

Section A (Source-Based Case Study)

Question 1 is **compulsory** for all candidates

Study the background information and all the sources carefully and then answer **all** the questions.

You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources.

1 (a) Study Source A.

Why was this source published? Explain your answer. [5]

(b) Study Sources B and C.

How far does Source C prove that Source B is wrong? Explain your answer. [7]

(c) Study Source D.

How useful is Source D as evidence about the Malayan Communist Party? Explain your answer. [5]

(d) Study Source E.

How surprised are you by this source? Explain your answer. [5]

(e) Study **all** the sources.

“The Communist threat was exaggerated by the British.” How far do the sources support this view? Use the sources and your knowledge to explain your answer. [8]

The Communist insurgency in Malaya


BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Read this carefully. It may help you answer some of the questions.

The Malayan Emergency was a period of unrest following the creation of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. After World War II, the Federation of Malaya was formed through the unification of several former British territories, including Sabah and Sarawak. The negotiations included special guarantees of rights for Malays and the establishment of a colonial government. These developments angered the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the party started a guerilla insurgency. On 18 June 1948, the government declared a state of emergency.

Was the Communist threat in Malaya exaggerated by the British?

Source A: *A British colonial government propaganda leaflet produced during the Malayan Emergency (1948 – 1960), aimed at the Chinese-speaking population in Malaya. The caption says, “Do the achievements of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Malaya terrify you?”. The words on the skulls were the names of people killed by the MCP.*



[Turn over

Source B: *Adapted from Chin Peng's memoir published in 2003.*

It was time the British quit, stop exploiting our resources and people to pay off her debts and maintain her Empire status. It was time for us to be independent in the land that belonged to us. The idea of British superiority was dashed the year the Japanese cycled down Malaya's roads. Britannia ruling the waves became a memory when HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales sank. But the British would not face these realities. After WWII, they wanted to resurrect their glory days. They made concessions: open their 'For Whites only' clubs to some privileged natives, assign some locals to middle-level government jobs. But they would remain the masters and bullies.

This is exactly what my comrades and I achieved. We made the British acknowledge that they had to listen to us. We forced them to the bargaining table long before they were prepared to sit there.

Source C: *Adapted from a 1957 report for the War Office Director of Operations, General Sir Roger Bower, who was the Malaya Command from 1956 to 1957.*

The Malayan Communist Party's campaign in Malaya is part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important areas in Southeast Asia. Its aim is to overthrow the Malayan Government and to set up in its place a Communist-controlled Peoples' Democratic Republic. In June 1948, on the instructions of the Cominform issued at 2 conferences in Calcutta 4 months earlier, the MCP started a campaign of murder, sabotage and terrorism designed to paralyse the Government and develop into armed revolution. By mid-1949 the leaders had realized that a quick decision was not possible. They modified their methods with a view to wearing down the Government and in due course dominating selected centres of population.

Source D: *Adapted from a 1958 memoir published in London written by a British serviceman about his times during the Malayan Emergency.*

Both sides in Malaya could feel the threat of China. The terrorists drew their inspiration from Peking Radio, and the number of terror incidents increased noticeably after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. In Malaya we felt the French were fighting in the same war as ourselves. We saw this struggle as part of the same global struggle that had now erupted at different times in Korea, Indo-China, Greece and Berlin. 'Containment of Communism', as a phrase, seemed to hold particular meaning for us in Malaya. The terrorists had fought this war as an ideological war: their aim was to establish a Communist Government. They were terrorists. They carried weapons. They wore uniforms. They killed.

Source E: *Adapted from a briefing conducted by Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, during a top-secret meeting with the British Cabinet on 14 October 1948. He was instrumental in persuading the British Government to outlaw the MCP in July 1948.*

The Malayan Communists had failed because they had not been extreme enough. Murder on a larger scale and sabotage of railways, mines and broadcasting stations might have been very successful. But the Communists were, in fact, amateurs drawn from the ranks of unskilled local Chinese bandits, not Moscow-trained revolutionaries. They do not possess the determination required to carry out such an ambitious plan. They had never been able to set up a central control of the insurrection. Arms and ammunition were running short and there were no fresh supplies of ammunition or recruits reaching the insurgents from outside the country. Six weeks would have been sufficient to defeat the uprising. At present British forces were engaged in exterminating the MCP in isolated groups.

Source F: *A 1949 account written by a British major reporting back from the frontline during the Malayan Emergency.*

External factors had caused a change of policy with instructions being issued, possibly from Moscow, that Communist activity was to be stepped up throughout Southeast Asia. Events in China must have inspired the Communists in Malaya. The actual choice of time at which to initiate open hostilities could, however, equally well be due to more extremist personalities gaining control of the MCP, together with a feeling of frustration caused by government restrictions on Communist-controlled trade unions.

The extremist leaders, who gained control of the Party in 1947, decided in May 1948, with some external influence, that the time was now ripe to switch from covert political to overt military action. To implement this decision was not difficult for them, since they already possessed an army, which was reasonably trained, easily mobilised and consisted of thugs who were only too willing to return to a life of violence and lawlessness.

[Turn over

Section B: Essay Questions

Answer two questions.

- 2 “The main reason for Germany’s defeat in World War II was due to Allied prowess” How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]
- 3 “The main reason that the Cold War in Europe came to an end was due to the actions of Ronald Reagan.” How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]
- 4 “The main reason for the decolonisation of Vietnam was due to the Viet Minh’s tactics.” How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]

- End of Paper –

Copyright Acknowledgements:

- Source A:** <https://www.psywarrior.com/MalayanEmergency.html>
Source B: Peng Chin, Ian Ward, and Norma Mirafior, *My Side of History* (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), 510-511.
Source C: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/85935694/2011_Bollag_Manuel_0324247_thesis.pdf
Source D: Crawford, Oliver, *The Door Marked Malaya* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1958), 181.
Source E: <https://vuir.vu.edu.au/15471/1/15471.pdf>
Source F: <https://www.army.mod.uk/media/6558/bar-report-malayan-emergency.pdf>

Core History Paper 2 (2174/02)
Suggested Answers
Section A: Source Based Case Study

1(a) Study Source A.

Why was the source published? Explain your answer.

[5]

Level	Descriptor	Marks
L1	Lifting from source E.g. This source was published to show a menacing MCP comrade standing on top of many skulls while holding a large knife in his hand.	1
L2	Context E.g. The source was published as a British propaganda during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960. This poster was part of the psychological warfare campaign launched by the British to discredit the MCP.	2
L3	Message / Outcome supported Eg. This source was published to convince the people in Malaya that the MCP were violent criminals who would bring suffering and chaos to Malaya / the MCP was responsible for widespread death and suffering. Source A shows a cartoon with a menacing MCP comrade standing on top of many skulls while holding a large knife in his hand. The caption says "Do the various achievements of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Malaya terrify you?" This shows that the MCP led to many deaths which made it a dangerous organisation that should not become the government of Malaya. E.g. This source was published to convince the people in Malaya not to support (provide food, shelter or information) to the communist guerillas. Source A shows a cartoon with a menacing MCP comrade standing on top of many skulls while holding a large knife in his hand. The caption says "Do the various achievements of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Malaya terrify you?" This shows that the MCP led to many deaths which made it a dangerous organisation that should not become the government of Malaya. (Other accepted outcomes: to discourage support for the MCP / to create fear of the MCP / to undermine communist recruitment / to discourage civilians from joining the MCP / to win support for the British colonial government's counter-insurgency campaign)	3
L4	Both of L3	4
L5	Message + Outcome in Context (L4 + L2)	5

- 1(b) **Study Sources B and C.**
How far Source C prove that Source B is wrong? Explain your answer. [7]

Level	Descriptor	Marks
L1	Undeveloped provenance E.g. Source C does not prove that Source B is wrong as Source C was from a 1957 war report by a British General whereas Source B was from Chin Peng, the MCP leader.	1
L2	Proves / Does not prove based on content comparison <i>Award 3m for well-developed answers.</i> <u>Difference</u> Eg. Source C proves that Source B is wrong as both sources are different in showing whether the Communist threat justified British emergency measures. Source C shows that the Communist threat justified British emergency measures whereas Source B shows otherwise. Source C states "The Malayan Communist Party's campaign in Malaya is part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important areas in Southeast Asia." while Source B states "It was time the British quit, stop exploiting our resources and people to pay off her debts and maintain her Empire status. It was time for us to be independent in the land that belonged to us." Therefore, Source C highlights that the Communist threat justified British drastic actions as it was meant to contain the spread of Communism in Asia Pacific while Source B highlights that the Communist threat did not justify British drastic actions as the communists were merely in an anti-colonial struggle / fighting for Malayan independence. (Other differences: reasons why the Communist wanted to resist the British OR whether was the communists justified in launching its insurgency OR on the portrayal of the communists / the British OR reasons for the Communist insurrections) <u>Similarity</u> E.g. Source C does not prove that Source B is wrong as both sources are similar in showing that the Communists did put in effort / were willing / had the capability to resist the British. Source C states "In June 1948, on the instructions of the Cominform issued at 2 conferences in Calcutta 4 months earlier, the MCP started a campaign of murder, sabotage and terrorism designed to paralyse the Government and develop into armed revolution." Similarly, Source B states "We made the British acknowledge that they had to listen to us. We forced them to the bargaining table long before they were prepared to sit there." Hence, both sources highlighted that the Communists were very determined to fight against the British. (Other similarities: the Communists were a force to reckon with)	2-3
L3	Both of L2	4

L4	L2 + Prove / Does not prove based on Cross-reference / Contextual Knowledge Eg. Source C proves that Source B is wrong as both sources are different in showing whether the Communist threat justified British emergency measures. Source C shows that the Communist threat justified British emergency measures whereas Source B shows otherwise. Source C states “The Malayan Communist Party’s campaign in Malaya is part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important areas in Southeast Asia.” while Source B states “It was time the British quit, stop exploiting our resources and people to pay off her debts and maintain her Empire status. It was time for us to be independent in the land that belonged to us.” Therefore, Source C highlights that the Communist threat justified British drastic actions as it was meant to contain the spread of Communism in Asia Pacific while Source B highlights that the Communist threat did not justify British drastic actions as the communists were merely in an anti-colonial struggle / fighting for Malayan independence. By cross-referencing to Source F, it supports Source C, this makes Source C reliable and hence proves Source B wrong. Source F states “External factors had caused a change of policy with instructions being issued, possibly from Moscow, that Communist activity was to be stepped up throughout Southeast Asia. Events in China must have inspired the Communists in Malaya.” Thus, this shows that the British had to impose emergency measures in Malaya due to the fear over the influence of the Communist bloc on the MCP.	5
L5	L2 + Does not prove based on Critical Analysis of provenance	6-7

- 1(c) **Study Source D.**
How useful is Source D as evidence about the Malayan Communist Party? Explain your answer. [5]

Level	Descriptor	Marks
L1	Useful / Not useful, based on provenance unsupported E.g. Source D is useful as it was from a British serviceman fighting against the MCP during the Emergency.	1
L2	Useful / Not useful, based on content / Not useful based on typicality or missing information <i>Award 3m for more developed answers</i> E.g. Source D is useful as evidence because it implies that <u>the MCP was dangerous because the Malayan Emergency was part of the wider Cold War struggle against communism.</u> Source D states “We saw this struggle as part of the same global struggle that had now erupted at different times in Korea, Indo-China, Greece and Berlin.” This suggests that the MCP were ideologically motivated communists and thus the Malayan Emergency was not merely a local conflict but part of a worldwide battle between communism and democracy.	2-3

	E.g. Source D is not useful as it does not show the MCP's motivations in fighting against the British since the source only shows the British perspective.	
L3	Useful / Not useful, based on cross-reference to other sources / contextual knowledge E.g. Source D is useful as evidence because it implies that <u>the MCP was dangerous because the Malayan Emergency was part of the wider Cold War struggle against communism</u>. Source D states "We saw this struggle as part of the same global struggle that had now erupted at different times in Korea, Indo-China, Greece and Berlin." This suggests that the MCP were ideologically motivated communists and thus the Malayan Emergency was not merely a local conflict but part of a worldwide battle between communism and democracy. This is supported by Source C which states "The Malayan Communist Party's campaign in Malaya is part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important areas in Southeast Asia." This shows that the MCP was manipulated by the USSR in helping to spread communism in Southeast Asia. Since Source D is supported by Source C, it is reliable and hence useful.	4
L4	Not useful, based on context / critical analysis E.g. Source D is not useful as evidence because of its purpose. As a memoir written by a British serviceman about his times fighting in the Emergency, he viewed the conflict as part of the global struggle against communism. Source D states "The terrorists drew their inspiration from Peking Radio, and the number of terror incidents increased noticeably after the fall of Dien Bien Phu." This highlights how the Malayan Emergency was a Cold War conflict since the MCP itself was very much inspired by the rise of communist movements in the region. As someone directly involved in fighting the MCP, the serviceman is likely to view the conflict from a British anti-communist perspective which saw British intervention as necessary in this global struggle against communism. As someone of military background, he would see his involvement in Malaya as a valiant effort in protecting the British empire and Malaya from the spread of communism worldwide. Furthermore, he inherently looked down on the MCP as seen from "They were terrorists. They carried weapons. They wore uniforms. They killed." Such use of emotive language presents the MCP as criminals and violent extremists who only sought to destabilise the society. As such, he was more likely to support British actions and portray the MCP negatively. Ultimately, the British serviceman was trying to justify British intervention in Malaya by explaining that Britain was defending Malaya from communism and terrorism rather than merely protecting its colonial interests. Thus, Source D is biased.	5

1(d) Study Source E.
How surprised are you by this source? Explain your answer.

[5]

Level	Descriptor	Marks
L1	Surprise / Not surprise, based on lifting / provenance E.g. Source E does not make me surprised about Source F as Source E is from Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia.	1
L2	Surprise / Not surprise, based on content E.g. I am surprised by Source E as it shows that there was minimal external communist influences. Source E states “But the Communists were, in fact, amateurs drawn from the ranks of unskilled local Chinese bandits, not Moscow-trained revolutionaries.” Thus, Source E shows that the communist insurgency was completely self-initiated by the communists themselves despite the weak effort. (Other issues: the communist threat was not serious / the MCP was weak) E.g. I am not surprised by Sources E as it shows that the MCP was engaged in an armed rebellion. Source E states “Six weeks would have been sufficient to defeat the uprising.” Therefore, it highlights that the MCP would not hesitate to resort to violence in fighting against the British. (Other issues: the MCP were violent or vicious)	2-3
L3	Surprise / Not surprise, based on cross-reference to other sources or contextual knowledge E.g. I am not surprised by Source E as it shows that there was minimal external communist influences. Source E states “But the Communists were, in fact, amateurs drawn from the ranks of unskilled local Chinese bandits, not Moscow-trained revolutionaries.” Thus, Source E shows that the communist insurgency was completely self-initiated by the communists themselves despite the weak effort. I am not surprised by Source E as it is supported by my Contextual Knowledge which also acknowledges the minimal external influences in directing MCP’s actions during the Emergency. While the MCP was in contact with the USSR, the ultimate decision to adopt armed rebellion was dictated by the MCP’s grasp of Malaya’s developments during the time. The change in MCP’s leadership from Lai Teck to Chin Peng made the MCP turned to armed struggle. It was exposed that Lai Teck was a British agent and so would not support an armed rebellion against the British. Also, with the Malayan economy improving by 1947, workers were increasingly reluctant to go on strike. Hence, the MCP has to switch to a more extreme strategy out of desperation to ensure its anti-colonial struggles would continue living on. As such, the MCP’s own considerations in Malaya was the major factor that decided its strategy of armed struggle rather than merely being manipulated by the communist bloc. E.g. I am surprised by Source E as it is contradicted by Source C which states “The Malayan Communist Party’s campaign in Malaya is part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important areas in Southeast Asia. Its aim is to overthrow the Malayan Government and to set up in its place a Communist-controlled Peoples’ Democratic Republic.” This shows that the MCP was inspired by the wider Communist bloc. Hence,	4

	I am surprised that Source E underestimated the MCP threat at the beginning. (Can also cross-refer to Source D)	
L4	Not Surprised due to Purpose E.g. I am not surprised by Source E as it is biased in showing how weak the MCP threat was. Source E is from Malcolm MacDonald who was the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia giving a top-secret briefing to the British Cabinet in October 1948. As a senior official, he was trying to highlight MCP weakness to reassure the British Government that there was no need to panic. Source E states "They do not possess the determination required to carry out such an ambitious plan. They had never been able to set up a central control of the insurrection." MacDonald had strongly supported the decision to outlaw the MCP. This would allow him to dismiss the MCP as a disorganized and ineffective organization that the British army could stamp out easily. He may have wanted to convince the Cabinet that the British government had made the right decision and that the situation was under control.	5

1(e)

Study all the sources.

"The Communist threat was exaggerated by the British." How far do the sources support this view? Use the sources and your knowledge to explain your answer.

[8]

Level	Descriptor	Marks
L1	Writes about the hypothesis, no valid source use.	1
L2	Yes OR No, supported by valid source use. <i>Award 2 marks for one Yes or No supported by valid source use, and an additional mark for each subsequent valid source use up to a maximum of 4 marks.</i> Yes Source A supports the view that the communist threat was exaggerated by the British. Source A is a British propaganda leaflet shows a cartoon with a menacing MCP comrade standing on top of many skulls while holding a large knife in his hand. The caption says "Do the various achievements of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Malaya terrify you?" Thus, the British had made use of such propaganda to portray the MCP as a tyrannical organisation only capable of bringing misery to the people in Malaya. This would persuade the locals to support the British as part of its psychological warfare against the MCP. Source B supports the view that the communist threat was exaggerated by the British. Source B states "It was time the British quit, stop exploiting our resources and people to pay off her debts and maintain her Empire status. It was time for us to be independent in the land that belonged to us." This shows that the communists were not dangerous or greedy as	2-4

	they were not harming the people in Malaya. Instead, they were driven by nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments in its fight against the British. Source E supports the view that the communist threat was exaggerated by the British. It states “They do not possess the determination required to carry out such an ambitious plan. They had never been able to set up a central control of the insurrection.” This shows that the MCP was weak, disorganised and ineffective in resisting the British and thus was of no threat towards Malaya. There was no need for the British to use drastic measures against the MCP since it was unlikely that they would succeed. No Source A does not support the view that the communist threat was exaggerated by the British. Source A shows a cartoon with a menacing MCP comrade standing on top of many skulls while holding a large knife in his hand. The caption says “Do the various achievements of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Malaya terrify you?” This indicates that the MCP was very dangerous and could bring about misery to the people in Malaya. The need for this psychological warfare on the people demonstrated that they did see the MCP as a real threat and thus they had to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese population through propaganda. Source C does not support the view that the communist threat was exaggerated by the British. Source C states “The Malayan Communist Party’s campaign in Malaya is part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important areas in Southeast Asia. Its aim is to overthrow the Malayan Government and to set up in its place a Communist-controlled Peoples’ Democratic Republic.” This shows that the MCP was influenced by the USSR in its attempt to spread communism in the region, thus making it necessary for the British to continue to strengthen their intervention to protect Malaya. Source D does not support the view that the communist threat was exaggerated by the British. It states “The terrorists drew their inspiration from Peking Radio, and the number of terror incidents increased noticeably after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.” This highlights that the British emergency measures was important as part of the global struggle against communism to ensure that the MCP do not seize power in Malaya. Hence, the British was defending Malaya from communism instead of its colonial interests. With the number of terrorist attacks rising significantly after the fall of Vietnam, it also renewed vigour of the MCP who had been inspired by the efforts of communists in other parts of the world. Source F does not support the view that the communist threat was exaggerated by the British. It states “The extremist leaders, who gained control of the Party in 1947, decided in May 1948, with some external influence, that the time was now ripe to switch from covert political to overt military action.” This shows that the MCP could cause disorder in Malaya which meant that the British had to step in to maintain law and order. With external communist inspiration and an organised leadership, the MCP could easily take control of Malaya and turn it into a communist regime.	
L3	Yes AND No, supported by valid source use	5-8

	<i>Award 5 marks for one Yes and No supported by valid source use, and an additional mark for each subsequent valid source use up to a maximum of 7 marks.</i> <i>For L2 and L3, award a bonus of up to two marks (ie +1/+1) for use of contextual knowledge to question a source in relation to its reliability, sufficiency etc. The total marks must not exceed 8.</i>	
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Section B: Structured Essay Question [20m]

2	The main reason for Germany's defeat in World War II was due to Allied prowess" How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer.	[10]
L1	Identifies/Describes Allied prowess or other reasons for Germany's defeat	1-3
L2	Explains Allied prowess or other reasons for Germany's defeat	4-5
L3	Explains Allied prowess and other reasons for Germany's defeat I agree that Germany's defeat was mainly due to Allied prowess, particularly the industrial and military strength of the USA and USSR. After Pearl Harbour, the USA mobilised its industry and rebuilt its armed forces, eventually outproducing Germany and earning the title "Arsenal of Democracy." Much of this went towards helping Britain and the USSR replenish their losses, while superior US technology helped win the Battle of the Atlantic. The USSR similarly maintained high wartime production, producing 1.5 times as many aircraft and twice as many tanks as Germany by 1943, giving it a decisive advantage at battles such as Kursk. This Allied industrial strength allowed them to consistently replace their losses and overwhelm German forces on multiple fronts. This shows that Allied prowess was significant in causing Germany's defeat, as Germany was steadily worn down by Allied resources it simply could not match, eventually forcing its unconditional surrender. I disagree as Germany's defeat was mainly due to its own mistakes and weaknesses. Hitler's constant interference in military decisions led to critical errors, such as allowing British forces to escape at Dunkirk and insisting on capturing the strategically unimportant city of Stalingrad, resulting in the loss of an entire field army. Germany also committed itself to fighting a two-front war after invading the USSR in 1941, dividing its resources between the Eastern and Western fronts, especially after the Allies opened a second front through Operation Overlord. These decisions left Germany unable to concentrate its forces effectively, resulting in a series of heavy defeats on multiple fronts. This shows that Germany's own mistakes were significant in causing its defeat, as these errors wasted German strength and gave the Allies opportunities to gain the upper hand that they may not have otherwise had.	6-8
	Award an additional 2 marks (to a maximum of 10 marks) for a balanced conclusion based on an explicit consideration of the relative importance of different reasons. The total marks to be awarded for the response will be based on marks obtained at L3 + 2 bonus marks: i.e. L3/6+2; L3/7+2; L3/8+2).	

3	“The main reason that the Cold War in Europe came to an end was due to the actions of Ronald Reagan.” How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer.	[10]
L1	Identifies/Describes actions of Reagan or other reasons for end of Cold War	1-3
L2	Explains actions of Reagan or other reasons for end of Cold War	4-5
L3	Explains actions of Reagan and other reasons for end of Cold War I agree as the Cold War came to an end mainly due to the actions of Ronald Reagan, whose policies placed unbearable pressure on the Soviet economy. Reagan's economic reforms, known as "Reaganomics," fuelled a booming US economy, allowing him to move beyond containment and directly pressure the USSR through a massive defence build-up, increasing US defence spending from \$134 billion in 1980 to \$253 billion in 1989, alongside the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). To keep pace with this, the Soviet government was forced to divert even more resources into military spending, compounding its existing financial burdens from Eastern Europe and the Afghanistan War. This further drained the already struggling Soviet economy, undermining the Communist Party's claims of being able to provide for its citizens. This shows that Reagan's actions were significant in ending the Cold War, as the immense economic pressure he placed on the USSR fuelled growing domestic resentment and support for opposition movements, directly contributing to the collapse of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. I disagree as the Cold War came to an end mainly due to Gorbachev's own reforms. Gorbachev introduced Glasnost, removing censorship and freeing political prisoners, which exposed the corruption and inefficiency of Communist officials and let Soviet citizens see the better standard of living enjoyed in the West. He also introduced Perestroika, allowing limited private enterprise, though this failed to revive the economy and instead caused unemployment and shortages. Gorbachev further pursued talks with Reagan that led to the 1987 INF Treaty, marking the first real reduction in nuclear arms between the superpowers. This growing disillusionment with the Communist Party fuelled demands for independence, leading Soviet republics to break away and the USSR to disintegrate by 1991. This shows that Gorbachev's own reforms were significant in ending the Cold War, as it was his internal policies that directly triggered the collapse of Soviet authority as there are no more competing blocs of influence, ending Communist rule and the Cold War.	6-8
	Award an additional 2 marks (to a maximum of 10 marks) for a balanced conclusion based on an explicit consideration of the relative importance of different reasons. The total marks to be awarded for the response will be based on marks obtained at L3 + 2 bonus marks: i.e. L3/6+2; L3/7+2; L3/8+2).	

4	“The main reason for the decolonisation of Vietnam was due to the Viet Minh's tactics.” How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer.	[10]
L1	Identifies/Describes Viet Minh's tactics or other reasons for decolonisation of Vietnam	1-3
L2	Explains Viet Minh's tactics or other reasons for decolonisation of Vietnam	4-5
L3	Explains Viet Minh's tactics and other reasons for decolonisation of Vietnam	6-8

	I agree that the main reason for the decolonisation of Vietnam was the Viet Minh's effective military tactics against the French. Led by Vo Nguyen Giap and numbering around 100,000 troops by mid-1946, the Viet Minh initially avoided direct confrontation with the superior French forces, instead waging guerrilla warfare — assassinating Vietnamese administrators working for the French and bombing shops frequented by the French. As their forces grew stronger, drawing on tactics learnt from the Soviets, Chinese communists, and French Resistance, they adopted increasingly aggressive tactics, eventually launching a general offensive to retake cities. Political support from the countryside, where peasants provided local militias, food, and information, allowed the Viet Minh to sustain this campaign even after the French seized major cities by 1948. This caused a steady stream of French casualties, progressively lowering French morale and forced the French into brutal countermeasures that further alienated the local population. This ultimately increased the French desire to end the war and pushed them to seek negotiations at the Geneva Accords. This shows that Viet Minh tactics were significant in causing decolonisation, as their guerrilla strategy not only bought crucial time and space to build an effective fighting force, but ultimately wore down French resolve to the point where France chose to negotiate an end to its colonial rule in Vietnam. I disagree as the decolonisation of Vietnam was mainly caused by the ineffectiveness of French military strategies, rather than Viet Minh tactics alone. French forces grew increasingly frustrated and ruthless, bombing and burning villages suspected of harbouring the Viet Minh, carrying out summary executions of suspected communists, and committing massacres such as the one at Gio Linh in Central Vietnam. Despite growing American economic and material support, the French remained unable to defeat the Viet Minh in open warfare even by 1951, and by 1952 the number of French officers killed outnumbered those trained in the previous four years. These brutal tactics caused the French to lose even more local support, while heavy casualties eroded support for the war back in France itself, particularly after the Viet Minh's major victory at Cao Bang in October 1950, which led to increasing loss of support for the war effort among the French people and increased their desire to end the war. This shows that ineffective French strategies were significant in causing decolonisation, as they gave the Viet Minh the time and opportunity to inflict heavy defeats on the French, directly contributing to the French people's growing desire to end the war and ultimately pushing France to seek negotiations at the Geneva Accords to end its colonial rule in Vietnam.	
	Award an additional 2 marks (to a maximum of 10 marks) for a balanced conclusion based on an explicit consideration of the relative importance of different reasons. The total marks to be awarded for the response will be based on marks obtained at L3 + 2 bonus marks: i.e. L3/6+2; L3/7+2; L3/8+2).	