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CRESCENT GIRLS' SCHOOL
SECONDARY FOUR
PRELIMINARY EXAM 2026

HISTORY

2174/02

Paper 2 Developments in the post-World War II world: The
Cold War and decolonisation in Southeast Asia,
1940s – 1991

20 August 2026
1 hour 50 minutes

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name, register number and class in the spaces provided at the top of this page and on all separate sheets of paper used.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

You may use a soft pencil for any rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **all parts** of Question 1.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

A digital answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. You must answer in the digital answer booklet. Follow the instructions on the cover page of the digital answer booklet.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of 7 printed pages, including the cover page.

[Turn Over

Section A: Source-Based Case Study

Question 1 is for all candidates.

Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer **all** the questions.

You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources.

1 (a) Study Source A.

Why do you think this article was published on 29 December 1955?
Explain your answer. [5]

(b) Study Sources B and C.

How similar are these two sources as evidence about the Malayan Communist Party? Explain your answer. [5]

(c) Study Sources D and E.

How far does Source E prove Source D to be wrong about the Malayan Communist Party? Explain your answer. [6]

(d) Study Source F.

Source F was written in 2013 by Chin Peng before his death. Does it make the source useless as evidence about the Baling Talks? Explain your answer. [6]

(e) Study all the sources.

‘The failure of the Baling Talks was mainly due to Cold War tensions in the 1950s.’ How far do the sources support this view? Use the sources and your knowledge to explain your answer. [8]

The Baling Talks, 1955


Background Information

Read this carefully. It may help you answer some of the questions.

The Malayan Emergency began in 1948, as British and Malayan forces fought the Malayan National Liberation Army (MLNA) of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), led by Chin Peng. By July 1955, the newly elected Alliance government, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, sought to end the conflict which had resulted in thousands of deaths and had caused considerable disruption to Malaya's economy and security. He was committed to advancing Malaya towards self-government and independence. In the same year, the MCP expressed willingness to negotiate, and Tunku agreed to meet Chin Peng at Baling on 28–29 December 1955. David Marshall, Chief Minister of Singapore, also participated. The Talks aimed to explore a ceasefire and possible political settlement. However, they took place amid Cold War tensions, as Britain and its allies sought to contain communism in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Malayan Government and MCP had conflicting political aims and demands. The Talks failed to reach an agreement.

Was the failure of the Baling Talks mainly a result of Cold War tensions or the conflicting aims of the Malayan Government and the communists?

Source A: *An extract from a newspaper article from London published in the Straits Times on 29 December 1955. The newspaper also published articles from the United Kingdom and was accessible to the readers there.*



Hold that tiger—a cry from London

TENGKU AND MARSHALL WARNED:
IF YOU APPEASE HIM YOU MAY
BE HIS NEXT VICTIMS

London, Wed. Today's "peace" talks in Malaya evoked a good deal of interest in this morning's British press.

The Daily Mail claimed: "The measure of his failure is considerable. Chin Peng is forced to bargain. His price for peace in the jungle will most probably be the recognition of the Malayan Communist Party. That price is too high. Both Tengku Abdul Rahman and Mr Marshall must surely be aware of this. Both admit an intense dislike of Communism and are well-meaning democrats. But to be well-meaning is not enough when it comes to dealing with the Reds. Their promises are worthless. If the Ministers try to appease the tiger (referring to Chin Peng), they may well be among the future victims. They should take heart of the knowledge that communism is not getting unchecked among the people of Asia."

Source B: *Adapted from an extract by experts in Cold War History, 2019.*

China's hesitance to assist the MCP was that after the Korean War ended, the UK assumed greater importance in China's foreign strategy as the British was seen as a bridge to improve China's relations with the West.

The British government adopted a more flexible policy towards China compared to America. To leverage this, the Chinese government agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives with the UK in Geneva in June 1954, to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations and to manage the issues of overseas Chinese affairs and trade. Improvements in China-UK relations naturally affected China's attitude toward Malaya, a colony of Britain. Bearing in mind their own interest, China viewed Malaya's struggle for independence more holistically than merely focusing on MCP campaign.

Source C: *Adapted from an extract of a historian's perspective of the Baling Talks, 2011.*

The Baling Negotiations were a case of one-side – the MCP – genuinely desiring peace and willing to make substantive concessions to achieve it, provided they could emerge with dignity and a right to participate in politics. The weak position which induced them to negotiate, however, also encouraged the Alliance Party to refuse sufficient concessions. Underlying that refusal was a belief that contrasting ideologies meant that any reintegration would have to be heavily controlled. From the viewpoint of the Alliance Party and Britain, any reintegration sufficient to secure peace – let alone power sharing – was as good as a state suicide.

Of extreme importance are the contextual factors in various levels of engagement with the MNLA, including state of battle, nuances of ideological thought and encouragement from outside ideological allies.

Source D: *From an extract of Chin Peng's memoirs on his recollections at the Baling Talks, published in 2003.*

We will never allow ourselves to be forced by others to give up our ideology but wish to put our ideology to the people to decide, if that is possible. I agree that citizens of nations had obligations but at the same time they must have freedom of thought.

The Tunku responded with, "Now, speaking for myself, I have no doubt whatsoever, that if they were allowed to take part in free elections, the people would choose our system."

I agreed with the Tunku and said so. Yes, the people would likely vote against us. That was not so much my concern. The principles of freedom of thought and choice were the fundamental issues I wanted recognised.

I asked whether the matters we were discussing would ultimately have to be vetted by the British government. The Tunku replied, "As far as we are concerned, we make our own decisions."

Source E: *Adapted from Tunku Abdul Rahman's response to Chin Peng's idea of reconciliation.*

The Communist Party of Malaya is a very powerful organisation receiving support from within and aid outside Malaya. In fact, we would be powerless to control your movement, if you were to come out of the jungle and put yourselves on the same level and same status as we are. Therefore, if you do not come out to surrender, we would rather not accept you in our society. If you want to have peace in this country, one side must give in - either we give in to you, or you give in to us. The two ideologies, yours and ours, can never work side by side.

Look at the example of the political developments in China where Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist government had been driven from the mainland. If I accept you on equal terms, I believe we will also be driven out of Malaya before long.

Source F: *From Chin Peng's Farewell Letter to his Comrades and Compatriots, written before his death and published in his memorial booklet, 21 September 2013.*

Ever since I joined the Communist Party of Malaya and eventually became its secretary-general, I have given myself in the service of the cause that my party represented - to fight for a fairer and better society based on socialist ideals.

My comrades and I had dedicated our lives to a political cause that we believed in and had to pay whatever price there was. It is irrelevant whether I succeeded or failed, at least I did what I did. Hopefully the path I had walked on would be followed and improved upon by the young after me. It is my conviction that the flames of social justice and humanity will never die.

I wish to be remembered simply as a good man who could tell the world that he had dared to spend his entire life in pursuit of his own ideals to create a better world for his people.

Section B: Essays

Answer **two** questions.

- 2 "China's desire to strengthen its position in the Cold War was the main reason for its involvement in the Korean War." How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]

- 3 "French military decisions were the main reason for France's defeat in the First Indochina War." How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]

- 4 "The weakening of the Soviet Union was the main reason for the fall of communism in Eastern Europe." How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]

End of Paper

Source Acknowledgements:

Source A Taken from: <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/page/straitstimes19551229-1.1.2>

Source B Taken from: Yanqing He, Kee Cheok Cheong & Ran Li (2019). Revisiting the Malayan Emergency: the China factor in the Baling peace talks in Cold War History. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2018.1555242>

Source C Taken from: Karl Hack (November 2011). Negotiating with the Malayan Communist Party, 1948-89 in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol 39, No. 4. p. 625-626 <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.615603>

Source D Taken from: Chin Peng (2003). My Side of the Story. Media Masters Pte Ltd. Pg.380-381

Source E Taken from: Chin Peng (2003). My Side of the Story. Media Masters Pte Ltd. Pg.385 -386S

Source F Taken from: Chin Peng's Farewell: A Letter to Comrades and Compatriots, September 21, 2013. <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com>



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Paper 2 Developments in the post-World War II world: The
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1940s – 1991

**20 August 2026
1 hour 50 minutes**

MARKING SCHEME

Section A: Source-Based Case Study

1(a) Study Source A. [5]

Why do you think this article was published on 29 December 1955? Explain your answer.

Levels	Descriptors	Mark Range
L1	Describes source	1
L2	Makes valid inference / purpose, unsupported	2
L3	Makes valid inference, supported & contextualised <i>Award 3m for inferring main message, supported</i> <i>Award 4m for contextualisation of source</i>	3 – 4
L4	Makes valid inference, supported, inferred purpose, explained and contextualised <i>Award 4m for inferring main message, supported and purpose explained</i> <i>Award 5m for contextualisation of source</i> E.g. This article was published on 29 December 1955 to warn the Tunku Abdul Rahman and Marshall of the danger posed by Chin Peng and the communists in Malaya so that they would be more firm in dealing with Chin Peng and his men and not approve of recognising MCP as a political party in Malaya. Source A has the headlines “Hold that tiger – a cry from London. Tengku and Marshall warned: If you appease him, you may be his next victim.” The headline was a direct warning and call to the Tengku and Marshall to not give in to the demands of the communists. The consequences of giving in would be dire for Malaya. This is further supported by “But to be well-meaning is not enough when it comes to dealing with the Reds. Their promises are worthless. If the Ministers try to appease the tiger (referring to Chin Peng), they may well be among the future victims.” The article seems to suggest that the communists should not be trusted and giving in to their demands of recognition would only endanger Malaya and Singapore in the future as they would continue to plot to take over Malaya and Singapore and turn them into communists’ countries. This article was published immediately after the second and last day of the Baling Talks where the talks had already fallen apart. The communists, led by Chin Peng, returned to the jungle with the promise to continue their struggle against the newly established government which had caused	4 – 5

	thousands of death. Thus, this source was published to warn Tunku and Marshall to remain firm in their dealings with Chin Peng and his party who had vowed to continue their acts of terror on Malaya. Other potential audience: the British in Britain	
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1(b) Study Sources B and C.**[5]**

How similar are these two sources about the Malayan Communist Party? Explain your answer.

Levels	Descriptors	Mark Range
L1	Similarity / difference based on provenance	1
L2	Comparison in content, unsupported	2
L3	Similarity and / or difference in content, supported <i>Award 3m for one-sided answers.</i> <i>Award 4m for answers that consider both similarity and differences.</i> E.g. Sources B and C are similar in showing that the MCP sought help from external communist forces. Source B states “China’s hesitance to assist the MCP was that after the Korean War ended, the UK assumed greater importance in China’s foreign strategy.” This suggests that MCP had reached out to the Chinese in their fight to gain control of Malaya especially since many of the communists elements were from China and they believed that China would support them in their fight for a communist Malaya. Similarly Source C states “From the viewpoint of the Alliance Party and Britain, any reintegration sufficient to secure peace – let alone power sharing – was tantamount to state suicide. Of extreme importance are the contextual factors in various levels of engagement with the MNLA, including state of battle, nuances of ideological thought and encouragement from outside ideological allies” This seems to suggest that the MCP had support from external forces who wanted to help MCP take over Malaya. These would include forces from China. Thus, both sources are similar in showing that MCP had reached out to external communist forces to support their fight against the Malayan government and their colonial masters. E.g. The sources differ in their portrayal of the MCP’s main motivation. Source B states “China viewed Malaya’s struggle for independence more holistically than merely focusing on MCP	3 – 4

	campaign.” This suggests that MCP’s main motivation had been to overthrow the British regime and the Malayan government so as to establish a communist Malaya. However, Source C states “The Baling Negotiations were a case of one-side – the MCP – genuinely desiring peace and willing to make substantive concessions to achieve it, provided they could emerge with dignity and a right to participate in politics. “ This suggests that the MCP was seeking peace and a peaceful co-existence with the newly elected government with the hope of being allowed to participate in the politics of Malaya, with no intention to make Malaya a communist country. Thus both sources are different in showing the intent of the MCP.	
L4	L3 + Perspective/tone analysis <i>Award 4m for similarity or difference in perspective, explained</i> <i>Award 5m for similarity and difference in content, supported and explained + analysis of perspective</i> E.g. Both sources differ in their perspective of MCP as they were written in different context. Source B was written by Cold War experts who focused their study on Cold War issues and saw the context of the Emergency from the perspective of the Cold War tensions happening in the world, particularly in Malaya at this time. Their study focused on MCP’s overall intention during the Emergency which was to establish a communist Malaya and as such had sought help from China. However, Source C was written by a historian focusing only MCP intent at the Baling Talks alone. By this time, MCP had already suffered massive defeat from the British measures and was more focused on their survival in Malaya as a political party and had thus sought for peace, rather than to fight for a communist Malaya.	4 - 5

1(c) Study Sources D and E.

**How far does Source E prove Source D to be wrong about [6]
the Malayan Communist Party? Explain your answer**

Levels	Descriptors	Mark Range
L1	Answers based on provenance	1
L2	Prove AND / OR not prove based on content, unsupported	2
L3	Prove AND / OR not prove based on content, supported	3
L4	Prove AND / OR not prove based on content, supported and cross-referred	4-5

[Turn Over

	<i>Award 4m marks for one-sided, cross-referred and 5m for both sides, cross-referred.</i> E.g. Source E prove Source D wrong about the power of the MCP. Source D states “Now, speaking for myself, I have no doubt whatsoever, that if they were allowed to take part in free elections, the people would choose our system.” This suggests that Tunku was convinced that the MCP had little support from the locals and would not pose a challenge to the government, showing that the MCP was weak, with limited support base. This is contradicted by Source E which states “The Communist Party of Malaya is a very powerful organisation receiving support from within and aid outside Malaya.” This shows that MCP, at the point of the Baling Talks was a very strong political party who would be able to pose a major threat to the newly established Malayan government. Source E is supported by Source A which states “If the Ministers try to appease the tiger (referring to Chin Peng), they may well be among the future victims.” While the journalist recognised that the MCP was in a weakened state, he was cautious of the strength of their leader Chin Peng who would continue to be a major threat to Malaya if left unchecked, showing that MCP would still pose a major threat. Since Source A supports Source E, Source E is reliable and therefore can prove Source D wrong. E.g. Source E cannot prove Source D wrong regarding the MCP’s intention at the Baling Talks. Source D states “We will never allow ourselves to be forced by others to give up our ideology, but wish to put our ideology to the people to decide, if that is possible.” This shows that the intent of the MCP was to be recognised as a political party and to be able to participate in the political process with the knowledge that they would not even win the mandate of the locals. This is contradicted by Source E which states “Look at the example of the political developments in China where Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist government had been driven from the mainland. If I accept you on equal terms, I believe we will also be driven out of Malaya before long” This suggests that the intent at the meeting was to gain recognition as a legitimate party so as to gain access to overthrow the government in Malaya and establish a communist state. However, Source E is unreliable as it is contradicted by Source C which states “The Baling Negotiations were a case of one-side – the MCP – genuinely desiring peace and willing to make substantive concessions to achieve it, provided they could emerge with dignity and a right to participate in politics.” This suggests that the MCP had no hidden agenda, other than to achieve peace for Malaya and a right to participate in politics. They were too weak at this point to want to have lofty ideals to create a communist Malaya. Since Source C contradicts Source E, Source E is unreliable and therefore cannot prove Source D wrong.	
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L5	L4 + answers based evaluation of Provenance <i>Award 5m for answers based on content with explanation and evaluation of provenance</i> <i>Award 6m for answers based on content with cross reference and evaluation of provenance</i> E.g. Source E cannot prove Source D wrong due to the purpose of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Source E was a response by Tunku to Chin Peng's request to be recognised as a legal political party. The purpose of Source E is to justify Tunku Abdul Rahman's rejection of political compromise with the MCP by portraying communism as a threat to the Alliance government and Malaya and arguing that the MCP must surrender for peace to be achieved. As such he would need to emphasise on the danger both he and the country felt in order to justify his unwillingness to compromise. This meant that he would exaggerate the danger he felt to protect his position and thus makes him unreliable and cannot prove Source D to be wrong about MCP not posing a threat to Malaya.	5 – 6
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1(d) Study Source F.

Source F was written in 2013 by Chin Peng before his death. Does it make the source useless as evidence about the Baling Talks? Explain your answer.

[6]

Levels	Descriptors	Mark Range
L1	Answers based on provenance	1
L2	Useful AND / OR Useless based on content, unsupported	2
L3	Useful AND / OR Useless based on content, supported	3
L4	Useful AND / OR Useless on content, supported and cross-referred <i>Award 4m for one sided, cross-referred and 5m for 2 sides, cross-referred.</i> E.g. Source F is still useful as evidence about the Baling Talks as it shows the ideological commitment Chin Peng had towards communism. Source F states "Ever since I joined the Communist Party of Malaya and eventually became its secretary-general, I have given myself in the service of the cause that my party represented - to fight for a fairer and better society based on socialist ideals." This shows his strong belief and commitment to advancing the cause of communism to ensure a more equal	4-5

[Turn Over

	society for Malaya. This would reflect his firm stand on the position of his party during the Baling Talks as he believed that his party would be able to contribute to Malaya. This is supported by cross-referencing to Source C which states “The Baling Negotiations were a case of one-side – the MCP – genuinely desiring peace and willing to make substantive concessions to achieve it, provided they could emerge with dignity and a right to participate in politics.” This shows that Chin Peng was willing to lay down arms in 1955 as long as they could participate in the constitutional process of election with the aim of adding a voice for the people. Since Source C supports Source F, Source F is reliable and therefore useful in reflecting the commitment of Chin Peng in his fight for the communist cause. E.g. Source F is useless as evidence about the Baling Talks as it failed to show the outcomes of the talks. This is seen in Source E which showed that talks between the MCP and Malayan government broke down. Source E states “Therefore, if you do not come out to surrender, we would rather not accept you in our society. If you want to have peace in this country, one side must give in -either we give in to you, or you give in to us. The two ideologies, yours and ours, can never work side by side.” This suggests that Tunku was unrelenting and refused to recognise the MCP as a legal party as he believed that the MCP would continue to pursue their cause and this would be a threat to Malaya. This is supported by my contextual knowledge which shows that Tunku was concerned about ensuring that Malaya got its independence and to do so, he must ensure that he held on to a firm stand against the communists. This would convince Britain that his government was ready to take on the challenge of the communists and would not tolerate them. This would then enable Malaya a smooth passage in its discussion for independence when they go to Britain for talks to finalise the plan. Since this is not found in Source F, Source F is useless.	
L5	L4 + answers based evaluation of Provenance <i>Award 5m for answers based only on evaluation of provenance</i> <i>Award 6m for cross-reference and evaluation of provenance</i> E.g. Source F is useless due to the context in which it was published. Chin Peng wrote the letter to justify his lifelong commitment to the Communist struggle and shape his legacy as a person motivated by social justice and the desire to create a better society so that his comrades and he will be remembered as heroes fighting for a just cause, rather than terrorists as portrayed by the Malayan and British government. This would not be useful for us to us as it would give us a skewed understanding of his behaviour at the Baling Talks.	5 – 6

1(e) Study all the sources.

‘The failure of the Baling Talks was mainly due to Cold War tensions in the 1950s.’ How far do the sources support this view? Use the sources and your knowledge to explain your answer.

[8]

Levels	Descriptors	Mark Range				
L1	Writes about hypothesis, no valid source use	1				
L2	Yes OR No, supported by valid source use <i>Award 2m for one Yes or No supported by valid source use, and an additional mark for each subsequent valid source use up to a maximum of 4m.</i>	2 – 4				
L3	Yes AND No, supported by valid source use Award 5m for one Yes and No supported by valid source use, and an additional mark for each subsequent valid source use up to a maximum of 7m. For L2 and L3, award a bonus of up to two marks (ie +1/+1) for use of contextual knowledge to question a source in relation to its reliability, sufficiency etc. The total mark must not exceed 8. <table><tr><th>Support</th><th>Does Not Support</th></tr><tr><td>A, C, E</td><td>B, D, F</td></tr></table> <u>SUPPORTS</u> E.g. Source A supports the view as the journalist believed that underlying the communist ideology is the attempt to take over the governance of the country. Source A states “The measure of his failure is considerable. Chin Peng is forced to bargain. His price for peace in the jungle will most probably be the recognition of the Malayan Communist Party. That price is too high.” This suggests that there is danger in acceding to the request to recognise MCP as a legal political party as it would attempt to take over the government in Malaya when they are ready. This fear of the ideology of the communists was propagated by the British as they saw the communists from the perspective of the Cold War tensions where the communists were trying to spread communism into Asia. This is further supported by “They should take heart of the knowledge that communism is not getting unchecked among the people of Asia”. demonstrating that the	Support	Does Not Support	A, C, E	B, D, F	5 – 8
Support	Does Not Support					
A, C, E	B, D, F					

[Turn Over

British saw this as part of the Cold War tensions of the communists trying to increase their sphere of influence. Thus, the British set the criteria for the newly elected government to be able to get rid of the communists in Malaya before granting independence. As such, it was the fear of the spread of communist beliefs by the British that led to them imposing this criteria on the government which would lead to the breakdown in talks between Chin Peng and Tunku.

E.g. Source C supports the view as it shows that the Alliance Party believed that the MCP was largely influenced by external forces. Source C states "Of extreme importance are the contextual factors in various levels of engagement with the MNLA, including state of battle, nuances of ideological thought and encouragement from outside ideological allies." This suggests that the Alliance Party's refusal to give in to the offer made by Chin Peng stems from their fear that the external influences would put the country in danger of falling into the hands of the communists as part of their overall plan of spreading their influence and thus gaining a foothold in Asia. This led to the breakdown in the talks.

E.g. Source E supports the view as it shows external support was given to MCP. Tunku, in Source E states, "The Communist Party of Malaya is a very powerful organisation receiving support from within and aid outside Malaya." This suggests that the communists had the support of the communist bloc and as such, Tunku recognised that they would be a major threat should they not be controlled on the outset. Thus, Tunku was unwilling to give legal status to the MCP and insisted that they surrendered and be investigated. However, Chin Peng refused to accept the conditions set by the government and this led to the breakdown in the Talks. This is reliable as it is supported by my contextual knowledge which shows that Tunku insisted that the government would retain the Emergency powers to arrest and detain MCP members if they did not give up their communist activities. This led to the failure of the talks as Tunku believed that MCP was part of the wider communist bloc that was trying to spread sphere of influence as they had done in Vietnam. Since my contextual knowledge supports Source E, Source E is reliable and therefore a valid source to support the view.

DOES NOT SUPPORT

E.g. Source B does not support the view as it shows that China was not interested in helping MCP and saw the fight in Malaya as the works of MCP alone. This is supported by "Bearing in mind their own interest, China viewed Malaya's struggle for independence more holistically than merely focusing on MCP campaign." This shows China was not interested in getting

	herself involved. This is further supported by “China’s hesitance to assist the MCP was that after the Korean War ended, the UK assumed greater importance in China’s foreign strategy as the British was seen as a bridge to improve China’s relations with the West.” This further suggests that the MCP was fighting on their own with no foreign support to try to overthrow the British and establish a communist government in Malaya. The talks broke down simply because both parties refused to give in to the other. This is reliable as based on cross-reference to contextual knowledge, Chin Peng and his party were fighting on their own and were cornered by the various measures introduced by Briggs and Templar to restrict their movement and limit their access to resources by moving the villages to New villages and declaring areas white to attract more to support the government. The fact that Chin Peng’s party was weakening showed that he had no external support to help him. As such, Source B is reliable and therefore valid to not support the view. E.g. Source D does not support the view as it shows that the intent of Chin Peng in his fight was his personal conviction towards communism. Source D states, “We will never allow ourselves to be forced by others to give up our ideology but wish to put our ideology to the people to decide, if that is possible.” This shows that he genuinely believed that communism should be a choice given to the people in Malaya. Furthermore, the source confirms that the British were also not involved in the decision making, suggesting that this conflict was an internal conflict between the communists and non-communists. This is supported by “I asked whether the matters we were discussing would ultimately have to be vetted by the British government. The Tunku replied, “As far as we are concerned, we make our own decisions.”” Thus, with no external powers involved in the decision making in this conflict, it was not a conflict related to the Cold War tensions, rather it was between two opposing ideologies in a country and the unwillingness to give in to each other led to the breakdown in the talks. E.g. Source F does not support the view because it shows Chin Peng’s commitment to wanting what was best for his fellow citizens. Source F states “Ever since I joined the Communist Party of Malaya and eventually became its secretary-general, I have given myself in the service of the cause that my party represented - to fight for a fairer and better society based on socialist ideals.” This suggests that his fight was based on his personal conviction of what he believed the people in Malaya deserved and he was willing to sacrifice himself for that cause. As a result of this, he would not have agreed to the terms set out by the Malayan government to disband the party and put members under investigation. This would lead to the failure of the Baling Talks.	
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Section B: Essays

2

“China’s desire to strengthen its position in the Cold War was the main reason for its involvement in the Korean War.” How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]

Level	Level Descriptors	Marks								
L1	Identifies / Describes given or other reasons <i>Award 1m for identifying one reason, and 2m for identifying 2 or more reasons.</i> <i>Award 2m for describing one reason, and 3m for describing 2 or more reasons.</i>	1 – 3								
L2	Explains given reason or other reasons <i>Award 4m for an explanation of given reason OR other reason, and an additional mark for additional reasons / supporting detail, to a maximum of 5m.</i>	4 – 5								
L3	Explains given reason AND other reasons <i>Award 6m for an explanation of given AND other reasons, and additional mark(s) for further supporting detail or reason, to a maximum of 8m (which include given reason).</i> <table><tr><th>Level / Marks</th><th>Requirement</th></tr><tr><td>L3/6</td><td>2 weak explanations</td></tr><tr><td>L3/7</td><td>1strong explanation + 1 weak explanation</td></tr><tr><td>L3/8</td><td>2 strong explanations OR 1 strong explanation + 2 weak explanations OR 4 weak explanations</td></tr></table> <i>*To qualify for +2 for evaluation, answers must achieve at least L3/7 (i.e. have least 1 strong paragraph).</i> <u>Given Factor: China’s desire to strengthen its position in the Cold War</u> E.g. China’s desire to strengthen its position in the Cold War was an important reason for its involvement in the Korean War because as a newly formed communist state, she needed to ensure that she was part of a stronger communist bloc. As such, Mao aligned himself with Stalin in the hope to strengthen communist position in Asia. As a clear sign of alliance, China signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with USSR. As part of this agreement, China entered Korea and intervened in October 1950 by sending the People’s Volunteer Army to support communist North Korea after UN forces had pushed deep into North Korea. This prevented the United States and its allies from achieving a complete victory and	Level / Marks	Requirement	L3/6	2 weak explanations	L3/7	1strong explanation + 1 weak explanation	L3/8	2 strong explanations OR 1 strong explanation + 2 weak explanations OR 4 weak explanations	6 – 8
Level / Marks	Requirement									
L3/6	2 weak explanations									
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L3/8	2 strong explanations OR 1 strong explanation + 2 weak explanations OR 4 weak explanations									

	demonstrated that the newly established communist government in China was willing to challenge the USA. Secondly, China's intervention helped to preserve North Korea as a communist state as a defeated North Korea would enable the USA to gain greater influence in East Asia, weakening the position of communist China. Therefore, China's involvement helped to protect and strengthen the communist side in the Cold War. <u>Alternative Factor: China's own security concern</u> E.g. However, China's security concern was another reason for its involvement. Firstly, when UN forces crossed the 38th parallel and advanced towards the Yalu River, China feared that American forces would reach its border. China had only become communist in 1949, so the presence of hostile US forces near its territory posed a serious threat to its new government. This was especially so since the USA had been involved in the Chinese civil war on the side of the Kuomintang and had not recognized the communist government in China. Secondly, China intervened after UN forces captured Pyongyang and continued advancing northwards towards the Chinese border. China feared that with the USA so near its border, it would provide them with the opportunity to attack China. By entering the war, China could push US-led UN forces away from its border and maintain North Korea as a buffer between China and the US-led forces. This shows that China's intervention was motivated strongly by the need to protect its national security, especially since she was a newly formed state who had been under threat from the USA. <i>Award an additional 2m (to a maximum of 10m for a balanced conclusion based on explicit consideration of the relative importance of different reasons.</i> <i>The total marks to be awarded for the response will be based on marks obtained at L3 + 2 bonus marks: i.e. L3/6 + 2; L3/7 + 2; L3/8 + 2)</i> E.g. Overall, I disagree with the statement. China's security concerns were the main reason, as the advance of US-led forces towards its border posed an immediate threat to the newly established communist government. China therefore intervened primarily to protect its security and maintain North Korea as a buffer, while strengthening its Cold War position was an important secondary benefit.	
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2 “French military decisions were the main reason for France’s defeat in the First Indochina War.” How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]										
Level	Level Descriptors	Marks								
L1	Identifies / Describes given or other reasons <i>Award 1m for identifying one reason, and 2m for identifying 2 or more reasons.</i> <i>Award 2m for describing one reason, and 3m for describing 2 or more reasons.</i>	1 – 3								
L2	Explains given reason or other reasons <i>Award 4m for an explanation of given reason OR other reason, and an additional mark for additional reasons / supporting detail, to a maximum of 5m.</i>	4 – 5								
L3	Explains given reason AND other reasons <i>Award 6m for an explanation of given AND other reasons, and additional mark(s) for further supporting detail or reason, to a maximum of 8m (which include given reason).</i> <table><tr><td>Level / Marks</td><td>Requirement</td></tr><tr><td>L3/6</td><td>2 weak explanations</td></tr><tr><td>L3/7</td><td>1strong explanation + 1 weak explanation</td></tr><tr><td>L3/8</td><td>2 strong explanations OR 1 strong explanation + 2 weak explanations OR 4 weak explanations</td></tr></table> <i>*To qualify for +2 for evaluation, answers must achieve at least L3/7 (i.e. have least 1 strong paragraph).</i> <u>Given Factor: French Military Decisions</u> E.g. French military decisions led to their defeat in the First Indochina War because the French adopted a strategy of direct confrontation, believing that their superior weapons and equipment would allow them to defeat the Viet Minh in open battle. They therefore expanded their military presence into North Vietnam, where the Viet Minh was based. In November 1946, French forces shelled Haiphong, and full-scale fighting broke out in December, beginning the First Indochina War. However, this strategy was ineffective because the Viet Minh deliberately avoided fighting the French on their terms. Instead, the Viet Minh retreated into mountainous and rural areas and used guerrilla warfare. By 1948, although the French had captured Hanoi and other major cities, they were unable to control the countryside. The Viet Minh continued to control much of the hilly and forested areas of North and central Vietnam. Therefore, the French decision to rely on their superior equipment in conventional warfare failed to defeat an enemy that refused to fight conventional battles. This gradually turned the	Level / Marks	Requirement	L3/6	2 weak explanations	L3/7	1strong explanation + 1 weak explanation	L3/8	2 strong explanations OR 1 strong explanation + 2 weak explanations OR 4 weak explanations	6 – 8
Level / Marks	Requirement									
L3/6	2 weak explanations									
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L3/8	2 strong explanations OR 1 strong explanation + 2 weak explanations OR 4 weak explanations									

French military advantage into a weakness because they could capture cities but could not eliminate Viet Minh resistance. The French also made a critical strategic decision at Dien Bien Phu, which resulted in their decisive military defeat. In November 1953, the French flew six battalions of paratroopers into Dien Bien Phu and established an airstrip. The French intended to use the base as bait to lure the Viet Minh into an open battle, where they believed their superior forces would prevail. However, the Viet Minh surrounded the base and moved artillery onto the hills overlooking the French position. The French guns and airstrip were vulnerable to Viet Minh artillery, while many supplies dropped by French and US aircraft were captured. Furthermore, General Navarre had sent French troops to operations elsewhere, leaving the defenders without sufficient reinforcements. The Viet Minh eventually encircled the French position, and on 7 May 1954, about 14,000 French troops surrendered. This was particularly significant because Dien Bien Phu was not simply another setback; it was a decisive victory that prompted peace negotiations at Geneva. Thus, the French decision to establish and defend an isolated base in Dien Bien Phu, combined with poor deployment of reinforcements, directly led to the defeat that ended French colonial rule in Vietnam.

Alternative Factor: Strength of Viet Minh

E.g. An important alternative factor was the effective military strategy of the Viet Minh. Under General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Viet Minh adopted a flexible three-stage strategy. Initially, it avoided open battles against the stronger French forces and instead used guerrilla warfare in the mountains and countryside. Once the Viet Minh became stronger, it launched limited frontal attacks, before eventually moving towards larger offensives. This strategy gradually weakened the French while allowing the Viet Minh to preserve its forces. The Viet Minh's ability to adapt was demonstrated by its victory at Cao Bang in October 1950 and its subsequent ability to fight increasingly large-scale battles. Between 1950 and 1954, the French fought eight open battles, including the fighting at Hoa Binh, from which French forces eventually withdrew. Therefore, the Viet Minh's military effectiveness was important because it prevented France from turning its superior equipment and larger forces into a decisive victory. Furthermore, the Viet Minh was able to mobilise Vietnamese support and obtain external assistance. The Viet Minh recruited peasants into local militias and relied on them for food and information. The scale of this support was particularly evident in the use of civilian porters: more than 1.7 million peasants helped transport arms and supplies to communist forces between 1950 and 1954. In addition, China provided training, military advisers and large quantities of equipment; by 1954, China was providing more than 10,000 tonnes of

	equipment per month, while the USSR supplied artillery. This support strengthened the Viet Minh's ability to sustain a prolonged war and contributed directly to its ability to defeat the French at Dien Bien Phu. <i>Award an additional 2m (to a maximum of 10m for a balanced conclusion based on explicit consideration of the relative importance of different reasons.</i> <i>The total marks to be awarded for the response will be based on marks obtained at L3 + 2 bonus marks: i.e. L3/6 + 2; L3/7 + 2; L3/8 + 2)</i> E.g. Overall, I agree that the French military decisions were the more critical factor in France's defeat. The Viet Minh's military effectiveness and support were essential in weakening the French, but the French repeatedly made decisions that allowed these strengths to be exploited. Their reliance on direct confrontation failed against guerrilla warfare, while their decision to establish the isolated base at Dien Bien Phu created the conditions for a decisive Viet Minh victory. Most importantly, the defeat at Dien Bien Phu led directly to the Geneva peace talks, and the Geneva Accords of July 1954 ended the First Indochina War and French colonial rule in Vietnam. Therefore, although Viet Minh strength was a significant underlying factor, French military decisions played the more critical role because they directly contributed to the decisive military defeat that forced France to withdraw from Vietnam.	
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4 "The weakening of the Soviet Union was the main reason for the fall of communism in Eastern Europe." How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. [10]		
Level	Level Descriptors	Marks
L1	Identifies / Describes given or other reasons <i>Award 1m for identifying one reason, and 2m for identifying 2 or more reasons.</i> <i>Award 2m for describing one reason, and 3m for describing 2 or more reasons.</i>	1 – 3
L2	Explains given reason or other reasons <i>Award 4m for an explanation of given reason OR other reason, and an additional mark for additional reasons / supporting detail, to a maximum of 5m.</i>	4 – 5
L3	Explains given reason AND other reasons	6 – 8

Award 6m for an explanation of given AND other reasons, and additional mark(s) for further supporting detail or reason, to a maximum of 8m (which include given reason).

Level / Marks	Requirement
L3/6	2 weak explanations
L3/7	1 strong explanation + 1 weak explanation
L3/8	2 strong explanations OR 1 strong explanation + 2 weak explanations OR 4 weak explanations

**To qualify for +2 for evaluation, answers must achieve at least L3/7 (i.e. have least 1 strong paragraph).*

Given Factor: Weakening of the Soviet Union

E.g. The weakening of the Soviet Union was a key reason for the fall of communism in Eastern Europe because it made the communist government vulnerable to any form of opposition. The Soviet Union had maintained control over Eastern Europe largely through the threat of military intervention. The Brezhnev Doctrine stated that the USSR would intervene if communist rule was threatened, and previous interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 demonstrated this willingness to use force. However, with the weakening of the Soviet command economy from the late 1960s and 1970s and their inability to adopt new technology and struggled to respond to increasing economic demands, it reduced the USSR's ability to maintain its military and political influence over Eastern Europe. This was important because the communist governments depended heavily on Soviet support to remain in power. Furthermore, in order to revive Soviet economy, Gorbachev announced that the USSR would adopt a policy of non-intervention, known as the Sinatra Doctrine in 1989. By March 1989, he had made clear that Soviet forces would leave Eastern Europe and would no longer prop up its communist governments. This was crucial because earlier opposition movements had shown that communist governments depended on Soviet force to suppress resistance. Once the USSR withdrew this protection, people in Eastern Europe were able to challenge their governments without the same fear of Soviet military intervention. This directly contributed to the rapid collapse of communist governments in 1989. Therefore, the weakening of the Soviet Union removed the external support that had kept Eastern European communist governments in power, leading to Eastern European states rising to challenge and take over from the communist government.

Alternative Factor: Opposition to communism in Eastern Europe

	E.g. However, opposition within Eastern Europe was also significant. Earlier protests demonstrated that communist governments were unpopular. There had been repeated opposition movements, including the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1970s. Although these movements were suppressed, they demonstrated that communist governments could be challenged by organised opposition and popular resistance. These movements revealed an important weakness of communist rule: the regimes relied heavily on force, or the threat of force backed by the USSR. The protests also increased resentment among civilians and showed that people were willing to resist communist governments. Thus, when Soviet support was withdrawn, opposition could quickly translate into political action. Once Gorbachev changed Soviet policy, opposition movements were no longer facing the same likelihood of Soviet military intervention. This meant that existing opposition could finally succeed. For example, in June 1989, Solidarity in Poland won 99 out of 100 seats in Poland's senate and protests against communists' rule continued and in October 1989, Hungary declared itself democratic, getting rid of the communist government. This shows that the Soviet removed the barrier preventing opposition from overthrowing communist governments. Hence this demonstrated that the opposition in Eastern Europe took upon themselves to bring down the communist government once the situation permitted. <i>Award an additional 2m (to a maximum of 10m for a balanced conclusion based on explicit consideration of the relative importance of different reasons.</i> <i>The total marks to be awarded for the response will be based on marks obtained at L3 + 2 bonus marks: i.e. L3/6 + 2; L3/7 + 2; L3/8 + 2)</i> E.g. Overall, I agree with the statement that the weakening of the Soviet Union was the main reason for the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Economic problems weakened the USSR's ability to sustain its influence, while Gorbachev's reforms weakened communist control and led him to abandon military intervention. Most importantly, his decision not to prop up the Eastern European regimes removed the force that had previously prevented opposition from succeeding. The rapid collapse of communism across Eastern Europe in 1989, including the fall of the Berlin Wall in November, demonstrates the importance of this change.	
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