goods for their population's consumer needs.*
- Between 1983 – 1988, the value of trade increase by 4000% to \$1.8billion.
- In 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze directed Soviet ambassador to China (Oleg) to follow China's economic reforms with attention that could be of application to the USSR given how fast China had started on reforms compared to the Soviet Union. The Soviets were impressed and plans were drawn up by 1988 for a 'Soviet Shenzhen' to be founded and Nakhodka was designated a free economic zone.
- By the end of 1988, Soviet troops were withdrawing from Afghanistan, and a partial withdrawal completed from Outer Mongolia.

- China's leader Deng Xiaoping also wanted Soviet help to secure a Vietnamese pull-out from neighbouring Cambodia following Vietnam's incursion into Cambodia. But this was not so straight-forward for the Soviets as they enjoyed major strategic benefits with Vietnam which they did not want to jeopardise.
 - June 1988: Gorbachev indicated his willingness to halt the supply of Soviet aid to Vietnam and use his best diplomatic efforts to get Vietnam out of Cambodia (bordering China).
 - Dec 1988: Deng felt that enough visible progress had been made in Soviet concessions to China to justify moving ahead for a summit of 'normalisation', and Gorbachev even made a visit to China in May 1989, the first formal visit by a top Soviet leader since Khrushchev.
 - Significance: This ONCE AGAIN REVEALED HOW PRAGMATIC NATIONAL INTERESTS to realistically calculate the best gains one can take from the moment is actually a vital factor influencing Sino-Soviet relations, and it can shape it to become POSITIVE IF MUTUAL INTERESTS & NEEDS ALIGN AS PER THE BACKGROUND SITUATION OF THE END OF THE COLD WAR, WEAKENING SOVIET ECONOMY in the 1980s reveals.

Sino-Soviet Summit (May 1989)

Changing Security Interests, Taiwan Issue, Gorbachev's Priorities & Foreign Policy, End of Cold War, Normalized Bilateral Relations under 5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

- Gorbachev's comment when taken on a visit to the Great Wall of China,: "It's a very beautiful work, but there are already too many walls between peoples."
- During the summit, Deng stated that the main fault of the Soviets was in 'their failure to treat the Chinese as equals' subjecting them to humiliating coercion and pressure. He called on the Soviets to 'close the past and open the future'.
- However, Deng continued to inform the Soviets in a 90min harangue on the history of foreign predation in China by Japan and the Soviets; in particular how the Soviets had seized Black Bear Island in 1929 and taken concessions of Manchuria at the Yalta Conference in 1945. Deng also continued to feel festering grievance over Outer Mongolia even during 1989! This was evident in how he had told visiting US President George Bush senior, in Feb as he recalled the old maps that showed China looking like a maple leaf without the central segment of Outer Mongolia being torn away by foreigners.
- Not surprisingly, Gorbachev grumbled to his aides that he was 'fed up with the old man's sermons'. However, he had genuinely triumphed in securing his main objective of normalising relations even though it meant publicly acknowledging this to be done on a basis of strict equality instead of the past superiority the Soviets had casted publicly since the 1850s as the well-meaning imperial uncle/elder brother of China. ***This was highly important to Gorbachev given the worsening domestic chaos politically and economically back home in the USSR by then as he sought to end the Cold War and reform the Soviet Union whose economy was badly failing by then with worsening chaos from perestroika and glasnost.***

Significance of the Aftermath of 1989 Summit:
New Economic Dynamics in Relationship & Political Strains

- 1990-1991: a new generation of CCP leaders received a professional training in the Soviet Union and acquired a fluent command of the Russian language. They also looked back on the experience with warmth – including important leaders like Jiang Zemin (*CCP General Secretary from 1989, who trained at the Stalin Automobile Works*) and Li Peng (*PM since 1987, who trained at Moscow Power Engineering Institute*).
- The Soviet Union opened the closed frontier border areas with China: visas were no longer required for business trips and Chinese traders went out into the Soviet hinterland in search of profits; all of which led to a surge of trade.
 - *Soviet technicians went to China to upgrade the outdated equipment in factories their predecessors had installed some 40 years ago!*
 - *April 1990: China's Prime Minister Li Peng expressed interest in cooperating with the Soviet Union in aircraft manufacturing and an agreement was reached for China to buy 24 Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets in 1991.*

New Economic Dynamics in Relationship:

- Under the public surface of the 'normalisation of relations' as 'equals' though much had changed in the whole balance in the Sino-Soviet relationship as ***both sides REACTED to the CONTEXT BACKGROUND OF URGENT ECONOMIC NEEDS & FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY OF ENDING THE COLD WAR IN THE 1980s.***
 - Back in the 1950s, Sino-Soviet trade consisted of the exchange of Chinese foodstuff and raw materials for Soviet manufactured goods, but now it was the other way round! After Gorbachev's 1989 visit to China, the Soviet leadership asked the CCP leaders for ECONOMIC AID as the collapse of the Soviet economy had resulted in a chronic shortage of consumers goods, and the Soviets needed to urgently bring in large quantities of goods but lacked the currency to buy them! Gorbachev and his Soviet colleagues even proposed a barter arrangement to pay for Chinese consumer necessities with Soviet raw materials!
 - China was breaking the Soviet market with not just foodstuffs now after 1989 but a wide range of LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS from textiles and footwear to consumer electronics! Meanwhile the Soviets were obliged to supply raw materials (such as timber) in the light of a general Chinese lack of interest in Soviet manufactures with the exception of armaments!
 - China's CCP leaders were 'quite taken aback' by the dramatic reversal of roles but agreed to lend the Soviets some money: Commodity credits of 500million & 1billion Swiss Francs were dispensed to the Soviet Union in early 1990 & March 1991!
 - 1989: Chinese property developer He Weinan went to the Soviet border city of Blagoveshchensk to set up a stalled hospital project and apartment and office blocks and shopping centres that stretched the town. Between 1989 to 1991, over 30,000 Chinese labourers found jobs helping the Soviet economy out on farms and in factories in the Soviet Union's Far East.

TRAGEDY OF TIANNMEN SQUARE - BEYOND ECONOMIC DYNAMIC CHANGES, there were also Political strains that crept into the relationship

- The Soviet Union began to look like the cradle of reforms and freedom in contrast to China. **Gorbachev's policy of glasnost (transparency)** that pointed the way towards freedom of speech and a pluralistic democracy **inspired the PRC's young people to protest** who were increasingly restive at the corruption, social inequality, lack of status and opportunities for students in contrast to the business elites and economic downsides of Deng's economic reforms.
- May 1989: Gorbachev arrived to China in a city paralysed by tens of thousands of student protesters; much to the embarrassment of Deng and the CCP hosts, and his official welcome had to be staged in the airport instead of downtown to keep him out of reach of the protesters! Gorbachev also had to be smuggled into China's Great Hall of the People for the state banquet through a rear entrance as the ceremonial entrance was blocked by protesters.
- *Some of the protest slogans read: "Swap Deng for Gorbachev!", and "Hurrah for Gorbachev!"*
- CCP's General Secretary at that time, Zhao Ziyang, had signalled his endorsement of Gorbachev's policies by calling for 'transparency' and told Gorbachev in a meeting about his doubts about the merits of one-party rule. Unfortunately for Zhao, his visible feelings for the plight of the student protestors was met with hostility by Deng, Li Peng and the rest of the CCP leaders. Not surprisingly on 17 May 1989, Zhao was forced to relinquish his post as CCP General Secretary to be replaced in due course by Jiang Zemin. Deng and the CCP leaders saw Gorbachev's glasnost as a huge threat to the CCP's rule and continued to look at events at home and the world through a Marxist-Leninist prism lens.
- 2 weeks after Gorbachev departed China, on 3-4 June, the Chinese government sent in troops and tanks to crush the Tiananmen protesters. Western disgust at this slaughter left China politically isolated and subject to sanctions on advanced technology and weapons.
- March 1990: A document circulating within the CCP stated that the Gorbachev policies and thinking had amounted to a betrayal of the fundamental principles of Marxism and was a traitor to the socialist cause.
- By 1991, the social chaos within the Soviet Union had provoked strong intense opposition to Gorbachev from die-hardliners in the Soviet Kremlin itself, and the Soviet Minister of Defence Yazov even made a trip to Beijing in May 1991 to assure China that the Soviet armed forces would 'defend the gains of Socialism'.
- After the collapse of the coup against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, Deng remarked angrily in private at the 'stupidity' and 'idiocy' of Gorbachev in embarking on economic reform without taking care to maintain the CPSU's (Soviet party) political grip.

INQUIRY:

- 1) *How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?*
- 2) *Were developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship a surprise?*

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF FACTORS SHAPING RELATIONSHIP

<u>Reason 1</u> Security Interests: Desire to be Safe & Respected	<u>Reason 2</u> Ideological Differences & Visions	<u>Reason 3</u> Developments in Superpower & Sino-Soviet Relations
- Common Threat of US - Econ Security - Territorial Security	(Peasants vs Workers) (Coexist vs Confrontation) (Stalinist vs Revisionism) - Declined with the End of the Cold War & Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Priorities	- Can affect positively & negatively - Pragmatically & realistically reacting to events to maximize the most benefits for the country's national interests at that time.
- Which of these reasons is the ROOT reason? How / why so? - Which of these is the OVER-ARCHING / UNDERLYING reason? How / why so? - Which of these is a MINOR reason? How / why so? - Any CHANGE / CONTINUITY in IMPACT / SIGNIFICANCE over TIME?		

Reason 1: Security Interests
Desire to be Safe & Respected

- The idea of being 'bullied' by others globally was a very important psychological imprint etched deep into the minds of Beijing's leadership that spanned various different disputes across time:
 - *Felt that this had started all the way as early as the Chinese Civil War when USSR under Stalin had refused to support the CCP adequately*
 - *Seemingly confirmed when the USSR forced China to sign an unequal treaty in 1950*
 - *Tensions and suspicions only simmered further when USSR made China do the bulk of the fighting and troop support for North Korea during the Korean War*
 - *By the time Khrushchev came to power, the Chinese leadership had already become very sensitive to the notion of being bullied and was determined to lead the world communist movement. Khrushchev's personality, with his traits of a rash temper and do-first-think-later propensity, didn't help matters.*
 - *When Khrushchev withdrew Soviet experts from China in 1960 as a form of sanctions for Beijing's increasingly confrontational behavior, it further confirmed to China that they were being bullied and not respected enough.*
 - *When Khrushchev signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963 with the US, it became interpreted by the suspicious Mao as a form of Soviet-American sabotage against China's nuclear programme and its place in the world.*

Comparative Analysis of Significance

The ***desire for power and be respected globally was particularly played out in ideological disputes*** over the right to interpret ideology and the best strategy to lead the world communist movement to its successful end-goal victory against the capitalists.

It was this fundamental underlying desire for power and respect that became one of the most contentious issues that consistently sustained the Sino-Soviet split over and above personality clashes and ideological differences. Ideological differences (as played out in various cases that facilitate tensions as seen in the earlier section of the notes) merely rationalized the downward slide in the Sino-Soviet relationship and made it more difficult for both to bridge their ties as doing so will require one side to give in and acknowledge the other's power and authority.³

- Ever since the 1950s, Mao was frustrated by the attitude of the USSR in sharing its nuclear weapons. The USSR only agreed to give China a nuclear deterrent if China allowed the USSR to control its use and its defence policy. This Mao could not agree to. Mao stated that this approach betrayed the revolutionary ideal and was also patronizing. He asserted that the Soviets did not view the other Communist countries as equals.
- After Soviet nuclear cooperation was withdrawn in 1959, Chinese nuclear physicists managed to piece together hundreds of shredded documents on nuclear technology. This knowledge enabled China to press ahead with developing its own bomb.
- However in 1963 the USSR and USA signed the Test Ban Treaty which suspended the atmospheric testing of nuclear bombs. To the PRC, USSR was again abandoning its role as revolutionary leader and instead working with the imperialist powers. Mao viewed this as an act of betrayal on the part of the USSR and an attempt to ensure that China could not develop its own weapons.
- Despite this, in 1964, China detonated its first atomic bomb and this was a huge achievement for China. It not only meant that the PRC would have to be taken seriously as an international power, but it also demonstrated to the USSR that it did not need Soviet support. To push this point, the Chinese codenamed their first bomb '59/6', after the year and month that Soviet atomic advisors had been withdrawn.
- Mao appeared not to be as wary of nuclear catastrophe. Indeed, he suggested that nuclear weapons were a toll of diplomacy. He also saw them as a key to China usurping the Soviet Union as leader of the international Communist struggle.

Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969:

Security & Power Dynamics Leads to Direct Fighting: Cumulative Build-up?

- Some historians viewed 1969 as the lowest point in Sino-Soviet relations for a number of reasons:
 - *Serious border incidents threatened to turn into full-scale war*
 - *The PRC and Soviet Union realigned missiles to face one another*
 - *There was an intensification of the rivalry to be the leading communist nation*

³ <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-019-00030-x>

- *The USSR even secretly asked the USA what the US would do in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on China. It forced China to consider better relations with the USA as a way to offset the Soviet threat. Mao understood that the PRC could not simultaneously confront the USSR and the USA, and suppress internal disorder. During 1970, when the Vietnam War was at its worst, and Chinese anti-American rhetoric at its zenith, Mao perceived that China's geographic neighbors, the Soviets, were the greater threat, and thus Mao sought a pragmatic rapprochement with the US, in confronting the USSR.*

Reason 2: Ideological Differences Desire for One's Version / Strategy to Prevail & Adopted

- There were also **ideological differences** which accounted for the lack of Soviet support to the CCP as early as 1949 – 1950.
 - Stalin felt that Mao's interpretation of Marxism, using peasants as the basis for revolution, was not genuine revolutionary Marxism, which should feature workers leading an urban-based class war. Mao's unorthodox method was tolerated as legitimate only because all other types of insurrection in China had failed. Mao's approach was thus never endorsed by Stalin as proper.
 - Stalin was mistrustful of any rivals within the Communist World and feared Mao as a rival for the leadership of the Communist world.
 - Stalin did not want to spread the Cold War and Soviet commitments into Asia at a time when war in Europe seemed likely after WWII.
 - Stalin also knew that Chiang's GMD would recognize Soviet claims to the disputed border territory along frontiers in Manchuria and Xinjiang. Stalin underestimated the CCP and believed the CCP's rival GMD to be the stronger party. He urged the CCP to unite with the GMD, even in the late 1940s when CCP victory was looking inevitable.
- When Khrushchev left office in 1964 and even when Mao died in 1976, there were some initial signs of hope that the Sino-Soviet relationship will improve.
 - *In November 1964, a mission led by Premier Zhou Enlai was sent to the USSR to improve Sino-Soviet relations, but there was to be no reconciliation as Brezhnev insisted that the Soviets insisted on peaceful coexistence with the West and the Soviet defence minister Marshall Rodion Malinowski actually urged Zhou Enlai to return home and overthrow Mao.*
- But ideological disputes CONTINUED to cause tensions as even after Khrushchev left, Mao continued to call on other Communist countries to follow the Chinese model rather than the 'revisionist' Soviet system. Thus seemingly suggesting the importance of the underlying role of ideological differences in causing the continuity of the hostility, rather than personality dislike per se between leaders.
- And on the Soviet side even under a new leader Brezhnev, they continued to attempt to isolate the PRC within the worldwide communist movement. When Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to eliminate 'revisionists' and China descended yet again into internal crisis, the Soviet denounced the revolution as total fanaticism, and criticized Mao for creating a state of anarchy.

- *Mao condemned the use of force by USSR in 1968 against Czechoslovakia authorized by Brezhnev. This was not only because the USSR was no longer behaving in a 'truly socialist' manner in his eyes, but also because he was worried that Soviet military might and the Brezhnev Doctrine could be turned against China; thereby showing that this wasn't merely a personality dislike fuelling on the Sino-Soviet tension.*
- The Soviets also took the opportunity to attack the PRC on a number of other propaganda fronts during the Cultural Revolution, including the following accusations:
 - *Trading illegally with the apartheid regime in South Africa*
 - *Receiving assistance from West Germany on nuclear research*
 - *Developing a worldwide opium trade*
 - *Sending supplies to U.S. forces in Vietnam*

Great Leap Forward (1958 – 1962) **Growing Ideological Divergences**

- The Great Leap Forward (GLF) was initiated by Mao to end China's dependence on Soviet aid and an ideological rejection of the Soviet model of economic development – whereas the USSR stressed the role of expertise and the working class in developing the economy, the GLF was based on the enthusiasm of peasants. However, these agricultural and industrial plans were also hailed as enabling China to reach the stage of communism before the Soviet Union; ***thereby reflecting a desire for SECURITY & POWER through adopting a certain ideological approach.***
- Effects: Serious problems began to emerge. Mao promoted the construction of small backyard steel furnaces in every commune but the steel produced was of low quality. China's harvest rotted in the fields too and millions died from starvation. In 1959, Mao was held responsible and forced to step down as State Chairman of China.
- The Soviet government declared that the concepts and applications used were 'unorthodox', and the Soviet official press revelled in the failure, denouncing Mao; thereby worsening the ideological strains in the relationship.

DISPUTES CONTINUED on....Cultural Revolution, 1966–1976 **Worsened & Deepened Ideo Differences & Power Play Dynamics**

- Mao's 'Cultural Revolution' of the 1960s & 1970s was an ideological campaign to initiate a revolution to eliminate the creeping return of bourgeois thinking and behaviour by hunting down intellectuals and CCP officials allegedly guilty of 'revisionist' attitudes. Mao believed that this would re-ignite the class struggle, and to also consolidate his personal control.
- Mao outlined a new ideological insight that the USA and the USSR were 'the global cities', and China and the Third World were 'the global countryside'. This was significant because Mao argued that the workers in the 'countryside' were the true revolutionaries, whereas the 'city' people were decadent bureaucrats. Mao linked the fight against the 'revisionists' within China - those accused of revising the theory of Marxism-Leninism, with the propaganda against the 'revisionist' USSR, which was now regarded as the PRC's number one enemy.

- Anti-Soviet propaganda inside China reached fever pitch and In August 1967, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, some 200,000 Maoist Red Guards laid siege to the Soviet embassy in Beijing. Many attacks got out of hand and as many as half a million people died. Meanwhile, Mao was able to get rid of his critics and resume supreme control of the PRC. While the excesses of the young Red Guards continued, Mao declared the Cultural Revolution over in 1969.

HOWEVER.....DO NOT BE SIMPLISTIC & OVER-HYPE THIS FACTOR'S SIGNIFANCE ALONE

- Even after China's Mao Zedong died in 1976, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, which he had richly contributed to, continued unabated, again demolishing the over importance attached to personality dislike and clashes for starting and sustaining the Sino-Soviet split which ***seems to be due to deeper underlying forces beyond a difference in ideological strategy and approach that differed between Soviet & Chinese leaders.***
- By 1976, anti-Chinese views had become institutionalized in the Soviet Union, as the Sino-phobic hawks such as Rakhmanin (*deputy head of a Central Committee department*) stubbornly clung to negative interpretations of China's evolving foreign policy. Leonid Brezhnev's physical decline (*by the late 1970s, he was incapable of independent decision-making*), gave the likes of Rakhmanin even more space to pursue a hostile policy toward China.
 - *Deng Xiaoping was less obsessed than Mao over the ideological direction and supposed Soviet betrayal of Marxism–Leninism (the term “revisionism” had by then long gone out of fashion) but remained just as concerned about the prospect of Soviet geopolitical gains in Asia.*
 - *Deng was in fact highly concerned about the USSR's increasing strategic geopolitical influence in Asia: such as growing ties with Vietnam, support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia bordering China, continued border skirmishes along the Sino-Soviet border, and actions in the Middle East such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.*
- **Analysis:** For China, the rise of Deng Xiaoping to the top post in Beijing by eventually succeeding Mao Zedong did not bring about an improvement in Sino-Soviet ties as well. This leads us to question how impactful and important really was the force of ideological differences as a key reason for sustaining and starting the Sino-Soviet split.

Reason 3: Developments in Superpower & Sino-Soviet Relations
(Pragmatic Calculations in Reacting for Best Interests to Survive & Thrive)

- *Initial Confrontation b/w US & China: Taiwan Issue*
- *End of Cold War Developments in 1980s*

Superpower & Cold War Developments: 1950s – 1970s:
Worsened Relations

- WORSENERED relations as it made China & USSR each feel more threatened in their security that made them determined to push their vision, plans and ideas forward to attain their goals and definition of 'security' in reaction to developments.

Taiwan Issue:

- The signing of the US-Taiwan defence treaty of 1954 and the two Straits Crises of the 1950s that saw the U.S. responding to the Chinese assault by mobilizing the 7th fleet to assist the Nationalists with a blockade in the Taiwan Strait to ensure that Quemoy and Matsu would receive necessary supplies for the duration of the crisis all showed to China that the US was a dangerous threat.
- Significance: Given how the USSR under Khrushchev did not support Mao fully in taking back Taiwan, it reinforced perceptions in Mao Zedong that the USSR under Khrushchev with its 'peaceful co-existence' stance with the West could not be trusted and relied upon. This was particularly important to China as the issue of Taiwan was deemed to be a vital issue that prevents the full reunification of the island with the mainland, and the rival GMD still based in Taiwan.

2nd Indochina War (Vietnam War) & 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War:
Negatively Shaped Ties - Worries over Strategic Power Influence through Proxies

- The 2nd Indochina War as a Cold War battleground between the Communist North and US-supported South was another source of tension as it led both China & USSR to fear about strategic security and influence as they PRAGMATICALLY put-aside their common Communist bonds to compete in seeking to win support and influence over the communist Vietminh in the Indochina War. They did so as this would give either China or the USSR influence as the main 'champion' against US imperialism. China also had a strategic interest in Indochina as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were on its border, and they could not afford to see Vietnam becoming too close in relations with the Soviets.
- Struggle between the USSR and the PRC to win the Vietnamese Communists to 'their' side in the ideological split: China accused the USSR of being in league with the USA in Vietnam, and the PRC refused to allow the USSR to use Chinese airports for Soviet airlifts to Vietnam.
- Having lost influence over Vietnam to the Soviets, China attempted to make up for this strategic defeat by forming a closer relationship with Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge party in Cambodia, and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 reflected again how COLD WAR and SUPERPOWER DEVELOPMENTS CAN lead to pragmatic considerations that negatively affect the Sino-Soviet relationship.

- The Khmer Rouge were a 'Maoist' party supported by the PRC and in many ways, Pol Pot's regime was modelled on 'Maoism' and between 1975-79, the Pol Pot regime murdered over 2.5 million people; whose brutality exceeded anything perpetrated in the Cultural Revolution.
- Following a series of clashes on the border, the USSR-backed Vietnam invaded Cambodia on 24 December 1978, stating 'regime change' and deposing Pol Pot as its aim. Vietnam expelled all Chinese people from the territory they occupied. Many of these exiles became the 'boat people' who were later stranded at sea attempting to find refuge.
- China retaliated by calling the invasion 'Soviet expansionism' and in response to the overthrow of its pro-Chinese puppet state in Cambodia, China launched an invasion of Vietnam on 17th February 1979 in order to protect Cambodia.
- At the United Nations (UN), both sides declared the other was the aggressor and the USSR declared its intervention was on 'humanitarian grounds'. There was no quick victory for the Chinese and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was forced to withdraw due to heavy casualties after months of fighting. Although Vietnam had clearly won the war, the PLA claimed success.
- Significance: The conflict again revealed how developments in the Cold War and superpower relationship that have implications pragmatically on China & Soviet strategic influence and interests can and did negatively shape ties to become more hostile despite both being Communist countries.

End of Cold War Developments in 1980s: **Normalized Relations**

- However, while the above had shown how Cold War & superpower developments can shape Sino-Soviet ties negatively, it **CONVERSELY helped to NORMALIZE relations in the 1980s** as the practical interests change in this time as China and the USSR reacted to events to be safe as they adjusted and toned down their ideological disputes.
- By 1986, USSR's annual GNP growth was only 1.4%: *Economy was too focused on heavy industries and military products; very little consumer goods & vital social services were available*
- To reform the Soviet economy, Gorbachev realized that his foreign policy priority must be to end the expensive Cold War and obtain technology and funds to help revive and save the Soviet economy. He thus sought to end the Cold War and this had drastic implications in the Soviet Union's foreign relations, which China took note of.
- Gorbachev's foreign policy elevated Soviet international status to unprecedented heights and achieved substantial results in reducing Cold War tensions.....the Politburo majority, the KGB, and the military did not imagine that Gorbachev would be prepared to bring the Cold War to an end, at the cost of destruction of the Soviet external empire in Central Europe and fatal instability in the Soviet Union.
- Significance: In light of Gorbachev's radical new approach and policies, China saw a pragmatic opportunity in normalizing ties to maximise the interests to be gained from doing so, and hence

was willing to make efforts to normalize ties with the USSR when Gorbachev seemed to be sincere in making concessions to China in light of the end of Cold War developments and new foreign policy priority for the USSR; once again, this shows how past historical disputes over security and ideological issues can and were put aside if and when mutual interests align when conditions are pragmatically suitable for mutual national interests to do so.

<u>Conclusion & Interpretations</u> Sino-Soviet Relations
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- Was it a surprise? Why do you say so?
- Interpretations of the Sino–Soviet split can on the whole be divided between those that see it as the result of a traditional clash of great power interests and those that seek a more theoretical approach and look at factors such as clashes over ideology and the nature of imperialism.
- The books produced in the 1960s and 1970s tended to reflect the former view and were influenced by the ‘realist’ theory of international relations. However, the increasing availability of Chinese sources, including secret speeches by Mao, have allowed historians to concentrate more on the importance of ideological issues and the stress put by the Chinese on the struggle against imperialism.
- Lorenz M. Luthi (2008): The newly available documents point to the role of ideology in the Sino-Soviet split. Both Chinese Communists and the Soviets were true believers in Marxist-Leninism. The discord between Beijing and Moscow arose over the method of establishing a socialist society domestically, and over the joint policy of the socialist camp toward the capitalist world.
- Furthermore, while ideology was central, it increasingly became entangled in internal politics. Leadership conflicts led Mao Zedong to exploit the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations for his own goals, abroad and at home.

Chapter 1B: Development of Sino-US Relations
Negative to Positive Improvement: Why / How / Effects / Expected?

<u>Worsening (1949 - 1968)</u> Basic Theoretical Ideological Divide	<u>Improvement Process (1969 – 1979)</u> Realistically put Ideo Diff Aside (Mutual Security Needs, Benefits & Interests)
- Ideo. Stereotypes about 'other' side → USA: Saw PRC as expansionist power out to take over Asia (<i>Domino Theory</i>) → PRC: Saw USA as hostile imperialist power that is out to destroy PRC <u>Korea & Taiwan Impact</u> - Negative Impressions were further enhanced and facilitated due to Experiences by PRC & USA in Korean War (<i>CW Episode</i>) → Memory of Hatred from Fighting → Impression of Aggressive Expansionism by both sides ("<i>Domino Theory</i>" & US "<i>Imperialism attempts</i>") → Reinforced Mutual Desire to Stand Up & Contain the 'Other': Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam - Evidence of Mutual Hostility → No recognition: PRC was refused UN seat → Actual Fighting in Korean War → 2 Taiwan Straits Crises (1950s) → Strengthening of Japan (Containment) → Trade Embargoes → Using "Proxies" to Fight (Vietnam)	- China's Problems & Constraints by 1969 → Sino Soviet Clashes at border → Encircled by US Acts /Arc of Containment → Chaos from Cultural Revolution - US's Problems & Constraints by 1969 → Need to withdraw from Vietnam → Economic Problems with Vietnam War → Need to advance SALT talks & reduce chances of MAD <u>Realpolitik</u> based on Practical Considerations & Benefits - Initiated by US President Nixon & Advisor Kissinger with Mao/Zhou Enlai → Removal of trade embargo against PRC → Important Secret negotiations by Henry Kissinger (National Security Advisor) → Ping Pong Diplomacy (1971) → Shanghai Communique (1972) → Work together to contain & prevent USSR dominance in Asia - US President Jimmy Carter continued this with Deng Xiaoping → Full Diplomatic Recognition: 1979 - Evidence of Mutual Compromises → UN Membership for PRC → Taiwan's Status → Vietnam War & Vietnamese Allies → Trade Issues: PRC, Japan, USA
<u>Deeper Thinking & Critique</u> Was ideological theoretical differences and stereotypes enough to ALWAYS affect ties?	

<u>Realpolitik & Rapprochement b/w US & China in the 1970s</u> (Pragmatic Realist for Mutual Benefits: overcame ideological differences & historical tensions)	
<u>Initiator: Washington</u> Placed national interests above the theoretical ideological beliefs –willing to even work together with ideological rival PRC to counter the USSR in CW!	<u>Reciprocated by: Beijing</u> Ironically teamed with an ideological rival (USA) and played power politics against a former comrade and ideological brother (USSR) bounded by a 1950 treaty of alliance.
The value of a common ideological belief system as a bonding glue (<i>Communists vs Capitalists/Democratic</i>) was devalued as a meaningful reference to guide policy actions in Beijing and Washington due to convergence of mutual interests.	

Rapprochement Turning Point (Watershed) for Cold War from 1972

Became a Tri-polar Competition (US-USSR-PRC) instead of just Bi-polar

Analysis & Evaluation of US-PRC Relationship over Time (Change & Continuity)

Irreconcilable ideological orientations initially wrecked hostility in the US-PRC relationship, but it proved insufficient in the long-run to prevent both from gradually coming closer together from 1969 to 1979 in search of common interests against their common foe (USSR) in light of enhanced threats and developments then (unique context then).

Why Change over Time towards Pragmatic Realistic Decisions of Realpolitik?

By 1969, **both USA and PRC faced increasingly severe threats to their interests by developments as a partial result of the Cold War that ironically made both willing to shelve their theoretical differences aside to get mutual gains** in the 1972 Shanghai Communique. The idea of using ideological beliefs to demarcate 'good' and 'bad' to decide on one's allies was abandoned.

While the Sino-US relationship was transformed for the better after 1969 / 1972 partially because of Cold War security concerns against the mutual foe (USSR), the key underlying reason why these ideological differences could be shelved was largely because **both faced enhanced threats by 1969, and thus accepted to make a conscious realistic choice to manipulate the Cold War and each other for mutual benefits against the USSR in the heightened security threat environment to survive –**

The Cold War had now become a tripolar triangular power play amongst the 3 sides as they each sought to outdo and outrival the other through manipulation of one against the other. Ideological lenses and beliefs were no longer sufficient alone to serve as a guide to choose one's friends.

WHO GAINED MORE IN THIS TILT TOWARDS IMPROVEMENT IN TIES??

Superficially on the surface....

Both made security, strategic and economic gains that enhanced their respective govts' standing in the world and domestic population eyes.

In reality.....

However, PRC arguably gained more because the strategically encircled PRC (by US Containment Arc & USSR border threat) could improve its security and get ideological foe USA to not only diplomatically recognize it, but to also make concessions on trade and the key issue of Taiwan which together allowed the CCP govt to move on from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.

Final Outcome Impact: Positive or Negative or Both?

- 1) *Mutual Strategic Gains: Vietnam, Taiwan, USSR, SALT*
- 2) *Changed Cold War to become tripolar: Less likely to result in outbreak of direct war*
- 3) *Reduced MAD & Enhanced Peace Prospects*
- 4) *Boost Both Govts' Domestic Popularity through foreign policy gains against USSR*

CONFRONTATION	a) Sino-Soviet Alliance & Korean War (1950 – 1953) b) US Support for Taiwan from 1950s c) Competition during 2 nd Indochina War • Increased mutual enmity & distrust over security & ideological threats.
RAPPROCHEMENT & NORMALISATION	a) US President Nixon's Visit to China (1972) b) Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (1979) • Pragmatic willingness to put aside ideological differences and past historical tensions for MUTUAL BENEFITS AT THAT TIME GIVEN CONTEXTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CHINA & US in the late 1960s & the 1970s

<u>Reason 1</u> Security Interests: Desire to be Safe & Respected	<u>Reason 2</u> Ideological Differences & Visions	<u>Reason 3</u> Developments in Superpower & Sino-Soviet Relations
- <i>US: Fear of Domino Theory after Vietnam War</i> - <i>China: 1969 Sino Soviet Border clash & US Containment Arc against PRC</i>	- <i>Saw China & USSR as one single monolithic Communist entity out to take over the world in a domino theory fashion; esp after 1950 Treaty of Friendship, and the Korean War.</i>	- <i>US needed help with Vietnam Withdrawal</i> - <i>US & China's Economic Problems</i> - <i>Détente in Cold War: SALT & Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)</i>
<u>EVALUATION</u> - Which of these reasons is the ROOT reason? How / why so? - Which of these is the OVER-ARCHING / UNDERLYING reason? How / why so? - Which of these is a MINOR reason? How / why so? - Any CHANGE / CONTINUITY in IMPACT / SIGNIFICANCE over TIME?		

INQUIRY:

- 1) ***How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?***
- 2) ***Were developments in the Sino-US relationship a surprise?***

CONFRONTATION FROM 1950s

Different Ideologies, Increased Mutual Enmity & Distrust over Security and Ideological Threats

- ***Background: Theoretical Ideological Clash***
- ***Korean War (1950–1953): mutual distrust as security and ideological threats; impact of superpower rivalry and Sino-Soviet alliance; China's and the USA's responses to the Korean War; increased mutual enmity***
- ***The USA's support for Taiwan: diplomatic recognition; support during First and Second Taiwan Straits Crises (1954- 1955 and 1958); economic and military support for Taiwan: Mutual Defence Treaty (1955), Foreign Assistance Act (1961), Taiwan Relations Act (1979)***
- ***Continual Sino-American confrontation (e.g., competition for allies during the Second Indochina War); attempts to avoid direct confrontation***

Background:

Theoretical Ideological Clash: Manifested into Support for Issue of Taiwan & Korean War

- During WWII, most U.S. aid to China went to Chiang Kai-Shek and his Nationalist Guomindang Party (GMD/KMT). After the Japanese withdrawal from China after WWII, the CCP and the GMD fought each other in the civil war. The Americans pumped material assistance and advice to Chiang's 'anti-communist' forces, but this did not bring about Chiang's victory and the US perception of Chiang was shattered as a result. The US came to doubt Chiang's abilities and even considered stopping aid to Chiang after his disastrous defeat in the civil war.
- When Mao Zedong and the CCP came to power in Oct 1949, the US refused to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a legitimate state even as they contemplated whether or not to continue supporting Chiang Kai Shek who had fled to Taiwan. The failure of Chiang in the civil war had made the US support for him to waver. This however changed after the Korean War broke out as the US became convinced that support must be given to anyone who is willing to contain China who seems to be an expansionist monolithic force out to take over Asia under Communism. The US was also concerned over the Chinese development of nuclear weapons.
- The fall of China to Communism alarmed the USA as it was perceived as the fusion of a monolithic Communist block and the USA refused to recognise the PRC even as they were hesitant to continue supporting the corrupt and inefficient Chiang Kai Shek.
- It was only after the Korean War that Taiwan became the key area of dispute as the Americans became determined to ensure that it was the anti-Communists on Taiwan and not the PRC that was given China's seat at the UN.

- **Significance Analysis:** The Taiwan issue became the focus for the underlying ideological conflict that initially mirrored the divide between the USA and the USSR. By itself however, this theoretical ideological clash were not sufficient to plunge the Sino-US relationship into an acrimonious confrontation although they did set the base / foundation of mistrust and mental stereotypes that will be confirmed in subsequent events when their strategic interests did not align.

Issue of the Korean War (1950 – 1953):

Manifested into Sino-US Military Clash & Hardened Theoretical Stereotypes

- At the end of WWII, Korea was divided along the 38th Parallel – the North was under a Communist regime and the South under an anti-Communist government. The North was supported by the Soviets, and the South, initially had been supported by the Americans. When the North, under Kim Il Sung, invaded the South in 1950, the U.S. State Department believed that this attack was under the direction of Stalin and Mao as part of a ‘joint venture’ by the new Communist bloc in Asia that sparked off domino theory fears.
- The PRC had not been particularly concerned with the divided Korea as its continuing focus was on Taiwan and Tibet. It was also attempting to consolidate control within mainland China itself and to initiate ‘revolutionary’ reforms. At the same time, the Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations because of the U.S. refusal to officially recognize the PRC. Therefore, in the vote to send U.N. troops into Korea to defend the South, the Soviet Union did not use its veto.
- **Significance:** Mao condemned American action, but the USA justified its position by claiming that the North had been the ‘aggressors’. Mao countered by claiming that the South had been the initial aggressors. Although U.S. forces arrived in South Korea under the U.N. flag in June 1950, the PRC’s Zhou En-Lai asserted that the U.S. troops were imperialist invaders.
- **Effects:** The PRC organized mass demonstrations in China and warned the Americans that it would be forced to intervene if there was any push into the North and there were already thousands of the People’s Liberation Army troops fighting with the North Korean as ‘volunteers’. A military clash erupted in October 1950, U.N. troops under General Douglas MacArthur crossed north over the 38th Parallel and the PRC sent in millions to fight in defence. By 1953, the PLA had lost nearly a million men & Sino-US ties had soured considerably.

Impact of the Korean War on Sino-American Relations

Positive/Negative? Short/Long Term? Surprising?

While the Chinese and Americans stopped trying to kill each other in Korea following the Panmunjon Amnesty⁴, the Korean War's open conflict built unremitting hostility into the Sino-American confrontation, which would fuel its continuation until the early 1970s.

- 1) *Beijing's desire to be a regional superpower*
- 2) *US Multi-faceted Containment of China*
- 3) *US Commitment to the Defence of Taiwan*
- 4) *Sino-U.S. Competition in East Asia*
- 5) *Open Sino-US hostility on the World Stage*
- 6) *Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954 & 1958*

(1) Beijing's Desire to be a Regional Superpower

- While the PRC had been considerably weakened in Korea, in terms of the loss of life and the economic cost, the war may have strengthened the political reputation position of the CCP.
- The fact that the Soviets had made Beijing pay the entire bill for the cost of supplies helped to rally the Chinese to their own Communist Party, and made them more determined to stand alone. Mao emphasized that it was Chinese, and not Soviet blood, that had been spilled for the 'international Communist cause'.
- For Beijing, persistence of the U.S. policy of military and economic containment of the PRC after the Korean armistice not only threatened its national security, but also its aspirations to re-establish China's place as the foremost nation in East Asia.
- World War II had shattered old forms of political and economic organization throughout the region, and Mao and his associates had a powerful sense of mission to assert leadership in guiding the course of revolutionary change in neighbouring states. Mao, in particular, was sensitive to the historic place China held as the "middle kingdom" model for its neighbours.
- **Significance:** The PRC was committed to promoting Marxism-Leninism as a blueprint for national development and encouraging emulation of the Chinese revolution. This reinforced Beijing's greater desire to recreate a political and economic sphere of influence in areas adjacent to China, as well as purge the U.S. presence in the region.

(2) U.S. Strategic & Economic Containment of China

- A major legacy of the Korean War was that it motivated the US in the 1950s to oppose China from:
 - *Re-establishing China's position as the preeminent nation in East Asia*
 - *Seeking reunification through acquisition of Taiwan*
 - *Elevating Beijing's international status as a recognized and respected world power that is treated equally by the US.*

⁴ The Panmunjom Peace talks not only made way for an Armistice ending gunfire between the North and South Korean, it also established the guidelines for all future interactions between the two nations and ended the Korean War.

- This did not occur until the Korean War, which strengthen the US resolve to contain the supposed aggressive expansionist ambitions of PRC as the Truman Administration created an alliance system (*US Arc of Containment against PRC through Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Philippines*) to contain the perceived threat of Chinese expansion in Asia.
- **Significance:** Significantly, the Korean War ended division in Washington regarding Japan's future, as the Pentagon agreed to early restoration of sovereignty and the State Department reciprocated with agreement to future Japanese rearmament.
 - *In September 1951, the Japanese Peace Treaty provided for independence the following May, but only after Tokyo had promised neither to recognize nor trade with the PRC.*
 - *Japan signed separately a bilateral security pact with the US allowing US troops to remain in Japan indefinitely.*
- *US Arc of Containment of China: To assuage fears of a revived Japan, Washington negotiated security agreements with several nations in East Asia, thereby constructing an off-shore line of military alliances along China's eastern and southern borders. In August 1951, it signed a mutual defence pact with the Philippines pledging mutual protection from aggression. The next month, the US signed a similar agreement with Australia and New Zealand known as the ANZUS Treaty. In August 1953, Dulles negotiated the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Security Treaty.*
- As another barrier to contain China's expansion, the U.S. also organized the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. In light of the military victory won by the communist led Vietminh in Vietnam, SEATO's declared purpose was to organize collective security to deter, or if necessary defeat, Chinese communist aggression in the region.
- Along with negotiating new defence pacts, U.S. leaders intensified the economic warfare begun during the Korean War.
 - *September 1952: US joined with Britain, France, Canada, and Japan in forming the China Committee (CHINCOM), a working group to maintain strict export controls against the PRC and other Communist states in Asia.*
 - *Washington, London, Paris, and Ottawa could not agree on the appropriate export control*
 - *US also established a separate Far Eastern Group in Asia to impose stiffer export controls on the PRC and North Korea than what the Coordinating Committee on East-West Trade Policy (COCOM) then was maintaining towards the European Soviet bloc. But Britain, France, and Canada opposed the U.S. proposal because none saw any benefit in losing Asian trade. The compromise was a creation of a separate Far Eastern Committee within the COCOM structure, which allowed U.S. officials to enforce more restrictive trade lists on exports to Asian Communist countries than the European Soviet bloc.*
 - *Additionally, the US pressured Japan into signing a bilateral agreement that required it to embargo 400 more goods against the PRC than other CHINCOM members.*

(3) Sino-U.S. Geopolitical Competition in East Asia

- China had sustained enormous damage in World War II and its civil war, but its strength still was very substantial relative to its neighbouring countries. Taking advantage of its central geographic location, large economy, and military prowess, Beijing acted quickly to re-establish regional hegemony. Pyongyang's failed invasion, historian Shen Zhihua points out, gave the PRC the chance to become "the main force" in Korea after intervention. Moreover, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) also occupied Tibet during the Korean War.

- 1950: Beijing had recognized Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), declaring its intention to help its new Communist ally end French colonialism. China had even more incentive to provide assistance after U.S. intervention in the Korean War. During July, a Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) began providing aid to Viet Minh headquarters and opened an officer candidate school in southern China.
- The PRC's support for the Viet Minh grew steadily, not least because the Truman administration was supplying France with economic and military aid against the communists. By 1954, Washington was financing 80% of the French war effort. China strived to match this support, sending large amounts of U.S.-made weapons captured during civil war, logistical support and ran a special artillery school for Viet Minh soldiers. PRC also maintained three hospitals in China to treat wounded Viet Minh fighters. "Chinese advisors," historian John Garver reports, "played a key role in formulating Viet Minh strategy and in directing Viet Minh forces in the execution of that strategy." Chinese assistance allowed Ho's forces to assume the offensive and, as is well known, lay siege to the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu early in 1954.

(4) US Commitment to Taiwan's Defence after initial reluctance

- The Americans had previously been reluctant to guarantee long-term protection for Taiwan after being doubtful over Chiang's capabilities, but after the war they pledged themselves to it for fear of the domino theory materializing:
 - *Jan 1951: Truman administration had delivered to Taiwan \$29 million in military assistance. Thereafter, the State Department negotiated a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that gave legal foundation for the use of U.S. military aid for Taiwan's self-defense.*
 - *March 1951: creation of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on Taiwan, with responsibilities that included distributing military aid and advising the Guomindang on military training and organization. By 1952, MAAG personnel had risen to 770 Americans, who worked to reorganize ROC's armed forces and modernize its small air force/navy.*
- Main focus of Truman's policy was to create sufficient military strength on Taiwan to deter a Beijing attack, thereby preventing a conflict that he did not want to expand beyond Korea.
- **Significance:** Given the vital importance attached to Taiwan by Beijing, the US assistance to Taiwan was seen as an affront and simply unacceptable as it meant denying a united China under the legitimate leadership of the CCP in Beijing. Hence this only served to aggravate and worsen tensions between the US & China, seemingly confirming the mutual ideological stereotypes.

Open Sino-US hostility on the World Stage over Taiwan from 1950s

Spurred by KW Impact & Driven by Underlying Desire for Containment, Power and Respect

- After the Korean War, hostility between the PRC & US boiled over to open global hostility and rivalry over a variety of issues as each sought to out-manoeuvre the other in a show of strength. This was particularly so over the issue of Taiwan:
 - *The Korean War changed US opinion about Taiwan. It now recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government of China and the Eisenhower administration even adamantly opposed admitting the PRC to the UN. In June 1951, US Secretary of State Acheson declared that “a claimant for seating cannot shoot his way into the UN and cannot get in by defying the UN and fighting its forces.” Thereafter, annual Congressional resolutions threatened to end U.S. participation in the UN if it voted to oust Taiwan (ROC) in favour of PRC.*
 - *Furthermore, the 1954 Geneva Conference opened a new phase in the Sino-American confrontation, shifting the contest to the diplomatic stage. It was convened by members of the UN to seek both a resolution of the Indochina crisis and a settlement in Korea.*
 - **Significance:** *Beijing was acutely aware that this was its first opportunity to establish itself as a major actor in world politics. But the Eisenhower administration was determined to prevent this. Throughout the conference, the US made every effort to maintain its hostile posture against the PRC, denigrating Beijing’s position or refusing to recognize its status.*
 - *Most famously, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, upon a chance encounter, extended his hand to U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, who, instead of shaking it, walked away in an astonishing display of disrespect.*
 - *In July 1954, Moscow and Beijing persuaded Ho Chi Minh to accept the Geneva, which provided for separate governments in Laos and Cambodia and temporary division of Vietnam until elections for reunification in 1956. Not only did the US not sign the agreement facilitated by Beijing, it acted to divide Vietnam permanently.*

First Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954

- The Korean War had altered the American perspective towards Asia. In early 1950, President Truman stated: *“The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil strife in China.”* However, by 1953, Taiwan had become a key territory in American policy of containment in Asia.
- The PRC had not attempted to take Taiwan earlier for a number of reasons:
 - *Taiwan was well defended and the PRC was not confident it had the air power or landing craft.*
 - *The U.S. Navy 7th Fleet, which had been based in the area to secure it for strategic reasons during the Korean War, was now present.*
 - *At the end of the Korean War, the US stated it would protect Taiwan from aggression.*

- Following the Korean War armistice on 27th July 1953, the PRC focused on islands in the Taiwan Strait under the KMT - *Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu*. These were both advance bases for any attack against the Chinese mainland, and also Taiwan's first line of defence.
- On 3rd August 1954, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared the offshore islands to be strategically linked to the protection of Taiwan, which had become an essential part of the 'island chain' of positions that the U.S. was building across the Western Pacific.
- However, although negotiations over a mutual defence treaty between Taiwan and the U.S. were under way, CCP leaders were unconvinced of Washington's willingness to defend Taiwan. On 3rd December 1954, Mao decided to test the commitment of the US by shelling the islands of Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu. US President Eisenhower saw this as the opening gun of a military campaign aimed at seizing Taiwan. Instead, Beijing's intent was to warn the US not to sign a defence treaty with the ROC and persuade it to cease its hostile policies toward the PRC.

Significance: Taiwan came to Symbolize Global Communist Campaign by Beijing
Justified Increased US Support to Taiwan & Containment of PRC

- 1) US President Eisenhower suggested *that nuclear weapons would be used* if Taiwan was directly threatened. He also *extended US military aid and training program to the offshore islands*, including Jinmen and Matsu, as well as *transferring two more destroyers to the ROC*.
 - 2) **U.S-China Mutual Defence Treaty of 1954**: passed by Eisenhower that further showed US resolve and committed the U.S. to deploy land, sea, and air forces in and around Taiwan for its defence. It also stipulated that the ROC (Taiwan) and the US would aid each other to resist an armed attack or communist subversive activities directed against either's territorial integrity. The treaty therefore prolonged and assisted the Republic of China in maintaining legitimacy as the sole government of the whole of mainland China until the early 1970s.
 - 3) In addition, in January 1955, US Congress passed the **Formosa resolution**: authorized the President "to employ the Armed Forces of the US as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and defending Formosa and the Penghu islands against armed attack". The resolution also included the phrase "*security and protection of such related position and territories of that area now in friendly hands,*" - intended by Congress to include Jinmen and Matsu.
- Credibility Image of US at Stake: Eisenhower responded forcefully as U.S. had to show strength to its allies in the region after the Korean War, and he was also confident that the USSR would not support the PRC in a war.
 - Historian John Lewis Gaddis suggests that Chiang Kai-Shek had a role in bringing in the USA: "... *when Mao began shelling the offshore islands in September 1954 ... Chiang claimed the psychological effects of losing them would be so severe that his own regime in Taiwan might collapse. US responded as they had to South Korea: Chiang got a mutual defence treat.*"

2nd Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958

- On 23rd August 1958, China began shelling Quemoy and Matsu again, and at the same time there was a build-up of PLA troops in the area & US navy vessels were fired on in the Straits. The USA thus prepared for war with the PRC. Between 24 and 30th August, the U.S. built up its military presence, including an aircraft carrier, in the Taiwan Strait.
- US President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles announced that the U.S. regarded the Taiwan Strait, including Quemoy and Matsu, as being within its defence area. The crisis abated when U.S. forces helped to break the Chinese blockade of the islands and Beijing announced that it would suspend its bombardment. In the end, no full-scale attack on Taiwan came.

Significance:

- The US believed that the PRC was an expansionist state and provided leadership for other revolutionary countries: This view linked into the American domino effect theory and PRC was perceived as a genuine threat to the West's security.
- Therefore, the US pursued the following in relation to the containment of China:
 - *A U.S. trade embargo with the PRC*
 - *Obstruction of PRC entry to the United Nations*
 - *Huge economic aid and military aid to Taiwan*
 - *Aid programme for the region*
 - *Instigation of a regional containment bloc – SEATO*
 - *Bilateral defence treaties with Asian states seen as under the PRC threat.*

CONTINUED WORSENING TENSIONS & INDIRECT CONFRONTATION IN THE 1960s

- By the 1960s, even as the Sino-Soviet split worsened, the detrimental lingering effects of the Korean War on Sino-US ties persisted / continued on in the 1960s to continue to negatively affect Sino-US relations: 'containment and isolation' of China adopted by the Eisenhower administration was continued even under the apparently more liberal administration of President Kennedy.
- **Context & Significance:** China became more pre-occupied with the worsening Sino-Soviet split (*to the point of a military clash*), but the USA failed to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet split & did not do so until Nixon's Presidency (1969–1974). The Sino-Soviet quarrel was an opportunity for the USA to fracture the international communist network, which was part of their longstanding policy of Containment. However, just as the divergence between China and the USSR was approaching breaking point in the middle of the 1960s, the USA became deeply involved in Vietnam and this temporarily 'reunited' the entire Communist world including China & USSR against it.

Issue of Taiwan into the 1960s

Throughout the 1960s, the PRC persisted in its demands for the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland as the existence of a separate government and another China was deemed an affront to the Chinese nation and to Chinese nationalism; which only CONTINUED the Sino-US confrontation.

- Although there was no return to the brink of war that had occurred in the 1958 crisis, the issue was still of fundamental importance to Beijing. This was their overriding preoccupation, and no compromises, such as 'two Chinas', were acceptable. Any improvement in Sino-American relations could only be possible, in the PRC's view, when Taiwan no longer existed as a separate state.
- In the early 1960s, US President Kennedy went so far as to proclaim that a Chinese attack on one of Taiwan's offshore islands could be judged as a prelude to an assault on Taiwan itself, and that the U.S. military forces 'would take appropriate actions for its defence'.
- In 1961, the US Congress passed the **Foreign Assistance Act**, creating the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and entrenching foreign aid as a key element.
 - *The goal was of economic area denial, using foreign aid in American's efforts to "hold back communism." Under the Foreign Assistance Act, Washington provided Taiwan with financial aid, grants and technological expertise to help the economy's recovery.⁵ From 1961 to 1964, Taiwanese exports averaged a growth rate of 31% per year. Its growth rate rose steadily and in 1964 reached double digit figures, 12.6%, for the first time since 1951. Without a doubt, Taiwan's enormous growth rates were made possible by the security provided by the U.S. navy, backed up by a large infusion of American economic aid and scientific expertise.*

Significance by 1960s in comparison to 1950s

- Nonetheless, while Taiwan as an issue did continue to plague US-PRC relations as the US refused to abandon it outright and China also refused to give up its claims there, it had become *relatively* less important by the 1960s compared to other issues and deeper strategic worries that had risen to the fore in that period. There was no repeat of the Taiwan Straits Crises of the 1950s. This was because of the rise of other more pressing concerns for both China and the US:
 - *For the US, its attention increasingly became more focused on the worsening Vietnam War which saw the US increasing its military commitment without returns in what eventually became a very expensive quagmire and greatly damaged the US government's credibility by even claiming the political career of President Lyndon Johnson who could not stand for re-election as a result.*
 - *For China, it became increasingly more focused on the threat of the Soviet Union as the Sino-Soviet split became increasingly more antagonized to the point of a military clash along its border. Handling the impact of the domestic chaos resulting from the Cultural Revolution also meant that it had little time to focus on taking back Taiwan and entangling with the US over it.*

⁵ Previously in the 1950s, much of the U.S. aid was used in infrastructure and the agricultural sector.

DEEPER ANALYSIS TO WORSENING RELATIONS AFTER KOREAN WAR & TAIWAN ISSUE

DID THE KOREAN WAR MERELY ACCELERATE PRE-EXISTING IDEOLOGICAL HOSTILITY??

- *Recap: During WWII, the US had some direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and had given it some material assistance against the common enemy, Japan. However, most U.S. aid went to Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Guomindang Party (GMD).*
- *Recap: When Mao Zedong and the CCP came to power in October 1949, the US refused to recognize the Communist-controlled People's Republic of China (PRC) as a legitimate state. Instead, they backed Chiang Kai-Shek who, at the end of the Chinese civil war, had fled to the island of Taiwan, off the coast of mainland China.*
- *Recap of Other Issues in the 1940s: Non-Recognition of PRC, & Criticisms over PRC actions in Tibet*

Analysis:

The Korean War's open conflict, which saw mutual loss of lives, built unrelenting hostility and confirmed pre-existing stereotypes into an already tense Sino-American confrontation, which would fuel its continuation until the early 1970s. This intensification spilled over the prior pre-existing theoretical ideological divide into a broader and fiercer global rivalry for geopolitical supremacy and prestige against the other that manifested itself in various issues, such as over Taiwan.

SUMMARY OF US AID TO TAIWAN OVER TIME (1950s – 1970s)

Driven by Underlying Force of Security & Strategic Interests given Cold War developments rather than Ideological Differences PER SE SUPERFICIALLY

1945 – 1949	• Theoretical ideological clash • US support for Chiang Kai Shek (GMD/KMT) in China's Civil War against Mao Zedong's CCP • Despite massive US aid, Chiang failed and fled to Taiwan after losing the civil war. US contemplated stopping aid to Chiang in 1949	Hostile Sino-US ties
1950s <i>Truman</i> <i>Eisenhower</i> <i>Dulles</i>	• Korean War changed US opinion towards Taiwan: Military clash between China & US troops. US saw China under Mao Zedong as an expansionist threat in Asia with a firm belief in the domino theory threat • Taiwan thus assumed great importance for the US strategy in containing China's supposed expansionist desires in Asia. → Eisenhower extended US military aid and training program to the offshore islands as well as transferring two more destroyers to ROC. → 1954: U.S-China Mutual Defence Treaty → 1955: US Congress passed the Formosa resolution that authorized the President "to employ the Armed Forces of the US for securing and defending Taiwan Straits" • Taiwan Straits Crises (1954 & 1958) only served to confirm to the US that their decision to support Taiwan was right and that China's militaristic expansionistic acts must be contained or risk losing out in the Cold War.	Hostile Sino-US ties

1960s <i>Kennedy</i> <i>Johnson</i> <i>Nixon</i>	• US continued to support Taiwan & China maintained their ambitions. → <i>1961: US passed the Foreign Assistance Act, creating the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which aided Taiwan's economy.</i> • BUT Taiwan became less impactful as compared to the 1950s in affecting Sino-US ties by now as other more urgent concerns and events sapped up both countries' attention: → <i>US: Expensive Vietnam War quagmire & domestic unhappiness</i> → <i>China: Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet split & Cultural Revolution Chaos.</i>	Hostile Sino-US ties
1972 <i>Nixon</i> <i>Kissinger</i>	• Realpolitik and events during this context meant that China and US had to work together to shelve differences aside for the greater benefit to their strategic and economic gains at this point. • Taiwan's interests were secondary to US interests & concerns: → <i>US to set up liaison office in Beijing (in addition to the one in Taiwan)</i> → <i>Committed the US & Beijing to increased cooperation & trade.</i> → <i>BUT....Taiwan issue must be peacefully resolved.</i>	Positive Sino-US ties
1979 <i>Carter</i>	• Taiwan became "sacrificed" to the larger strategic interest. → <i>Official diplomatic recognition of Beijing by the US</i> → <i>One China Policy: Taiwan is part of China and there can only be one China and not 2 Chinas.</i> • Taiwan was not abandoned by the US totally. → <i>US President Carter reaffirmed that the US maintained the position that the Taiwan issue must be peacefully resolved.</i> → <i>US continued to maintain links with Taiwan</i>	Positive Sino-US ties

SUMMARY OF CHINA'S AID TO NORTH VIETNAM OVER TIME (1960s – 1970s)
Driven by Underlying Force of Security & Strategic Interests rather than Ideology

1950s <u>US</u> Truman Eisenhower <u>USSR</u> Khrushchev	• Cautious: In several official exchanges between top Beijing and Hanoi leaders in 1955-56, the recurring message was for Hanoi to focus on urgently consolidate in the North (NOT expand war to South!) • The Chinese who came to advise the North Vietnamese had trouble getting along with the local commanders who saw the Chinese as arrogant and condescending.	Hostile Sino-US ties
1960s <u>US</u> Kennedy Johnson <u>USSR</u> Khrushchev Kosygin	• US saw Beijing as being the mastermind working with Moscow to direct North Vietnam's takeover of Vietnam under Communism. • China was determined to prevent North Vietnam from collapsing: 1) <i>Fellow Communist brother ties</i> 2) <i>Gain prestige from standing up for the weak against the US</i> 3) <i>Prevent possible security threat if US were to take over Vietnam: memory of Korean War Yalu River incident.</i> 4) <i>Gain valuable ally in the Sino-Soviet rivalry for leadership of the world communist bloc</i> • After 1962, China's involvement grew officially and they helped North Vietnam to prolong US struggles in Vietnam: 1) <i>Train Vietnamese Military Commanders</i> 2) <i>Reorganize Vietnamese Defense & Financial Systems</i> 3) <i>Helped to create a solid economic base for Vietnam</i> 4) <i>Helped to mobilize Vietnamese peasants to support war through land reform campaigns</i> 5) <i>Massive transfer of Chinese Experience of Making Revolution to the Vietnamese</i> • Significance: <i>This freed North Vietnamese troops for deployment to assist the Vietcong in the South against the ROV and the US forces.</i> • After the 1968 Tet Offensive debacle, the US public had no more desire for continued US involvement in Vietnam: Richard Nixon won the US Presidential elections on the promise of exiting Vietnam. • From 1969, President Nixon believed that China's help will be valuable to helping the US leave Vietnam with some dignity: gain concessions for its proxy South Vietnam and a period of stability before any major Communist take-over. This was to ensure some saving grace for US credibility image. Nixon thus began to play the 'Soviet card' against China to maximize the gains from the Sino-Soviet rivalry: believed that China will help put pressure on North Vietnam.	Hostile Sino-US ties
1970s <u>US</u> Nixon <u>USSR</u> Brezhnev	• March 1973: US formally exited from the Vietnam War after China put pressure on North Vietnam to agree to the terms with the US. • April 1975: South Vietnam finally fell to the Communists	Positive Sino-US ties

Issue of Indochina War

Competition for Allies & Strategic Influence to CONTAIN DOMINO THEORY FEARS OF SPREAD OF COMMUNISM TO THREATEN US IDEOLOGY & INTERESTS

- The war seriously heightened tensions between the USA and the Asia-Pacific region, including not just the traditional ideological foes like China but also America's own allies. It also greatly sapped US, USSR and China's resources in supporting their respective proxies in this long-drawn conflict.
- Sino-US Hostility was present over Vietnam: The PRC condemned American involvement in Vietnam as 'imperialism' and cited it as a follow-up to the US support of Taiwan; all of which serves to indicate US expansionism in the region. Mao also claimed that the U.N. was dominated by the imperialist policies of the West. The US meanwhile saw China's support of North Vietnam as confirmation that there was a monolithic communist conspiracy at play and it was vital to stop the domino theory from taking over all of Asia.
- China was determined to prevent North Vietnam from collapsing:
 - 1) *Fellow Communist brother ties*
 - 2) *Gain prestige from standing up for the weak against the US in the Cold War struggle.*
 - 3) *Prevent possible security threat if US were to take over Vietnam: memory of Korean War Yalu River incident.*
 - 4) *Gain valuable ally in the Sino-Soviet rivalry for leadership of the world communist bloc*
- China helped North Vietnam & prolonged US struggles in Vietnam:
 - 1) *Train Vietnamese Military Commanders*
 - 2) *Reorganize Vietnamese Defense & Financial Systems (Tax & Fiscal Policy)*
 - 3) *Helped to create a solid economic base for Vietnam*
 - 4) *Helped to mobilize Vietnamese peasants to support war through land reform campaigns*
 - 5) *Massive transfer of Chinese Experience of Making Revolution to the Vietnamese*
- If the US bombed North Vietnam, China would:
 - 1) *Protect North Vietnamese cities*
 - 2) *Rebuild roads and bridges.*
 - 3) *Send anti-aircraft artillery units and army engineers to support*
- China actually deployed 320,000 Chinese troops (far greater support than USSR) to help protect North Vietnam from any possible land invasion.
- Significance: *This freed North Vietnamese troops for deployment to assist the Vietcong in the South against the ROV government and the US forces.*
- **Significance:** Its important to however note that China's intervention in supporting North Vietnam in was not so straight forward in terms of it being purely motivated by communist brotherhood ties to stand up to the 'imperialistic Americans'. In reality, much of China's increasing involvement in the Vietnam War was to gain a suitable proxy in its Sino-Soviet rivalry and boost its standing to the rest of the Communist World that China was more than capable of leading compared to the USSR.

INQUIRY:

- 1) ***How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?***
- 2) ***Were developments in the Sino-US relationship a surprise?***

RAPPROCHEMENT & NORMALISATION from 1970s

Different Ideologies, Increased Economic Cooperation & Mutual Interests, Continued Tensions

- ***Sino-American rapprochement: start of unofficial contact between China and USA (e.g., ping-pong diplomacy); official efforts to improve relations***
- ***Nixon's visit to China (1972): alignment of security interests between China and the USA; impact of Sino-Soviet rivalry and superpower détente; "Shanghai Communiqué" with areas of mutual agreement and disagreement; improvement in Sino-American relations***
- ***Establishment of diplomatic relations (1979): the USA's severance of official ties with Taiwan; the USA's and China's pragmatic approach to foreign policy; impact of cracks in superpower détente and Sino-Soviet rivalry; the USA's diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China***
- ***Increased economic cooperation; continual tensions over Taiwan***

Significance & Context:

With rising threats from USSR and security problems confronting both US & China by this point, détente started in 1969 when the US began to ease trade restrictions and the patrols by the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits were halted. However, the major turning point in Sino-US relations came when the US changed its policy towards the PRC and the UN in 1971, and culminated with the historic visit in 1972 of President Nixon to Beijing to meet the Communist leadership, including a very sick Mao, during which a joint communique for mutual benefits was issued that established a new realpolitik relationship between them and changed the Cold War dynamics too.

- 'Ping-pong' Diplomacy: *where an American table-tennis team was invited to compete in China and secret talks took place between US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Zhou En-Lai.*
- Reality: By 1970, the membership of the U.N. was also changing, and the USA would not be able to control the vote as regards PRC membership in the UN for much longer. Both sides now seemed ready to give up attempts to attain hegemony in Asia. This was the key point of the February 1972 joint Sino-American statement, the Shanghai Communiqué.

<i>Timeline to “Normalization”⁶ of USA’s relationship with China</i>	
<u>1969</u> Initial US Overtures	In 1969, the first conciliatory gesture from the White House came in the form of a relaxation of certain trade restrictions that dated from the Korean War.
<u>1970</u> China reciprocated	- The Chinese reciprocated in 1970 by opening the informal Sino-American talks in Warsaw. They had been suspended in early 1968 because of the American bombing campaign in Vietnam. - On April 1971, China invited an American table tennis team competing in Japan to try its skills against the championship Chinese team. Much to the surprise of American officials, the U.S. team subsequently received an invitation to play in Beijing, and was granted visas to travel to China. - This trip was a public relations success; after 20 years of suspicion and hostility – and anger over the treatment of U.S. prisoners in the Korean War – the American public was transfixed by this visit. This came to be known as ‘ping-pong diplomacy’.
<u>1971</u> U.S. responded in kind & ‘Ping- Pong Diplomacy’	- During the 1971 World Table Tennis Championships in Japan, the American national team players came into an unexpected interaction with the PRC team and they exchanged greetings and were invited to visit China on a friendship tour. On 10 April 1971, the American table tennis team, officials and spouses entered China via Hong Kong.⁷ This set up the opportunity for a public display of growing friendship between the US and China in common. - June 1971: Nixon formally revoked the 21-year-old trade embargo on China. - On July 1971, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, after establishing contact with Chinese authorities through the government of Pakistan, secretly flew to Beijing. 6 days later, President Nixon astonished the world with the announcement that he would personally travel to China to “seek the normalization of relations” between the two governments. - To impress upon Beijing the seriousness of his quest for an improvement in Sino-America relations, President Nixon inaugurated two changes in American foreign policy that were guaranteed to win approval in Beijing. → In October 1971, the USA did not use its diplomatic clout to prevent the United Nations from expelling Taiwan from the Security Council (Permanent membership) and transferring its seat to Communist China. → Washington then publicly sided with Pakistan against India, China’s archenemy, in the war of December 1971 that led eventually to the creation of a new state of Bangladesh out of the former East Pakistan by Dec 1971.

⁶ The term ‘normalization’ means that instead of hostility, diplomatic non-recognition, and the labelling of China as a rival, the USA would begin to consider China a strategic partner in world politics, and treat China as a state they had no qualms having diplomatic and economic ties with.

⁷ <https://www.history.com/news/ping-pong-diplomacy> & <https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/3012297/ping-pong-diplomacy-game-and-players-changed>

Timeline to “Normalization”⁶ of USA’s relationship with China	
<u>1972</u> Nixon’s visit to China	• Having smoothened his path to Beijing with these gestures of goodwill, Nixon journeyed over 20,000 miles in February 1972 to become the first American president in history to set foot on Chinese soil. The trip was a risk because there was no guarantee that Mao would agree to meet. However, Mao was genuinely excited and the two men met and established a good working relationship. • After several days of intensive negotiations, punctuated by an hour long meeting between top America officials and the ailing Mao Zedong, the two governments issued a joint communique in Shanghai on 28th February 1972. Nixon noted that the PRC leaders ‘took particular delight in reminding me that an exchange of ping-pong teams had initiated a breakthrough in our relations. They seemed to enjoy the method used to achieve the result almost as much as the result itself.’⁸
<u>Feb 1972</u> Sino-American Joint Communique (‘Shanghai Communique’)	• Nixon & Mao published the Shanghai Communique of 28th February 1972: → <i>Acknowledged substantial disagreements over Korea, Vietnam & Taiwan</i> → <i>Committed the USA and China to a friendship of peaceful co-existence based on mutual respect</i> → <i>Stated that the USA and China would seek to normalize the relationship by 1976, meaning that they would establish formal diplomatic links</i> → <i>Pledged that the two powers would work together to resist any country that sought to dominate Southeast Asia – this part of the Communique was an implicit reference to the USSR.</i> → <i>Committed the USA and China to increase cooperation and trade.</i> • The communique endorsed the expansion of cultural and commercial contacts between the two nations to complement the normalization of political relations that was underway. As part of this rapprochement, the two countries opened liaison offices in one another’s capitals in 1973, a time when Taiwan still had an Embassy in Washington. The liaison offices, which in many ways operated as de facto embassies, represented a significant concession by the PRC, which opposed the acceptance of “two Chinas” because that implied both were legitimate governments. • The respectful, almost deferential behaviour exhibited by each delegation towards the other during the public ceremonies contrasted sharply with the mutual distrust and ideological disparity that had characterized Sino-American relations since 1950. • Nevertheless, Nixon’s trip did not fully normalize the relationship. It was, however, a highly significant event that shocked the U.S. public and the leaders of the USSR, changing the dynamics of the Cold War relationship.

⁸ <https://www.history.com/news/ping-pong-diplomacy>

Timeline to “Normalization”⁶ of USA’s relationship with China	
<u>1978</u> US President Carter’s ‘One China’ Policy	• After Mao’s death in 1976, the removal of the fiercely anti-US Gang of Four and the modernization initiatives of Deng Xiaoping, relations between the PRC and the US became more cooperative. • US adopted “One China Policy”: By the terms reached, the US acknowledged “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” The US declared its intention to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Republic of China, originally signed in December 1954. US also declared that it would “maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” • In President Carter’s address to the nation on December 15, 1978, he announced that in accordance with “the Shanghai communiqué, issued on President Nixon’s historic visit, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.”
<u>1 Jan 1979</u> US President Carter establishes diplomatic relations with PRC	• Signed by US President Carter & China’s Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping i. <i>Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.</i> ii. <i>Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.</i> iii. <i>Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.</i> iv. <i>US govt acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.</i> v. <i>Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.</i>

US-PRC 1972 Shanghai Communique

Mao & Nixon, supported by Zhou Enlai & Henry Kissinger

- President Nixon's attempt to normalize relations with China during his second term had been frustrated by the Watergate scandal. The collapse of South Vietnam and the opposition of conservative Republicans created an inhospitable environment for pursuing normalization during Gerald Ford's presidency; any policy shift that could be depicted as appeasing a longstanding communist enemy generated significant political resistance.
- During US National Security Advisor Kissinger's secret trip to China in 1971 to prepare for the rapprochement and visit of US President Nixon to China, he did not say what would mean for US diplomatic relations with Taiwan although his PRC counterpart Zhou Enlai expected the US to eventually break formal ties with Taiwan as a condition for Sino-US diplomatic normalization.
- This diplomatic normalization in ties could not be achieved by 1972 which was why the Shanghai Communique issued by President Nixon & Mao in Beijing continued to acknowledge differences over the issue of Taiwan, and why there was NO NORMALIZATION of diplomatic ties in 1972 despite the rapprochement.
- The US did not challenge that Taiwan was part of China in the Shanghai Communique. This stance was a reflection of what both the PRC and the ROC/Taiwan claimed. However, it cornered the Nixon administration into hoping either the PRC or ROC/Taiwan would adjust their stance.
- Kissinger hoped that the Taiwan problem in the diplomatic relationship would gradually fade away over time but this issue proved resilient. The 1972 Shanghai Communique sought to avoid conflict when necessary, but the PRC still claimed that the reunification of Taiwan was an internal matter, while the US under the Nixon administration attempted to avoid any notion that Taiwan was a separate entity.
- PRC attempted to avoid revolutionary rhetoric about Taiwan with the hope that it would not provoke outrage by the United States and their shared mission for peace. Thus, both sides pragmatically compromised for peace and stability in the strategic circumstances of the 1970s.

Build-up to 1979 Normalization of US-China Relations

- But with US President Nixon resigning in 1974 with the Nixon Gate scandal, and the political weaknesses of his successor President Gerald Ford, it was extremely difficult to achieve the diplomatic normalization of relations in US-PRC diplomatic ties as President Ford could not break ties with Taiwan without causing political pressure from the Republicans in Congress.
- When US President Carter took office in January 1977, a significant improvement in relations between Communist China and the United States seemed far from inevitable. Officials within the Carter administration debated how to normalize relations with China without damaging relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Carter and his top aides agreed that the opportunity to normalize relations with China might be fleeting and should not be squandered.

- In the spring of 1978, President Carter decided to proceed with normalization in working with the PRC's vice-premier Deng Xiaoping.
 - **One China Policy:** By the terms of the agreement the two sides reached, the US acknowledged "the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." The US declared its intention to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Republic of China, originally signed in December 1954
 - Simultaneously, however, the US declared that it would "maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." In Carter's address to the nation on December 15, 1978, he announced that in accordance with "the Shanghai communiqué, issued on President Nixon's historic visit, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue."
 - **US would begin official diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979, and that the two countries would open Embassies on March 1:** the operation of Embassies enabled both parties to negotiate diplomatic disputes and pursue mutual interests.
- Despite difficulties and disputes over several foreign policy issues (*ie. China's invasion of Cambodia, the Taiwan Relations Act*⁹), U.S.-PRC relations generally improved as the two countries made progress on economic and security issues. Deng's 1979 trip was extremely successful as he charismatically wooed Congress, the media, and the American people. Journalists depicted the Chinese leader as personable, famously photographing him at a rodeo wearing a ten-gallon hat.
- On January 31 1979, the US and PRC concluded agreements on various topics including consular relations, academic exchanges, and cooperation in the fields of space technology, high-energy physics, and science and technology policy.
- The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased Sino-American military cooperation, despite the objections of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The US & PRC also coordinated their other responses to the Soviet incursion, such as the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. The normalization provided both sides with the essential diplomatic mechanisms necessary to manage difficulties and promote common objectives.
- **Was Taiwan 'abandoned' by the US for self-interests? Not so clear-cut and absolute as it appeared.**

"As the US asserted in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, issued on President Nixon's historic visit, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. I have paid special attention to ensuring that normalization of relations between our country and the People's Republic will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan. The people of our country will maintain our current commercial, cultural, trade, and other relations with Taiwan through nongovernmental means. Many other countries in the world are already successfully doing this."

US President Carter's Address in Dec 1978

⁹ A legal framework that Congress erected in 1979 to enable the people of the United States and Taiwan to continue economic and cultural relations following the U.S. decision to break diplomatic relations and commits the United States to help maintain Taiwan's self-defence capacity and to consider coming to its defence if it is attacked by mainland China.

April 1979 Taiwan Relations Act

- Declared it to be US policy to PRESERVE & PROMOTE extensive, close and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the US & Taiwan, AS WELL AS the people on the CHINA mainland!
- Declared that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security & economic interests of the US, and that the US decision to establish diplomatic relations with PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by PEACEFUL MEANS
- Stated explicitly that the US will provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature and maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize the system of the people of Taiwan.
- **Significance:**
- This showed to Taiwan, the PRC, the US public and the world that even as the US normalized relations with the PRC, it did not mean it will abandon its responsibilities to its allies.
- It showed again the PRAGMATIC willingness of the US to pursue normalization of ties with the PRC despite ideological differences and differences over Taiwan if they are interests to be gained from the normalization of PRC-US ties.
- In order to normalize relations with the PRC on 1 Jan 1979, the US HAD TO SEVER diplomatic ties with Taiwan / ROC, and the ROC was left alone in the world with no major official allies. BUT DESPITE THIS OUTWARD SEVERANCE, the 1979 US Taiwan Relations Act showed that the CORE components of the US-Taiwan relationship remained intact and the PRC had to live with this if it wanted diplomatic normalization of ties with the US and the accompanying interests it got from it in the challenging strategic circumstances of the 1970s.

INQUIRY:

- 1) ***How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?***
- 2) ***Were developments in the Sino-US relationship a surprise?***

FACTORS SHAPING RELATIONSHIP

<u>Reason 1</u> Security Interests: Desire to be Safe & Respected	<u>Reason 2</u> Ideological Differences & Visions	<u>Reason 3</u> Developments in Superpower & Sino-Soviet Relations
- Which of these reasons is the <u>ROOT reason</u>? How / why so? - Which of these is the <u>OVER-ARCHING / UNDERLYING reason</u>? How / why so? - Which of these is a <u>MINOR reason</u>? How / why so? - Any <u>CHANGE / CONTINUITY in IMPACT / SIGNIFICANCE</u> over TIME?		

Reason 1: Security Interests

China's Goals & Interests of Territorial Integrity & Sovereignty, US Belief in Domino Theory Fears to Destroy US & 'Free World', and USSR as a Common Threat by 1970s

Issue for US: Indochina War & Faltering US Public Support

- By 1968, Nixon had concluded that the Cold War had changed: no longer a bipolar world, so America had to adjust its foreign policy. President Nixon firmly believed that allowing ideology to dominate foreign policy was a great and unrealistic error.
- More critically, the situation in Vietnam had led the US to believe containment was not possible there, and it wanted the PRC's assistance in its exit strategy. President Nixon thus hoped to persuade China to put pressure on the Vietcong to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.
- The Vietnam War had also demonstrated that US military power was not as effective as had been hoped. Nixon knew that American power was in relative decline due to budgetary problems, Soviet nuclear and naval parity, and he wanted to make up for this through new strategic alliances. New friends were needed because relationships with old friends were deteriorating (*West Europeans were critical of the Vietnam War*).
- China had also developed ICBM capability, so it was now the US view that it was more dangerous not to have contact and to leave a potential superpower outside the community of nations. With an alliance, the US hoped to be able to reduce commitments in Asia, while retaining bases in the Pacific.

Issue for US: Need for Economic Security Benefits after damaging Indochina War

- Increased competition from Japan and the European economic community in the 1960s had eaten into America's share of the world market for manufactured goods; heavy domestic spending for social programmes at home under Johnson's 'Great Society' and the expensive war in Indochina meant the lure of the China market became very strong.

- This was further compounded by the severe strain that the Vietnam War had exerted on the US economy.
- The prospect of gaining entry to a virtually untapped market comprising a ¼ of the world's population fuelled great expectations – U.S. exports to China increased from \$5 million in 1969 to \$700 million in 1973.
- Obviously, Washington no longer saw China as the Far Eastern arm of the monolithic Communist bloc dominated by Moscow. This reflects the changing perspectives in the United States on the nature of global communism.
- The U.S. administration was beginning to understand that various Communist movements around the world were not as 'monolithic' as it had long suspected, with President Nixon stating, "Our foreign policy began to differentiate among Communist Countries". Nixon suggested that the US would now 'deal with countries on the basis of their actions, not abstract ideological formulas'.

Issue for China: Need for Economic Security Benefits

- The increase in trade with the USA as well as its ally, Japan, was more attractive as alternative to the non-beneficial economic connection with USSR.
- By January 1975, China's Premier Zhou Enlai was publicly advocating closer economic relations between China, Japan and the USA:
 - *He tried to dissuade Japan from buying Siberian oil and raw materials.*
 - *He did not want the USSR to acquire Japanese technology by trading with their Siberian raw materials.*
- China official were also urging the European Common Market to resist Soviet overtures for more intimate commercial and financial relations.

Issue for China: Fears of Pre-Emptive Soviet Strike & Being Isolated without Help

- In the 1960s and 1970s, the PRC saw the USSR as its main rival, so it wanted to reduce tensions with the USA. China was worried about reports of a pre-emptive Soviet nuclear strike and faced international isolation – by 1969, China had only three real allies: France, Pakistan and Albania. Mao thus saw improved relations with the United States as a way to confront the USSR and force it to accept an expansion of China's borders.
- China could gain concessions on key foreign policy issues, for example, U.N. membership, normalisation of relations with Washington, American ceasing to defend Taiwan as the true China, U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and Indochina as a whole etc. The PRC was worried about a resurgent Japan, and wanted its power limited.
- All these would permit the concentration of Chinese military strength on the Sino-Soviet border to check the massive Soviet build-up in regions like Siberia and Mongolia. The PRC also maintained that the détente would be 'temporary', and that it would remain vigilant against U.S. imperialism and aggression. Mao had argued in an article in 1940, 'On Policy', that it was legitimate to play off enemies and to do whatever was necessary to defeat the main enemy at a given time.

INQUIRY:

- 1) ***How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?***
- 2) ***Were developments in the Sino-US relationship a surprise?***

Deeper Analysis of Significance

This also reveals the INTER—TWINING of SECURITY FEARS / INTERESTS with COLD WAR & SINO-SOVIET developments that cannot be divorced from each other as these developments ended up having a security implication for both China & the US that made them pragmatically shelve their theoretical ideological differences for mutual benefits with an alignment of common interests given the challenges both faced with global developments in the context of the 1970s.

Reason 2: Ideology

Perception of World Communism as a Monolithic Bloc out to take over world

- Ever since the 1950 Treaty of Friendship between the USSR & China, and China's support for North Korea in the Korean War, it confirmed US stereotypes that there was a monolithic communist bloc out to take over the world and eventually destroy the US and the 'free world' in a global domino theory scenario.
 - For the US, it merely confirmed their fears of a communist bloc.
 - For China, the US intervention in the Korean War and support for Taiwan in the 1950s merely confirmed that these ideological foes were dangerous and out to destroy and threaten the PRC because of its different ideological stance and outlook.
- The PRC's interest in supporting revolutionary/decolonization movements in the developing world was not simply a pursuit of limited ideological goals in those specific countries. It aimed to ultimately replace the USSR as the world leader of international revolution, and to end Western imperialism by supporting anti-colonial movements.
- At the Bandung Conference in 1955, PRC Premier Zhou asserted that the USA was the key danger to world peace. The conference had been held in response to the USA's involvement in setting up SEATO (*an anti-Communist alliance*). At this conference, 29 Asian and African states asserted their neutrality. In 1966, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk outlined the USA's policy towards China to the U.S. Congress:
 - *The USA does not seek to overthrow the PRC*
 - *The USA objects to PRC involvement in the affairs of other countries, that is, encouraging revolutionary forces worldwide by providing training.*
 - *Although the PRC is more violent in word than action, it still should not be underestimated.*
- However, despite the rhetoric and the PRC's propaganda in support of 'revolutionary' movements, such as the 'Shining Path' in Peru, China did not have the resources to make a definitive difference in the developing world. Even when China had developed its own nuclear weapons, it did not have

the delivery systems to use them in wars of decolonization. Therefore, the threat to the developing world posed by the PRC, as perceived by the USA, was probably exaggerated.

- Following US National Security Advisor Kissinger's secret trip to China in 1971 to discuss ways for a diplomatic rapprochement given the US need for it with developments in the Indochina War & China's border clashes with the USSR, his memos to the US President CONTINUED even at this stage to show the PRC's Zhou En-lai's insistence to emphasize the differences in political ideology between both countries in the Shanghai Communique.
- Kissinger noted that even as they were keen to work for a rapprochement, the PRC continued to show their disdain for pretending that peace was either near or desirable as an end in itself; for submerging differences in ambiguous formulas of agreements which only serve to make relations look more 'normal' than they really are."
- Significance:
 - This shows that even in 1972, China under Mao Zedong was still distrustful of the US somewhat and disliked the very idea of writing a communique perhaps due to his revolutionary ideology and distrust of the United States. Hence clearly theoretical ideological differences even in the early 1970s CONTINUED To be an issue shaping the relationship.
 - But despite the ideological differences, the US and PRC still agreed that peace in Asia was a top priority, no matter its feasibility and this together with pragmatic security fears and developments in the Cold War & Sino-Soviet border clashes meant that the 1972 Shanghai Communique that marked a rapprochement was a pragmatic necessity in those necessary circumstances for mutual interests.
 - This showed that IDEOLOGY as a reason in shaping Sino-US relations can be less emphasized and reduced in the intensity and public posturing if security and pragmatic considerations in that context were more critical in affecting mutual national interests.

INQUIRY:

- 1) ***How important was ideology in shaping the relationship?***
- 2) ***Were developments in the Sino-US relationship a surprise?***

Reason 3: Developments in Superpower & Sino-Soviet Relations

*1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance, Sino-Soviet Split & Eventual Normalization
Worsening Cold War Tensions, Détente in 1970s & Decline of Cold War from 1985 with Gorbachev*

Cold War Triangular Strategy against USSR:

US President Nixon wanted to use China to put pressure on the USSR to compromise with the West

- USA's impending withdrawal from Vietnam would free up Chinese military forces in the Southern Asia for redeployment along the USSR-China northern frontier. From the US point of view, this might push the USSR to seek understanding with the USA more vigorously in order to avoid conflict on two fronts (U.S. and China), which the Soviet Union did. Furthermore, Nixon hoped that friendship with China would allow the USA to focus its entire nuclear arsenal on the USSR.
- The US also wanted to use the Sino-Soviet rivalry to jumpstart nuclear arms control talks following the deadlock of the SALT I (*Strategic Arms Limitations Talks*) negotiations in November 1969.
 - The Sino-Soviet split had undermined Soviet pretense to be the leader of a united Communist movement and the buildup of Soviet military divisions on the Chinese border implied that the Soviet Union was faced with tensions on two fronts (*U.S. and China*).
 - An exacerbation of this two-front tension might force the USSR's hand to explore political solutions (*i.e. détente*) with America. If the U.S. succeeded in opening China (*i.e. establishing a 'friendly' relationship with China*), as Nixon and Kissinger theorized, this might also intensify the urgency of the USSR to seek rapprochement with America. After all, the primary concern that both the USA and the PRC government shared was that of restraining and containing the USSR.
- Washington believed that once the USSR sensed any thaw in the hostility between the USA and China, and perhaps even potential cooperation, Soviet aggression had to either reduce or cease. After all, a threatening posture by the USSR might intensify Sino-U.S. cooperation.
- **In addition, the Americans knew that working with the Chinese would give them extra 'leverage', or negotiating power, in its arms agreements dealing with the USSR. This became known as 'triangular diplomacy' (refer to Fig 1 below)**
- ***Moscow's subsequent eagerness to conclude the SALT I treaty and settle the remaining East-West differences in Europe was undeniably influenced by Nixon's willingness to 'play the China card'.***




Fig 1: The USA, USSR and China in a three-way relationship

From the beginning, Kissinger and Nixon sought to manage China's expectations about the implications the Sino-American opening would have for US-USSR relations. They emphasized to China's leaders at the opening stages of the rapprochement that Washington would be even-handed in developing both US-PRC and US-USSR relations. Moreover, Kissinger was candid about the possible negative impacts of Soviet-American negotiations on China even. After Kissinger's secret July 1971 trip to Beijing, the Soviets responded to the Sino-American rapprochement by being more forthcoming about the US-USSR summit and other issues such as Berlin. Kissinger hastened to reassure China that the Nixon administration did not negotiate with the Soviets for the purpose of freeing the USSR to focus its energies on handling China.

While it was true that Washington sought good relations with both Moscow and Beijing, it did not necessarily wish for better Sino-Soviet relations. According to Kissinger's model of triangular politics, while the US did not seek a Sino-Soviet war, it did require some frigidity in Sino-Soviet relations because the pivotal American position would be beneficial only so long as the Chinese and Soviets regarded each other as a greater threat than the Americans. Thus, in their dialogues, Nixon and Kissinger sought to persuade China's leaders that while Moscow harbored ill intent toward them, Washington was China's firm friend. During the early talks, the Americans quickly realized that Beijing's key security concern revolved around superpower collusion to encircle China. The US thus consistently made efforts to assure China that the US would never collude with other countries against the PRC. President Nixon sent his assurance that Washington would not take any "major steps" affecting Chinese interests without prior discussion with Beijing, and was prepared to provide information regarding Soviet-American negotiations to alleviate Chinese concerns. Moreover, the Nixon administration was prepared to make with Beijing any arms control agreement it concluded with Moscow.¹⁰

US Strategic Fears of China becoming a Russian Satellite

Reacting to Sino-Soviet Worsening Split that manifested into Open Fighting by 1969

- The Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 saw Moscow taking a number of steps to reinforce its defences on the Chinese border – Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were stockpiled in Soviet controlled Mongolia, as if threatening to strike China; officials in the Kremlin apparently considered launching a pre-emptive strike against China's infant nuclear installation in Xinjiang.

¹⁰ <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00652.x>

- A Soviet invasion of China was thus very real to the USA, given the Soviet military build-up on the Chinese border. The potential of the USSR applying the Brezhnev doctrine (1968, *as done to Czechoslovakia*) to China would mean the Moscow would try to make the Beijing government subservient (*potentially by invasion, as had been done to Czechoslovakia*).
- A newly monolithic Sino-Soviet bloc would create an imbalance of power, a situation that the U.S. could not countenance in the face of its Vietnam entanglement.

China's Strategic Security Fears after 1969:
Reacting to Cold War & Sino-Soviet Developments

- The 1968 Prague Spring that saw the Brezhnev Doctrine in action with the Soviet army crushing the protests in Czechoslovakia stirred fears in China that the Soviet Union will do the same thing to the PRC along its shared land border.
- Given WORESENING DEVELOPMENTS in the Sino-Soviet split, the 1969 border clashes between China & the Soviet Union marked the first instance of direct military confrontation between both militaries along the border that served to confirm to the PRC that it faced a very real security threat at its doorstep.
- Therefore, by having a rapprochement with the US, it can potentially allow the PRC to play the 'US card' against the Soviets by warning them that any invasion of the PRC could result in consequences drawing in the US now and also allow China to build up its economic resources with the rapprochement in relations with the US.
- These security fears of China did not ease in the 1970s and continued on in the 1980s after the PRC witnessed the 1979 Soviet invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan. The PRC saw this as another instance of the Soviets being willing to amass troops to invade its neighbours should it deem it necessary to do so.

What did China Gain from Détente with the US in 1970s?

(1) United Nations (UN) Membership

- It was unrealistic of the PRC to hope to become a member of the United Nations in the 1950s as the General Assembly was dominated by Western countries. To become a member, it would need a majority vote in the General Assembly. Every year a vote was taken on PRC membership, and each time it was defeated.
- In 1961, the United States had sufficient support for the 'important questions' resolution to pass, which meant the question of PRC membership would now need a two-thirds majority.
- In 1965, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Adlai Stevenson, outlined why United States did not believe the PRC should be a member state:
 - *The CCP was not the legitimate government of China – it had come to power through force, not by democracy. It also used force to maintain its power.*
 - *It had a record of aggression, and was thus not a 'peace-loving nation'.*
 - *Its sponsorship of revolutionary groups in the developing world would hamper U.N. work in these areas.*
 - *Taiwan had an honourable record, and should not be expelled.*
- However, as U.N. membership grew, it was the non-aligned states and developing countries that began to dominate the General Assembly. Indeed, in 1970, the General Assembly finally voted in favour of the Chinese U.N. seat transferring to Beijing. However, it was not the necessary two-thirds majority.
- In 1970, the US initiated the 'two Chinas policy'. This suggested that Beijing take the Security Council seat for China, while Taiwan still maintain representation in the General Assembly. This solution was rejected by both Chinas.
- Finally, in the summer of 1971, President Nixon announced his imminent visit to the PRC and also stated that the United States would no longer oppose Beijing's admission to the U.N. The USA failed to prevent the expulsion of Taiwan. In reality, the Americans were simply accepting the inevitable.
- The PRC now had the power of the veto in the U.N. Security Council. It could be used to block resolutions, an example of this being a PRC veto which prevented the admission of Bangladesh to the U.N. in 1971. This was done in retaliation for the 'victory' of the USSR and its Indian allies over the PRC-backed Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan War.
- With its wider access to diplomatic contacts through the U.N., the PRC also gained better links with countries in the developing world. It was able to increase its prestige and influence, to present views on the world stage and publicly support its allies and denounce its enemies (*including the USSR*).

(2) Reduced US Commitment to Taiwan

- It had always been the Chinese Communist view that Taiwan belonged to China, and that it was not a negotiable issue. Indeed, historian Macmillan suggests that Taiwan was an important to the PRC as their problems with the USSR. When Zhou met Kissinger in July 1971, he said of Taiwan: “That place is no great use for you, but a great wound for us.”
- In 1972, Nixon declared “The ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland if not a matter for the U.S. to decide.” This was a key foreign policy objective for the PRC and was a main reason for their pursuit of détente. However, progress towards reunification was very slow – the US did not want to hurry its transference of official recognition to the PRC, nor was it comfortable with the idea of ‘giving up’ Taiwan.
- Meanwhile, the U.S. Government placated the PRC, and helped set the stage for normalization by gradually removing military personnel from Taiwan and scaling back its official contact with the ROC Government.
- The issue dragged on until U.S. President Jimmy Carter finally established full diplomatic relations with China in 1979. At the same time, arms sales to Taiwan were halted. As Historian Hsu comments, “The majority of Americans ... found it hard to oppose the simple mathematics of ... relations with 900 million on mainland China compared with the 17 million on Taiwan”.
- However, Jimmy Carter was defeated by the fiercely anti-Communist Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, in the 1980 presidential election, and a renewed ‘Cold War’ ensued. Reagan again committed the United States to protecting Taiwan. He resumed arms sales and Sino-American relations deteriorated.
 - *Even though the PRC had failed to reunite Taiwan with the mainland, it had to remain relatively diplomatic over the issue: China did not want to provoke the USA at a time when relations with the USSR remained tense.*

(3) Economic Gains with Japan

- The improved relations with the US had, as the Chinese hoped, an impact on their relations with Japan. On 12th August 1978, China and Japan signed a friendship treaty. Their relationship developed over the next few years, particularly in economic ties.
- Within five years of their friendship treaty, China had become second only to the United States as a trading partner with Japan. This had an additional benefit for the PRC as it was a further pressure on the Soviet Union. The Soviets were concerned at this new friendship between historic enemies, and the situation led to more fears in the USSR being ‘encircled’.

FOR YOU TO CONSIDER:

DO YOU THINK THIS GAIN WAS MORE THAN WHAT THE US GAINED OUT OF THE RAPPROACHMENT & NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA? HOW / WHY SO?

Conclusion to Sino-American Relations

1) Initial Ideological Stereotypes:

- For twenty years (1949-1969), the US tried to disrupt, destabilize, and weaken China's communist government. Washington believed that China was an aggressive, expansionist power that threatened the security of its non-communist neighbours.
- *Washington encouraged its allies to refrain entering into diplomatic relations with Beijing and even prohibited Americans from visiting China.*
- *The US also cut off trade and orchestrated an international embargo of China. For the next thirty years, the U.S. Government continued to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan as the sole legal government over all of China. During that period, the U.S. and PRC Governments had only intermittent contact through forums such as the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, which began in 1955.*

2) Pragmatic Mutual Security & Political Needs:

- Nevertheless, a new era began with a rapprochement during Richard Nixon's presidency where Nixon's new realpolitik approach to foreign policy ('triangular' diplomacy) altered two decades of American policy which had coldly looked at China, especially after perceiving themselves to have 'lost' her in 1949 to the Communist bloc.
- *Nixon and his aide, Henry Kissinger, found ready partners in Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai who also wanted to improve Sino-U.S. relations in light of changing Cold War circumstances and developments.*
- *Their efforts resulted in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, which laid the basis for future cooperation even while acknowledging continuing disagreements on the subject of Taiwan. Relations finally improved to the point of normalization under Carter in 1979.*

3) New 3rd Player in Cold War Politics & Dynamics:

- China therefore emerges as a significant factor in the development of the Cold War. The importance of Communist China's role in the Cold War changed over time. The PRC's influence grew in line with their nuclear power status, their increasingly hostile relationship with the USSR and, ultimately, their growing rapprochement with the USA.
- This shift in the balance of power resulted in the Cold War becoming more of a 'tri-polar' (USA, USSR, PRC) conflict rather than 'bi-polar' (USA, USSR).
- Mao realized that the international Cold War was bipolar in nature, despite the strength and size of the PRC. His goal became to destabilize US-Soviet relations and establish his own global equilibrium where the Chinese Communists would have equal weight with the other superpowers. He thus needed to maintain some relations with the Soviet Union as they were helping the Chinese develop nuclear technology. Other than this, he increasingly felt that the Sino-Soviet alliance had outlived its usefulness and he began to criticise Khrushchev's policy of 'Peaceful co-existence'.