

Y4 History P2 Prelims Suggested Answers

1 (a)	Study Source A.	[5]
	What can you infer from the source? Explain your answer.	
L1	Describes from the provenance/Misinterpretation of the source.	1
	The source is a photo featuring a member of the Malayan Home Guard manning a checkpoint on the edge of a town during the Malayan Emergency.	
L2	Valid inference, unsupported.	2
	I can infer that the British believed civilian support was crucial in defeating the Communist insurgency.	
L3	Inference, basic interpretation supported with source evidence/Context only.	3
	I can infer that the British believed civilian support was crucial in defeating the Communist insurgency. This is supported by the photograph showing a member of the Malayan Home Guard manning a checkpoint at the entrance to a town, together with the "STOP Home Guard Check Point" sign and barrier controlling access into the area. This suggests that the British were not merely regulating the movement of people, but were trying to prevent civilians from providing food, medicine, intelligence and recruits to the Communist guerrillas.	
L4	Inference supported with good explanation and context.	4-5
	I can infer that the British believed civilian support was crucial in defeating the Communist insurgency. This is supported by the photograph showing a member of the Malayan Home Guard manning a checkpoint at the entrance to a town, together with the "STOP Home Guard Check Point" sign and barrier controlling access into the area. This suggests that the British were not merely regulating the movement of people, but were trying to prevent civilians from providing food, medicine, intelligence and recruits to the Communist guerrillas. The Communist insurgents depended heavily on the Min Yuen, a civilian support network that supplied them with essential resources while they operated in the jungle. To cut off this support, the British implemented the Briggs Plan, resettling over 500,000 rural Chinese into New Villages surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by checkpoints such as this one. By isolating the Communist guerrillas from the civilian population, the British hoped to weaken the insurgency and eventually defeat the Malayan Communist Party. OR I can infer that the British security measures were effective in weakening the Communist insurgency. This is supported by the photograph showing a member of the Malayan Home Guard manning a checkpoint, together with the "STOP Home Guard Check Point" sign and barrier controlling access into the town. This	

	suggests that the British had established strict security measures to monitor the movement of people and goods. Such checkpoints formed part of the Briggs Plan, under which over 500,000 rural Chinese were resettled into New Villages protected by the Home Guard. Together with identity cards, curfews and food control measures, these checkpoints prevented the Min Yuen from supplying the Communist guerrillas with food, medicine and intelligence. As the insurgents became increasingly isolated from their civilian support network, their operational strength declined, contributing significantly to Britain's eventual defeat of the Communist insurgency.	
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1 (b)	Study Sources B and C.	[6]
	How similar are the sources? Explain your answer.	
L1	Description of sources/Mismatch of sources.	1
	Source B is an extract from a speech delivered in the British Parliament while Source C is a webpage written by an academic with the National Library, Singapore.	
L2	BOC/Unsupported analysis/Provenance comparison.	2
	The sources are similar in showing that the Communist insurgents continued to receive support from civilians despite British efforts to isolate them.	
L3	Similarity OR Difference.	3-4
	The sources are similar in showing that the Communist insurgents continued to receive support from civilians despite British efforts to isolate them. Source B states that the Communists were "supported and supplied by many thousands of active members of the Min Yuen" and that "they are still helping the Communists." This means that the British's resettlement programme had not successfully cut off civilian support for the Communist insurgents, who continued to receive supplies, information and recruits from the Min Yuen. Similarly, Source C states that "people in the New Villages used to smuggle out essentials to the insurgents" by having "rice and antibiotic pills hidden in the bicycle frame" and "hiding rice at the bottoms of pails containing latex". This means that despite the British's security measures, civilians continued to provide supplies to the Communist guerrillas through ingenious smuggling methods. However, the sources differ in the reasons why civilians supported the Communist insurgents. Source B states that "the promise to give them a legal title to their land... has not yet been implemented" and that "nothing would do more to win these people over than the security afforded by a legal title to their holdings". This means that the speaker believed many squatters continued to help the Communists because the British had failed to provide them with a strong incentive to support the government. Without the security and benefits of legal land ownership, they had little reason to shift their loyalty to the British. In contrast, Source C states that "those	

	who were either neutral or opposed the goals of the communists were coerced into aiding them or faced reprisals – even death – if they did not cooperate". This means that many civilians supported the Communist insurgents not because they lacked incentives from the British, but because they feared punishment or death if they refused to help.	
L4	Similarity + Difference.	5
L5	Purpose comparison.	5-6
	Award 5m if evidence/impact is lacking.	
	However, the sources differ in their purposes. As Source B is an extract from a speech delivered in the British Parliament on 27 February 1952 during a debate on the situation in Malaya, the purpose of the source is to advocate to the British government that stronger measures are needed to win the support of the squatters. This is seen from "Nothing would do more to win these people over than the security afforded by a legal title to their holdings and a guarantee that they will no longer be liable to eviction." This means that the speaker believed the Briggs Plan alone was insufficient and that granting legal land ownership would encourage the squatters to support the British instead of the Communist insurgents. During the Malayan Emergency, the British recognised that military action alone could not defeat the Communist insurgency, as the guerrillas depended heavily on civilian support through the Min Yuen. Therefore, the author made this speech so that the British government would implement its promise of granting legal land titles, thereby encouraging the squatters to support the government and deny assistance to the Communists. On the other hand, as Source C is extracted from a webpage written by an academic with the National Library, Singapore in 2019, the purpose of the source is to create awareness that civilian support for the Communist insurgents was often the result of coercion rather than genuine loyalty. This is seen from "those who were either neutral or opposed the goals of the communists were coerced into aiding them or faced reprisals – even death – if they did not cooperate". This means that the author seeks to present a balanced historical explanation by showing that many villagers were caught between the British authorities and the Communist insurgents. As a historian writing decades after the Emergency, the author had access to a wide range of historical evidence and sought to provide a nuanced account of life in the New Villages. Therefore, the author created the source so that readers would develop a more accurate understanding of why civilians assisted the Communist insurgents during the Malayan Emergency.	

1 (c)	Study Sources D and E.	[6]
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	Does Source D make you surprised by Source E? Explain your answer.	
L1	False matching/lifting/No stand given.	1
	Source D does not make me surprised by Source E as they both mentioned about communism in Malaya.	
L2	Answers based on provenance/No BOC for content analysis.	2
	Source D does not make me surprised about Source E as Source D is an extract from an autobiography of Chin Peng while Source E is an extract from a British leaflet by a Communist in Malaya, Lam Swee.	
L3	Surprised based on content, supported.	3
	Source D makes me surprised by Source E as they differ regarding how the Communist Party treated civilians and its own supporters. Source D states that "we constantly used brutal tactics... Such accusations are grossly distorted" and that "the overwhelming percentage of the urban and rural work forces were solidly behind us". This means that Chin Peng claims the Communist Party generally enjoyed genuine support from the people and did not rely on widespread brutality or coercion to secure that support. In contrast, Source E states that the MCP "forced the people to follow the lawless path and caused thousands to desert their families and to move about in hunger". This means that the Communist Party compelled civilians to support them through intimidation and violence, causing suffering to ordinary people.	
L4	Surprised based on content and supported with CR/Source C.	4
	Source D makes me surprised by Source E as they differ regarding how the Communist Party treated civilians and its own supporters. Source D states that "we constantly used brutal tactics... Such accusations are grossly distorted" and that "the overwhelming percentage of the urban and rural work forces were solidly behind us". This means that Chin Peng claims the Communist Party generally enjoyed genuine support from the people and did not rely on widespread brutality or coercion to secure that support. In contrast, Source E states that the MCP "forced the people to follow the lawless path and caused thousands to desert their families and to move about in hunger". This means that the Communist Party compelled civilians to support them through intimidation and violence, causing suffering to ordinary people. Source D makes me further surprised by Source E as Source E is supported by my contextual knowledge. During the Malayan Emergency, the Communist insurgents depended on the Min Yuen for food, medicine, intelligence and recruits. Those who refused to cooperate often faced intimidation, harsh punishments or even death. Many civilians living in the New Villages also continued to assist the Communists because they feared reprisals if they did not do so.	
L5	L4 + not surprised due to different purposes.	5-6
	However, Source D does not make me surprised by Source E as it is expected that they would have different purposes since they come from different contexts. As Source D is an extract from the	

	autobiography of Chin Peng, the Communist leader during the Emergency, published in 2003, the purpose of the source is to justify to readers that the Malayan Communist Party enjoyed genuine public support and was unfairly portrayed by British propaganda. This is seen from "Such accusations are grossly distorted and the result of very effective government propaganda" and "the overwhelming percentage of the urban and rural work forces were solidly behind us". This means that Chin Peng seeks to defend the reputation of the MCP by arguing that it did not rely mainly on brutality to secure support, but instead had the backing of most workers and villagers. As the former leader of the MCP writing decades after the Emergency had ended, Chin Peng had an interest in defending his legacy and influencing how future generations would remember the Communist movement. Therefore, the author created the source so that readers would view the MCP more sympathetically and question the British government's portrayal of the Communist insurgency. On the other hand, as Source E is a British leaflet written by a surrendered Communist, Lam Swee, in October 1950, the purpose of the source is to persuade Communist insurgents that surrendering to the British government is preferable to continuing the armed struggle. This is seen from "I do not want to see the M.C.P. continue to use such treacherous and poisonous schemes to end your precious lives" and "we have all been treated well by the Government". This means that the leaflet portrays the MCP as cruel and deceitful while presenting the British government as humane towards surrendered Communists. During the Malayan Emergency, the British conducted extensive psychological warfare by distributing surrender leaflets to undermine Communist morale and encourage defections. Therefore, the British created the source so that Communist guerrillas would lose confidence in the MCP, surrender to the British authorities, and weaken the Communist insurgency.	
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1 (d)	Study Source F.	[5]
	How useful is the source in showing the aims of the British government for British Malaya? Explain your answer.	
L1	Answers based on content/description of source/no valid inference.	1
	The source is an extract from a recorded speech broadcast to Australia by Sir Gerald Templar on 12 October 1952.	
L2	Inference unsupported.	2
	I can infer that the British government was preparing Malaya for eventual self-independence.	
L3	Useful/not useful, supported and explained.	3
	The source is useful in showing the British government's aims for British Malaya. The source states that "Responsible self-	

	government is certainly going to be given to Malaya, for this is the declared aim of Her Majesty's Government." This means that the British government aimed to prepare Malaya for self-government and eventual independence rather than maintain permanent colonial rule. The source is not fully useful in showing the aims of the British government for British Malaya because it provides only a limited view of British aims. The source states that "The problem now in Malaya is twofold. It is to win the shooting war and raise the condition of the people from that level where communism thrives." This means that the source only highlights the British aims of defeating the Communist insurgency and improving the welfare of the people to reduce support for communism. It also states that "Responsible self-government is certainly going to be given to Malaya." This suggests that the British intended to prepare Malaya for self-government.	
L4	L3 + cross-reference to another source/contextual knowledge to support usefulness of source OR to show that source is not useful. OR 4m for Purpose only explained. (Maximum 3m if evidence/impact lacking)	4
	The source is useful in showing the British government's aims for British Malaya. The source states that "Responsible self-government is certainly going to be given to Malaya, for this is the declared aim of Her Majesty's Government." This means that the British government aimed to prepare Malaya for self-government and eventual independence rather than maintain permanent colonial rule. According to my contextual knowledge, this is true. The British introduced constitutional reforms after the Second World War, such as the expansion of local participation in government through elected municipal and state councils. These measures were intended to prepare Malaya for self-government. OR The source is not useful in showing the British government's aims for British Malaya. The source states that "Responsible self-government is certainly going to be given to Malaya". This means that Britain was committed to granting self-government to Malaya. However, according to my contextual knowledge, this is incomplete. During the Malayan Emergency, the British government's immediate priority was to defeat the Communist insurgency and restore security before any transfer of power could take place. Large-scale military operations, the Briggs Plan, food control measures and the establishment of New Villages were introduced primarily to eliminate the Communist threat. Although Britain was	

	preparing Malaya for eventual self-government through constitutional reforms, independence was intended to be gradual and only after stability had been restored. Therefore, the source overemphasises Britain's constitutional aims while understating its immediate security objectives, making it less useful in showing the full range of British aims.	
L5	L4 + Analysis of source to indicate that source reliability is affected by purpose of source. 4m only if purpose is lacking in evidence/impact.	5
	However, the source is not useful as it is unreliable. As the source is an extract from a recorded speech broadcast to Australia by Sir Gerald Templar on 12 October 1952, the purpose of the source is to persuade the Australian public that British policies in Malaya were legitimate and effective and that the Communist insurgency was being successfully contained. This is seen from "Responsible self-government is certainly going to be given to Malaya" and "With the shooting war we are making steady progress." This means that Templar was portraying British rule as beneficial and presenting the anti-Communist campaign as successful. During that time, the Malayan Emergency was ongoing and Britain relied on support from Commonwealth countries such as Australia, which contributed military forces to the fight against the Communist insurgents. Therefore, the author created the source so that the Australian public would continue to support Australia's involvement in the Emergency and maintain confidence in Britain's efforts in Malaya. Since there is an ulterior motive, the source is unreliable and therefore not useful in showing the British government's aims for British Malaya.	

1 (e)	Study all the sources. 'The defeat of the communists during the Malayan Emergency was bound to happen.' How far do these sources support this view? Use the sources and your knowledge to explain your answer.	[8]
L1	Writes about the hypothesis, no valid source use	1m
L2	Yes or No, supported by valid source use.	2-4m
	Yes Source A agrees with the statement. The source shows a member of the Malayan Home Guard manning a checkpoint at the entrance to a town, together with a "STOP Home Guard Check Point" sign and barrier. This means that the British had established extensive security measures to control the movement of people and prevent civilians from supplying the Communist insurgents with food, medicine and information. As part of the Briggs Plan, over 500,000 rural Chinese were resettled into New Villages, where checkpoints, identity cards and food control measures isolated the Communist	

	guerrillas from their civilian support network, the Min Yuen. These measures gradually weakened the Communists' ability to sustain their insurgency, suggesting that their defeat was becoming increasingly inevitable. Source E agrees with the statement. The source states that "They forced the people to follow the lawless path" and "we have all been treated well by the Government". This means that the Communist Party relied on intimidation and violence, whereas the British government treated surrendered Communists humanely. Such brutality was likely to alienate civilians and reduce support for the Communist movement. At the same time, the British conducted extensive propaganda campaigns, offered surrender terms and implemented "hearts and minds" policies to encourage defections and gain the trust of the population. As increasing numbers of Communist insurgents surrendered and civilians provided information to the authorities, the Communist movement became progressively weaker. This suggests that the defeat of the Communists was increasingly unavoidable. Source F agrees with the statement. The source states that "More and more terrorists are killed because more and more of the people are coming forward to give the Government the information they need" and that "Happy and contented people will never be susceptible to communism." This means that the British were successfully winning the support of the people, who increasingly cooperated by providing intelligence against the Communist insurgents. At the same time, the British improved security, raised living standards through the New Villages and introduced constitutional reforms, including greater local participation in government and a commitment to eventual self-government. These measures reduced public support for the Communist Party and weakened the Min Yuen's ability to sustain the guerrillas. As the Communists became increasingly isolated from the population, their defeat appeared increasingly inevitable. No Source B disagrees with the statement. The source states that "they are still helping the Communists" and that "we have therefore failed to achieve the most important object of the whole policy of squatter resettlement". This means that despite the implementation of the Briggs Plan, the British had not yet succeeded in cutting off civilian support for the Communist insurgents. The Min Yuen continued to provide food, information and recruits to the guerrillas, allowing them to survive in the jungle. The speaker also argues that the British had failed to fulfil their promise of granting legal land titles, reducing the squatters' incentive to support the government. This suggests that the Communists still had significant civilian support in 1952 and that their defeat was not yet inevitable.	
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	Source C disagrees with the statement. The source states that "people in the New Villages used to smuggle out essentials to the insurgents" and describes how rice and antibiotic pills were hidden in bicycle frames and false bottoms of buckets. This means that the British's security measures were not completely effective, as civilians continued to find ways to supply the Communist guerrillas. The source also explains that many villagers were "coerced into aiding them or faced reprisals – even death". Despite the establishment of New Villages and checkpoints, the Min Yuen continued to operate and provide essential supplies to the insurgents. This suggests that the Communist movement remained resilient and capable of sustaining its armed struggle, indicating that its defeat was not bound to happen. Source D disagrees with the statement. The source states that "the overwhelming percentage of the urban and rural work forces were solidly behind us" and that "it would have been totally counter-productive for us to brutalise roundly those on whom we were so dependent.". This means that Chin Peng believed the Communist Party enjoyed widespread voluntary support from the people rather than relying mainly on coercion. Throughout the Emergency, the Communist insurgents depended heavily on the Min Yuen to provide food, medicine, intelligence and recruits. If, as Chin Peng claimed, most civilians genuinely supported the Communist cause, the insurgency would have possessed a strong support base that could have enabled it to continue resisting the British. Therefore, the source suggests that Communist defeat was not inevitable.	
L3	Yes and No, supported by valid source use. Award 5m for 1 yes and no and an additional mark for each subsequent valid source up to a maximum of 7m. Students must explain the evidence provided from each source. Merely quoting evidence will result in the lowest mark in the band.	5-7m
*	For L2 and L3 award a bonus of 1m for use of <u>contextual knowledge</u> to question a source in relation to its reliability, sufficiency, etc.	+1m
	However, Source D is limited in its assertion as it is unreliable. The source states that "the overwhelming percentage of the urban and rural work forces were solidly behind us." This means that Chin Peng claims the Communist Party enjoyed widespread popular support, suggesting that its defeat was unlikely. However, according to my contextual knowledge, this is not true. The British isolated the Communist insurgents from the Min Yuen through the Briggs Plan and New Villages, while food control measures, identity cards and propaganda campaigns encouraged civilians to support the government instead. As civilian support for the Communists declined, the insurgency became increasingly isolated and weakened. Therefore, Chin Peng exaggerates the level of popular support for the Communists, making Source D unreliable in supporting its assertion that the defeat of the Communists was not bound to happen.	

Levels	Descriptors	Marks
L1	Identifies/Describes given or other reasons (Award 1 mark for identifying one reason, 2 marks for identifying 2 or more. Award 2 marks for describing one reason and 3 marks for describing 2 or more.)	1 – 3 marks
L2	Explains given reason OR other reasons (Award 4 marks for an explanation of given reason OR other reason, and an additional mark for additional reasons/ supporting detail, to a maximum of 5 marks.)	4 – 5 marks
L3	Explains given reason AND other reasons (Award 6 marks for an explanation of given AND other reason, and additional mark(s) for further supporting detail or reason, to a maximum of 8 marks (which include given reason).	6 - 8 marks
	Award an additional 2 marks (to a maximum of 10 marks) for a balanced conclusion based on an explicit consideration of the relative importance of different reasons. The total marks to be awarded for the response will be based on marks obtained at L3 + 2 bonus marks: i.e. L3/6+2; L3/7+2; L3/8+2).	
	i.e. for L3 Explains given reason AND other reasons Response can get up to 8 marks through two routes. (a) 2 explained reasons that are well-developed with depth of treatment OR (b) 3 explained reasons - with breadth of coverage but less depth of treatment Valid Evaluation •Award additional 2 marks •Total marks to be awarded: Marks obtained at L3 + 2 bonus marks	

2	'The Marshall Plan was widely considered a success.' How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. Rebuilding the Economy of Western Europe • The Marshall Plan was widely considered a success because it enabled Western Europe to recover rapidly from the devastation of the Second World War. • Firstly, between 1948 and 1952, the USA provided around US\$13 billion in aid to 16 Western European countries to rebuild industries, infrastructure and agriculture. Secondly, industrial production in Western Europe rose significantly, with many countries exceeding their pre-war production levels by 1952. • The financial aid allowed factories, railways and farms to be restored, creating jobs and improving living standards. The sharp increase in industrial production demonstrated that European economies were not merely surviving on American aid but had become productive and self-sustaining. Since the economic recovery continued even after Marshall Aid ended, the Plan created lasting economic growth rather than temporary relief. This shows that the Marshall Plan genuinely succeeded in achieving its primary objective of rebuilding Western Europe. • Therefore, the Marshall Plan was a real success because it produced long-term economic recovery that continued beyond the period of American assistance. Containing Communism • The Marshall Plan was also a success because it effectively contained the spread of communism in Western Europe. • Firstly, countries such as France and Italy, where communist parties had gained significant support after the war, experienced economic recovery through Marshall Aid, reducing support for communist movements. Secondly, the Marshall Plan encouraged cooperation through the establishment of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which strengthened economic ties among Western European nations. • Economic hardship had encouraged many people to support communist parties that promised jobs and stability. As Marshall Aid improved employment and living conditions, fewer people were willing to vote for communist parties. At the same time, greater economic cooperation united Western European countries within a capitalist economic system that was closely linked to the USA. Since America's main objective was to prevent communist expansion rather than eliminate communism completely, the Marshall Plan successfully achieved its strategic goal without military intervention. • Hence, the Marshall Plan was a major success because it secured a stable capitalist Western Europe while limiting Soviet influence.	10m
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	Intensification of the Cold War • However, the Marshall Plan was not an unqualified success because it intensified Cold War tensions between the USA and the USSR. • Stalin rejected Marshall Aid and forbade Eastern European countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia from accepting it, believing that the aid would increase American influence in Europe. In response, the Soviet Union established Cominform in 1947 to strengthen political and ideological control over communist governments in Eastern Europe, ensuring that they remained loyal to Moscow and resisted Western influence. This demonstrated how the Marshall Plan deepened political divisions between the two superpowers, as Europe became increasingly split into opposing ideological blocs. • In addition, the Soviet Union created Comecon in 1949 as an economic organisation to coordinate trade and economic cooperation among communist countries, providing an alternative to the Marshall Plan. Rather than encouraging Europe-wide economic recovery, the Marshall Plan led to the creation of rival economic systems in Eastern and Western Europe, reinforcing the division of the continent. These growing political and economic divisions contributed to later Cold War crises such as the Berlin Blockade. • Therefore, if the Marshall Plan is judged by its broader impact on European peace and cooperation, it cannot be considered a complete success because it accelerated East-West rivalry. Conclusion • Overall, I agree to a large extent that the Marshall Plan was widely considered a success. It successfully achieved its two main objectives of rebuilding the economies of Western Europe and containing the spread of communism, both of which had lasting effects. Western Europe continued to experience economic growth even after American aid ended, while communist influence remained limited in most Western European countries throughout the Cold War. Although the Marshall Plan did intensify tensions with the Soviet Union and contributed to the division of Europe, this argument is less convincing because worsening US–Soviet relations was largely the result of broader ideological differences and mutual distrust that already existed before 1947. The Marshall Plan merely accelerated an existing rivalry rather than creating it. Its long-term economic and political achievements therefore outweigh its negative impact on superpower relations, making it a significant success overall.	
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3	'The structural weaknesses of the Soviet command economy was the main reason why the Cold War ended by 1991.' How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. Structural Weaknesses of the Soviet Command Economy • The structural weaknesses of the Soviet command economy was also a significant reason for the end of the Cold War because they weakened the Soviet Union's ability to compete with the United States and maintain its status as a superpower. • One example was the chronic shortage of consumer goods caused by central planning. Soviet factories focused on meeting production quotas rather than producing goods that consumers actually wanted, resulting in long queues for basic necessities such as food and clothing. • Another example was the lack of incentives for workers, as Soviet citizens were guaranteed employment regardless of performance. This led to low productivity and inefficiency compared to Western economies. • Furthermore, the Soviet economy was burdened by enormous military expenditure, with approximately 16% of national output spent on defence, while the USA spent only about 6%. The Soviet Union also accumulated a 35 billion rouble annual deficit and spent billions supporting Eastern European allies and communist governments around the world through organisations such as COMECON. • In addition, Soviet agriculture remained highly inefficient, forcing the USSR to import millions of tonnes of grain despite possessing vast agricultural land. • These economic weaknesses reduced living standards and undermined public confidence in the Communist Party. More importantly, the Soviet Union could no longer afford to sustain the arms race, support communist regimes abroad or maintain control over Eastern Europe. Economic stagnation therefore forced Gorbachev to introduce reforms and seek better relations with the West. As Soviet power declined and communist governments collapsed, the ideological and geopolitical rivalry that had characterised the Cold War came to an end. Therefore, the structural weaknesses of the Soviet command economy were the most important reason for the end of the Cold War because they weakened the foundations of Soviet power and made continued confrontation with the United States impossible. Increasing Resistance Within the Communist Bloc • Increasing resistance within the communist bloc was an important reason for the end of the Cold War because it undermined Soviet control over Eastern Europe and destroyed the communist bloc that had been one of the foundations of the Cold War. • In Poland, the Solidarity movement led by Lech Wałęsa gained widespread support among workers and challenged the	10m
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	authority of the communist government. Despite attempts to suppress the movement, Solidarity survived and eventually participated in partially free elections in 1989, leading to the formation of the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe. • In addition, widespread protests and demonstrations broke out across Eastern Europe in 1989, leading to the collapse of communist governments in countries such as Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The most symbolic event was the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which represented the collapse of communist control in Eastern Europe and the end of the division between Eastern and Western Europe. • These events weakened the Warsaw Pact and demonstrated that communist governments no longer enjoyed the support of their populations. As Soviet influence over Eastern Europe collapsed, the ideological division between the capitalist West and communist East began to disappear. Without a communist bloc under Soviet control, the Soviet Union could no longer maintain its position as leader of one side of the Cold War. Therefore, increasing resistance within the communist bloc contributed significantly to the end of the Cold War by dismantling Soviet control over Eastern Europe and removing one of the key sources of East-West rivalry. Military Superiority of the USA • The military superiority of the United States was a major reason for the end of the Cold War because it convinced Soviet leaders that they could no longer compete with the USA in the arms race and had to seek cooperation instead. • One example was Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) announced in 1983, which proposed a space-based missile defence system capable of intercepting Soviet nuclear missiles. Although SDI was never fully implemented, Soviet leaders feared that it could neutralise their nuclear deterrent and leave the USSR vulnerable to an American first strike. • Another example was the Able Archer 83 NATO military exercise and the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, which demonstrated America's growing military and technological superiority. • Faced with an economy only about half the size of the United States and already spending approximately 16% of its GDP on defence, the Soviet Union struggled to keep pace with American military developments. As a result, Gorbachev increasingly sought negotiations with the United States rather than continued confrontation. This led to a series of arms control agreements, including the Geneva Summit (1985) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear missiles. These agreements reduced tensions between the superpowers and marked a shift away	
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from Cold War rivalry towards cooperation. Therefore, American military superiority contributed significantly to the end of the Cold War because it pressured the Soviet Union into negotiations, reduced the arms race and encouraged peaceful relations between the two superpowers.

Gorbachev's Policies

- Gorbachev's policies were one of the most direct reasons for the end of the Cold War because they fundamentally transformed Soviet domestic and foreign policy.
- Through Glasnost, Gorbachev allowed greater freedom of expression, exposing corruption, economic failures and unpopular policies such as the war in Afghanistan. This weakened public faith in the Communist Party and encouraged demands for further reform.
- Through Perestroika, he attempted to restructure the Soviet economy, but the reforms instead worsened economic instability and weakened central control. More importantly, Gorbachev introduced "New Thinking" in foreign policy. He pursued arms reduction agreements with the United States, improved relations with Reagan, withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan and significantly reduced military spending.
- Most importantly, he abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine and made it clear that the Soviet Union would no longer use military force to preserve communist governments in Eastern Europe. This allowed communist regimes across Eastern Europe to collapse in 1989 without Soviet intervention.
- As Soviet control over Eastern Europe disappeared and ideological confrontation with the West was replaced by cooperation, the foundations of the Cold War collapsed. Therefore, Gorbachev's policies directly contributed to ending the Cold War by dismantling both Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and the superpower rivalry that had sustained the conflict for decades.

Conclusion

- While increasing resistance within the communist bloc and American military superiority both contributed to the end of the Cold War, I believe that Gorbachev's policies were the most important reason. This is because they directly removed the political, military and ideological foundations of the Cold War. Through Glasnost and Perestroika, Gorbachev weakened the Communist Party's control and encouraged demands for reform, while his policy of New Thinking improved relations with the United States, reduced military confrontation and abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine. Most importantly, he chose not to use force to suppress anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe, allowing communist governments to collapse in 1989.
- In comparison, increasing resistance within the communist bloc was not the most important factor because resistance alone had

	existed for decades. Earlier challenges such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968 were crushed by Soviet military intervention and failed to end the Cold War. Resistance only succeeded in 1989 because Gorbachev refused to intervene. Therefore, resistance was ultimately dependent on Gorbachev's decisions. • Similarly, American military superiority placed significant pressure on the Soviet Union through initiatives such as SDI, the deployment of Pershing II missiles and the continuation of the arms race. However, military pressure by itself could not end the Cold War. It merely created incentives for change. The Cold War only ended because Gorbachev responded to this pressure by pursuing arms control agreements such as the INF Treaty, reducing tensions with the West and abandoning confrontation. Without Gorbachev's willingness to negotiate and reform, military competition could simply have continued.	
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4	'The Viet Minh was mainly responsible for the French defeat in the First Indochina War.' How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. Viet Minh • The Viet Minh was one of the reasons for the French defeat in the First Indochina War because it was able to gain widespread support from the Vietnamese people and effectively challenge the French militarily. • For example, Ho Chi Minh introduced reforms at Viet Bac such as land redistribution and literacy campaigns that improved the lives of peasants. • In addition, under the leadership of General Giap, the Viet Minh adopted effective guerrilla warfare tactics and successfully resisted French operations such as Operation Lea. These reforms won the support of the Vietnamese population, who provided the Viet Minh with food, intelligence, supplies and recruits, while guerrilla tactics allowed the Viet Minh to exploit its knowledge of local terrain and avoid direct confrontation with the superior French forces. • Together, popular support and effective military leadership enabled the Viet Minh to sustain a long-term struggle against the French, gradually weakening French control, depleting French manpower and lowering French morale. Therefore, the Viet Minh was the main reason for the French defeat because it successfully mobilised both the people and military resources needed to overcome French rule. French Ineffective Strategies in Maintaining Control over Vietnam • However, the French also contributed significantly to their own defeat through ineffective political strategies in maintaining control over Vietnam.	10m
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	- For example, the French appointed Bao Dai as Head of State of the State of Vietnam despite his unpopularity among the Vietnamese due to his collaboration with the French and Japanese. In addition, the French attempted to establish alternative governments and limited political reforms but continued to retain real power in their own hands. As a result, many Vietnamese viewed Bao Dai's government as a French puppet regime rather than a legitimate national government. This prevented the French from gaining the loyalty and support of the Vietnamese people and allowed the Viet Minh to portray itself as the true nationalist movement fighting for independence. - Consequently, more Vietnamese chose to support the Viet Minh rather than the French-backed government, strengthening the communist movement while weakening French authority. Therefore, French political failures contributed to their defeat because they were unable to build a stable and credible government capable of competing with the Viet Minh for popular support. French Military Failures - Another reason for the French defeat was their military failures during the war. - For example, the French struggled to defeat the Viet Minh's guerrilla warfare tactics, as they were trained mainly for conventional warfare and found it difficult to locate Viet Minh fighters who could blend into the local population, utilise jungle terrain and launch surprise attacks before retreating. - In addition, the French made the costly decision to establish a military base at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954, believing that they could cut off Viet Minh supply lines and force General Giáp into a conventional battle. These military failures demonstrated the French inability to adapt to the nature of the conflict. - Their failure to counter guerrilla warfare allowed the Viet Minh to survive and gradually expand its influence, while the disaster at Điện Biên Phủ left French forces isolated and vulnerable to artillery attacks from the surrounding hills. Together, these mistakes weakened French military strength, lowered troop morale and ultimately convinced the French government that the war could not be won. Therefore, French military failures contributed significantly to the French defeat because they repeatedly allowed the Viet Minh to exploit French weaknesses and gain the upper hand in the war. Conclusion - In conclusion, I agree that the Viet Minh was the main reason for the French defeat in the First Indochina War. While French ineffective strategies in maintaining control over Vietnam and French military failures contributed to the defeat, these factors pale in comparison to the Viet Minh's ability to exploit them.	
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	Through land reforms and literacy campaigns, the Viet Minh successfully won the support of the Vietnamese people, who provided supplies, intelligence, shelter and manpower that sustained the communist war effort. At the same time, under General Giáp's leadership, the Viet Minh effectively utilised guerrilla warfare and later conventional warfare to wear down French forces. In contrast, French political failures such as the appointment of Bao Dai only weakened French legitimacy but would not have resulted in defeat if the Viet Minh had failed to gain popular support. Similarly, French military mistakes such as Điện Biên Phủ were only disastrous because the Viet Minh possessed the military capability, resources and popular backing necessary to take advantage of them. Therefore, the Viet Minh was the most important reason for the French defeat because it directly undermined French political control and military strength, while the other two factors merely created opportunities that the Viet Minh successfully exploited.	
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