

Name:		Centre Number/Index Number:		Class:	
--------------	--	--	--	---------------	--



DUNMAN HIGH SCHOOL

Preliminary Examinations

Year 6

H2 HISTORY

9174 / 02

24 September 2025

3 hours

Paper 2 Developments in Southeast Asia
(Independence–2000)

Additional Materials:

Answer Booklet

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your Centre number, index number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten your work securely together.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of **5** printed pages.

[Turn over]

Section A

You must answer **all** questions from this section.

FORMATION OF ASEAN

1. Read the sources and then answer the question which follows.

Source A

Initially, it was Mr Thanat Khoman of Thailand and Mr Adam Malik of Indonesia who initiated the idea of a new regional grouping. The Thais were nearest to Indochina. The Thais, as you know, had been involved in Indochina and had been very pro-American. Indonesians were concerned that if the Vietnamese won they would become the proxy of either the Chinese or the Russians or both. Who would then dominate mainland Southeast Asia? Would it be China or Russia? Both would be equally bad for Indonesia. So they thought that something had to be done to deal with this threat.

Singapore was responsive to the concept of ASEAN because it saw merit in it, provided it was not an anti-communist or pro-American outfit. We did not highlight the political motivations because the Chinese and the Russians would have attacked them. In fact, in the early years, both the Chinese and the Soviets accused ASEAN of being a stalking horse for American imperialism, a neo-colonialist plot.

From an interview with S. Rajaratnam, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, 30 November 1985.

Source B

We in Singapore, are not unmindful of the fact that regional cooperation will run into more rocks than calm waters. Each of us in this region had our differences, compelled to do things purely on the basis of national interest. We must think not only of our national interests but posit them against regional interests: That is a new way of thinking about our problems. We must also accept the fact, if we are really serious about it, that regional existence means painful adjustments to those practices, and thinking in our respective countries. We must make these painful and difficult adjustments.

The last point that I would like to stress is that there may be misunderstanding as to what ASEAN is all about. So, I would like to stress that those who are outside the grouping should not regard this as a grouping against anything, against anybody. We have approached ASEAN as standing for something, not against anything. If there are people who misunderstood the proposed regional grouping, or manifest hostility against it, let us explain that it can only be because in Europe and in many parts of the world, outside powers have vested interests in the fragmentation of this region. So, as far as we are concerned, we want to ensure a stable Southeast Asia.

Adapted from a speech by S. Rajaratnam, Singapore's Foreign Affairs Minister (1965 – 1980), in Bangkok on 8 August 1967.

Source C

The idea of ASEAN itself was conceived in the course of intra-regional negotiations leading to the end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. In wrecking the prospects for MALPHILINDO, Konfrontasi had underscored the importance of regionalism by demonstrating the high costs of the use of force to settle intra-regional conflicts. After fundamental political change, Indonesia's decision to renounce Konfrontasi served a model for its neighbours and raised the possibility of a regional order based on the non-use of force in inter-state relations. While interest in regionalism among the five member states of ASEAN was a result of varied geopolitical considerations, all recognised ASEAN's value as a framework through which to prevent a return to a Konfrontasi-like situation. ASEAN would first and foremost constrain Indonesia's possible return to belligerence.

From a book published by a leading academic on Southeast Asian regional issues, 2001.

Source D

In 1965, the Cold War was at its height. The world was bipolar, divided into communist and non-communist blocs and a main fault line ran through Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War had been raging on for several years. That year, President Lyndon B Johnson upped the ante by bombing North Vietnam. All the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia faced serious internal threats from communist insurgencies or subversive movements supported by a China that was then in the throes of the launch of the Cultural Revolution.

All the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia were embroiled in disputes of varying intensity with one another. Singapore had just been "separated" from Malaysia and Indonesia was pursuing a policy of "konfrontasi" against Malaysia and Singapore. The Philippines claimed Sabah. Brunei with British help had suppressed an internal rebellion backed by Indonesia. There were also strong irredentist pressures on the borders between West Malaysia and Thailand, and between the Philippines and Indonesia. In these unfavourable circumstances, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed so that the non-communist states in Southeast Asia could contain and manage their differences to meet the greater threat from the communists.

From a speech by Minister Mentor, Lee Kuan Yew, at a lecture organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.


Source E

Although we had clearly defined our aims and aspirations to exclude military entanglement and remain safely on economic ground, international realities forced ASEAN to deviate from its original path. Several developments began to preoccupy ASEAN: the defeat and withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam and even from the mainland of Asia; the growing Vietnamese ambitions nurtured by the heady wine of victory; and the threat of Ho Chi Minh's testament enjoining generations of Vietnamese to take over the rest of French Indochina in addition to the northeastern provinces of Thailand. Such developments forced ASEAN to turn its attention to

more critical issues, like Cambodia, with the result that economic matters were almost entirely neglected and set aside.

Adapted from an article by former Foreign Minister of Thailand (1959 to 1971), Thanat Khoman, published on 1 September 1992.

Source F



The caption reads: "The apples are ripening"

From a cartoon published in a Dutch newspaper, 17 August 1965.

Now answer the following questions.

- Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on Singapore's understanding about the Cold War in Southeast Asia. [10]
- How far do Sources A – F support the view that the formation of ASEAN stemmed from the need to manage inter-state tensions among its members? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

You must support each answer with examples drawn from
at least three countries.

EITHER

2. Why were some governments in independent Southeast Asia less effective in achieving political legitimacy than others? [30]

OR

3. How far do you agree that approaches to national unity by governments in independent Southeast Asia proved to be successful? [30]

AND EITHER

4. To what extent were governments always in control of economic development in independent Southeast Asia? [30]

OR

5. "Economic change in Southeast Asia only brought benefits to independent Southeast Asia." How far do you agree with this statement? [30]

END OF PAPER